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1 Theoretical background
1.1 Introduction and background
In many European countries, the relationship between migration and
labour markets has become a hotly contested topic in both public and
academic discourse. This is especially true when it comes to the inter-
play of migration and the irregular employment of foreigners. The pre-
cise content of the arguments may vary from one European country to
the other, depending on national economic structures and migration
patterns, but the debate generally revolves around two main questions.
The first is the elusive nature of this hidden phenomenon that hinders
our understanding of the true nature of the issue and opens the door
to speculative and populist arguments. The second is the more practi-
cal issue of what should and could be done in terms of migration and
labour market policies.
The problem with this two-pronged debate is that policymakers gen-
erally try to answer the second question without a minimally satisfying
answer to the first. Both at the national levels and at the level of the
European Union, sweeping policy proposals are put forward and
swiftly translated into directives, ordinances and legislative instru-
ments, with the intention to curb irregular (more often called ‘illegal’
or ‘undeclared’) employment through repressive means (usually a com-
bination of higher sanctions and more controls). To give a striking ex-
ample of such a wide-ranging policy plan that is based on rather scant
evidence, a recent policy proposal of the European Commission (Com-
mission of the European Communities 2007a) proposes sharply in-
creased sanctions (including criminal sanctions for certain types of in-
fringements) against employers of illegally residing third-country na-
tionals, which would require EU Member States to ensure that at least
10 per cent of companies per year are subject to inspections to control
employment of illegally residing third-country nationals. While this
policy proposal, if adopted, would require Member States to multiply
their current control capacities and worksite inspections several times
over and would likely cost billions of euros, the European Commission
supplies no convincing evidence that sanctions and worksite inspec-
tions can indeed deliver the desired results.1
The question as to whether it is sensible to address the complex rela-
tionship between irregular migration and irregular work solely through
a package of increased sanctions and controls, and whether it is sensi-
ble to target exclusively third-country nationals in this context, will be
taken up again in the conclusions to this study. For the moment we
would simply like to note that the issue of irregular migrant work has
become a familiar topic across Europe, which places this case study
firmly at the centre of a European debate. Moreover, the mentioned
policy proposal of the European Commission demonstrates two more
points of interest – that all governments are facing the problem of re-
conciling their lack of knowledge on this hidden phenomenon with the
need for rational, evidence-based policymaking, and that (partly for the
same reason) some European states may be affected by regulations and
policies that may not fit their particular circumstances. Both issues can
and should be addressed with more in-depth research that is capable of
indicating the differences in national circumstances as well as the com-
mon patterns that may be susceptible to common policy standards. As
such, our own research is firmly linked to the contemporary theoretical
and political debate in Europe, and will be interesting for both the Aus-
trian as well as a wider European readership.
In fact, the state of knowledge about irregular migration and irregu-
lar foreign employment in Austria has been fairly underdeveloped up
to the present. Surveying the literature, one finds very little systematic
research on the topic, in contrast to the considerable level of interest
these issues have attracted in the media, political discourse and public
discussion. Perhaps this should not be surprising, as the phenomenon
cannot, by its very nature, be precisely measured, and as primary
sources are very hard to come by. In fact, aside from a limited number
of scientific publications on irregular migration in Austria, most public
knowledge on the subject up to now derives either from anecdotal stor-
ies or from evidence collected by law enforcement bodies.
From the perspective of social science, this lack of empirical and the-
oretical research is clearly unsatisfactory, as migration related to irregu-
lar foreign work constitutes an important aspect of social reality in the
midst of our society with potentially wide-ranging social, economic and
political consequences. Moreover, the growing complexity and dy-
namics of irregular labour markets call for substantial efforts towards
an understanding of newly evolving irregular labour migration systems
through rigorous scientific analysis.
Adding to the complex processes of migration and irregular work in
Austria, as in other European countries, the 2004 expansion of the
EU-15 to the EU-25 had profound effects on migration patterns to and
within the 25 countries of the enlarged EU. Aside from the much-dis-
cussed legal access to the labour markets of the EU-15 countries for citi-
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zens of the new Member States, which at least in Austria and Germany
will continue to be determined by national migration policies over the
next couple of years,2 patterns of irregular foreign employment in Aus-
tria have seen significant changes in their structure and dynamics.
With the latest (2007)3 and future4 round of EU enlargement, new fra-
mework conditions will shape the dynamics of irregular foreign em-
ployment in many European States. To understand these processes, it
is important to look at the underlying factors driving and sustaining ir-
regular foreign work. Only by discerning fundamental patterns and
structural reasons for irregular migrant work that lead to a holistic un-
derstanding of the phenomenon, can sensible policy interventions
(either through migration policy or labour market policy both at the na-
tional and the European level) be designed, which are able to achieve
their desired outcomes, while minimising their unintended conse-
quences.
1.2 Research topic and definitions
The main focus of our study is the structure, dynamics and interplay
of migration and irregular work in Austria. We understand ‘migration’
as the international movement and (at least temporary) settlement of a
person (who is then called a ‘migrant’): that is, the relocation of one’s
domicile, to Austria. We are furthermore interested in the migration of
foreigners (non-nationals) only, thus excluding the migration of (re-
turning) Austrians, but including both the migration of EU nationals
and third-country nationals to Austria. We will refer to this group as
‘migrants in Austria’.
We are, furthermore, not interested in all aspects of migration and
all activities of migrants, but mainly in those aspects that relate to irre-
gular work. ‘Work’ is conventionally defined as gainful economic activ-
ity (employment or self-employment), while the term ‘irregular’ needs
further explanation. When talking about irregular economic activities
of migrants, this is often referred to as ‘illegal work’, referring to illegal
status of residence and/or illegal employment. In the course of this re-
search project, it soon became clear, however, that this clear distinction
between illegal and legal does not adequately account for the complex-
ity of the phenomenon. Irregular work is increasingly taking place at
the margins of legal regulations, often circumventing them, and it is
thus not easily distinguishable from regular forms of economic activ-
ities. Additionally, irregular work is facilitated by new flexible working
arrangements characterised by a blurry legal framework that can easily
be misused. Consequently, irregularities are increasingly incorporated
in precarious ‘quasi-legal’ forms of employment, regarding legality of
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residence and employment. Thus, to mark the boundaries of illegal mi-
grant work is difficult. Consequently, the term ‘irregular work’ as it is
used here comprises more than mere ‘illegal work’ (meaning persons
who are either working without residence and/or work permits). For
the purposes of this study, then, irregular migrant work is defined as
follows:
Irregular migrant work comprises all paid work of foreigners
(non-citizens), that conflicts with one or more of the following
laws and regulations: foreign employment law (including resi-
dence law) social insurance laws, tax laws, labour legislation and
trading regulations.
Thus in a legal sense, irregular work of foreigners is distinguished
from irregular work of nationals (Austrian citizens) only insofar as cur-
rently only non-nationals (except EU-15 Member States plus Malta and
Cyprus) can violate the terms of foreign employment laws, and only
third-country nationals can violate residence laws. This definition en-
ables us to incorporate a variety of irregularities occurring on the Aus-
trian labour market, including for example, work without a residence
permit, non-registration at social insurance institutions or working as
so-called ‘pseudo-self-employed’.5
Having defined the terms ‘migration’ and ‘irregular work’, it be-
comes apparent that for the current research topic, it is of no specific
significance a priori whether or not the migrant worker has entered the
country regularly or irregularly. (It is of course important for the oppor-
tunity structure of illegally resident migrant workers, as will be shown
later). As we are interested only in the irregularity of work activities,
the legality of a migrant’s entry to Austria is not a pre-selecting factor
in the choice of our research subjects.6 What matters for the status of
the migrant worker, however, is whether his residence status is legal or
illegal, whether his access to the labour market is restricted or unrest-
ricted (in the same way as for nationals and EU-15 citizens) according
to migration and employment legislation, and whether his work is reg-
ular (for the purposes of social security contributions, taxes, trading
regulations, etc.) or irregular. These three dimensions of the status of
migrant workers logically result in eight theoretical categories of mi-
grant work status, five of which fall within the domain of this study.
Of these eight theoretical categories, (1) and (3) are regular migrant
work and are, hence, not the focus of this study. On the other hand, ca-
tegories (5) and (6) do not exist, because unrestricted access to the la-
bour market rules out the illegality of residence and (7) does not exist
because the permission to work is subordinated to the permission to
stay. This leaves categories (2), (4) and (8) as relevant status categories
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for our research. However, it is important to keep all possible cate-
gories of work status in mind, as our research has shown that both
transitions from one status category to another (e.g. from (3) to (7)) as
well as simultaneous combinations of work status for different activ-
ities (e.g. (3) and (4)) are a common phenomenon.
A final clarification on our research topic is needed. Our study is
concerned with economic activities of migrants in Austria, which are,
at least in principle, legal activities. Thus, criminal activities (e.g. cigar-
ette smuggling, drug trafficking or illegal trading activities) are ex-
cluded from our research. Moreover, certain types of high-risk econom-
ic activities have not been the subject of our research, mainly due to
the special difficulties of access to informants and for reasons of perso-
nal safety of our interviewers (this concerns mainly sex-work or prosti-
tution).
1.3 Methodology
The study has been designed as a basic research project that hopes to
provide a better theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of irre-
gular migrant work in Austria through, mainly, qualitative research.
Starting from relevant theoretical insights from the large body of mi-
gration theories and the rather scarce literature on irregular migration
and informal work in Austria, the main challenge of the project was
the design and implementation of methods suitable to produce empiri-
cal evidence on the structure, characteristics and dynamics of irregular
migrant work in Austria. Overall, our project entails three compatible
research approaches: secondary data analysis, expert interviews as well
as qualitative interviews with irregularly employed migrant workers.
This combined approach has been carefully structured in order to over-
come a number of practical problems in empirical field research on
‘hidden populations’ (e.g. where to look for interviewees, how to gain
access to them, etc.) and to validate our empirical results through trian-
gulation (Flick 2007). Before these methods will be further discussed,
Table 1.1 Relevant categories of irregular migrant work status
Unrestricted access to
the labour market
Restricted access to
the labour market
Residence legal (1) Work regular
(2) Work irregular
(3) Work regular
(4) Work irregular
Residence illegal (5) Work regular
(6) Work irregular
(7) Work regular
(8) Work irregular
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it is necessary to say a few words on the suitability of such methods in
the study of irregular migrant work.
Our research topic ‘migration and irregular work’ belongs to the ca-
tegory of research studies on ‘hidden populations’, which cannot be ea-
sily observed. Such populations are often also referred to as ‘rare’, ‘elu-
sive’ or ‘hard-to-count’ populations and include, for example, illegal re-
sidents, male prostitutes or the homeless, as well as irregular workers
(Chelimsky 1991; Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004). Almost by definition, there
are no official data on the whole group of research subjects under in-
vestigation, as irregular migrant workers and in our case also their em-
ployers have an incentive to hide their identity from the authorities.
Therefore, there are no fully reliable quantitative methods to derive
knowledge on the complete universe of the individuals in question,
although there are several indirect estimation methods that can provide
indications on the extent and characteristics of the phenomena under
study (for an overview, see for example, Jandl 2004; Pinkterton et al.
2004; Sheldon 2002). Larger volumes of data are seldom available, ex-
cept in rare circumstances where researchers have access to compre-
hensive police files and are able to carry out comprehensive surveys, or
in countries with regularisation campaigns (see e.g. Engbersen 1999a,
2001; Massey & Zenteno 2000; Durand & Massey 2004; Massey
2004). In most cases, however, the hidden character of the phenomen-
on prevents us from drawing a representative sample for quantitative
studies (e.g. surveys or secondary data analysis), as the distribution of
relevant characteristics (age, gender, nationality, economic sectors) is
not known, and research is largely constrained to qualitative methods
(Vogel 2003).
In recent years, a number of such studies on irregular foreign em-
ployment in other European countries have demonstrated the useful-
ness of qualitative empirical methods to the research subject in ques-
tion (see e.g. Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004 for a review of thirteen case stu-
dies on irregular migration). Due to their small sample sizes (normally
between twenty and 40 interviews), it is hard to demonstrate the gener-
al validity of the conclusions (hard to replicate) with regard to irregular
migration and informal labour markets. Still, they serve as an impor-
tant source of information on a number of issues such as migrant mo-
tives, work-related strategies and types of organisation. It is thus widely
agreed among international researchers that due to the sensitive and
difficult nature of the underlying area of research, the use of qualitative
empirical methods is essential (Lederer & Nickel 1997).
As we will see in Section 1.7, in Austria there has been very little sys-
tematic research on irregular migrant work to date, despite the widely
presumed significance of the phenomenon. The few studies that do ex-
ist take a limited qualitative approach (e.g. Behr 2003; Hofer 1994; So-
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cial Impact 2000) or try to deduce the overall extent of informal work
through indirect estimation methods (Biffl 2001; Schneider 2002,
2005, 2006). Aside from limited administrative data, there are no com-
prehensive data, large-scale surveys or regularisation campaigns. Due
to these difficulties of obtaining reliable and suitable data on the quan-
titative dimension of irregular foreign employment, the qualitative as-
pects of irregular foreign employment are thus the main focus of our
research, carried out mostly through qualitative research methods.
Nevertheless, our study can also contribute to the debate on the quanti-
tative dimensions of irregular foreign employment by gaining new in-
sights into the organisation, structure and extent of the phenomenon
in certain sectors and branches and thereby narrowing the range of
plausible quantitative estimates.
In this study, we present results obtained through three complemen-
tary research methods. These should be briefly introduced here. A
more elaborate description of the Delphi survey and the interview tech-
niques for our migrant interviews will be presented at the beginning of
Parts 2 and 3 of this report.
Secondary data analysis
In an initial phase, a topical review of the existing literature on the sub-
ject was carried out, which identified a number of empirical studies on
the subject in other European countries but only few such studies on
the Austrian situation. Nevertheless, many topical studies on other Eur-
opean countries, especially those on Germany, provide theoretical and
empirical insights of relevance for the Austrian context as well. While
irregular migration patterns and labour market structures may differ
from case to case, insights into fundamental social processes elsewhere
may still be valid for Austria as well. At the very least, these studies
provide a starting point for formulating research questions and a valu-
able reference point for comparative analysis.
Parallel to the literature review available, administrative and statisti-
cal data relevant to the subject were identified and collected. Only few
such data were identified in existing administrative records (e.g. police
apprehensions of foreigners, entry-bans for foreigners based on preced-
ing irregular foreign employment) and fewer still were considered rele-
vant and suitable for the research topic (e.g. statistics on the detection
of foreign workers on worksites by specialised units of the labour in-
spectorate or the customs office).
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Expert knowledge
One commonly pursued methodical approach in the study of irregular
migration phenomena is the interviewing of selected key-informants or
experts. ‘Experts’ are persons with specialist knowledge or special in-
sights due to their role of producing information or having privileged
access to information about certain groups of persons or of decision-
making processes (Meuser & Nagel 2002: 73). Therefore, unlike other
forms of open interviews, in expert interviews it is not the biographical
aspects of the interviewed persons, their orientations, attitudes or inter-
pretations of their own lives that is of importance to the analysis, but
rather the shared knowledge of experts on a certain phenomenon
(ibid.: 72)
As access to data on irregular migrant work is very limited in Aus-
tria, our main aim in drawing on expert knowledge was to benefit from
experts’ ‘head start’ in terms of knowledge on various aspects of the
field (Bogner & Menz 2005). Therefore, in order to fully benefit from
available expert knowledge on irregular migrant work in Austria, a two-
stage procedure was adopted. In the first stage, semi-structured inter-
views with 36 Austrian experts were conducted, transcribed and ana-
lysed. Experts were selected from a variety of fields and institutions,
where their opinions and judgments were considered relevant to the
research topic. These comprised, for example, labour market experts
from chambers of commerce and labour, trade unions, ministries and
academia; law enforcement experts; practitioners from charity and aid
organisations, migrant organisations and migration researchers.
In the second stage, the so-called Delphi method (two rounds) was
applied in carrying out and evaluating expert interviews. The design of
the first Delphi questionnaire was guided by the preceding round of ex-
pert interviews as well as the literature review. The Delphi method in-
volves a large number of independent experts in an interactive process
of exchange through the use of written questionnaires, designed to fos-
ter convergence and consensus (see e.g. Linstone & Murray 1975; Rowe
et al. 1991; Lachmanova´ & Drbohlav 2004). Experts are given the op-
portunity to state their views on a given topic and react to the (anon-
ymous and consolidated) views and assessments of other experts in the
second round. Our Delphi survey involved the processing of two
rounds of questionnaires, which were answered by 37 experts in the
first round and 22 experts in the second round. More details on the
Delphi method are presented in Part 2 of this report.
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Migrant interviews
To collect qualitative empirical data and to obtain an inside perspective
on migration and irregular work, the main part of our research project
consisted in the selection, identification and implementation of 50 Pro-
blem-Centred Interviews (Witzel 2000) with irregularly working mi-
grants in Austria, i.e. face-to-face interviews with individuals who have
first-hand knowledge of the subject themselves. As a qualitative inter-
view technique, ‘the principles guiding a Problem-Centred Interview aim
to gather objective evidence on human behaviour as well as on subjec-
tive perceptions and ways of processing social reality’ (Witzel 2000: 1),
viewing interviewees as agents in their decision-making processes and
actions in a specific situation. The main aim therefore is the explora-
tion and comprehensive description of processes and relevant aspects
that can only be provided from ‘insiders’, in order to achieve a better
understanding of social reality. In contrast with interviewing experts,
who distance themselves from the subject in question but provide their
expertise in a specific field of activity, affected persons can convey their
very personal and subjective perspective of a process or a situation.
Over a period of more than a year, a total of 50 interviews with mi-
grants, who were irregularly working in the most notorious branches
and activity areas of the Austrian economy, were carried out. The sam-
ple selection (Schatzman & Strauss 1973; Sandelowski et al. 1992) of
interviewees was based on regions of employment, economic activities,
gender and nationality, and was intended to be broadly representative
of the branches, seasons, and activities in which particular irregularly
working migrants are presumably concentrated, according to the preli-
minary results obtained in the Delphi survey. A detailed description of
the interview sample, methods of analysis as well as further reflections
on methodological problems in this type of research is provided in Part
3 of this report.
1.4 Preliminary hypotheses and research questions
Our research aims at contributing to improving the knowledge base in
two disciplines: migration as well as labour market research. The main
objectives of the project are to fill a major gap in Austrian migration re-
search; to identify the main underlying factors driving and sustaining
irregular foreign work; to discover fundamental patterns and structural
characteristics of irregular migrant work; to identify shifts and changes
in these patterns and characteristics that result in major socioeconomic
trends; to determine the impact of (successive rounds) of EU enlarge-
ment on irregular migrant work in Austria; and to compare and con-
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 17
trast our findings with the regulatory intentions of state policies and
control mechanisms.
Based on a preliminary survey of the literature, a number of hypoth-
eses were constructed to guide our theoretical interest and to be tested
against empirical evidence:
1. Due to high income differentials, there is a large potential supply of
regularly and irregularly working migrants in Austria from lower-
income countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
2. In certain sectors and branches of the Austrian economy, there is a
considerable demand for irregular foreign labour.
3. Irregular migrant work is in most cases accompanied by a de-quali-
fication of the migrant workers accepting low-skilled work.
4. Irregular migrant workers in Austria strongly depend on the exis-
tence and functioning of social and family networks, and increas-
ingly on professional networks of illegal job providers as well.
5. Access to irregular labour markets varies considerably according to
the impact of specifically targeted policies (migration policy, labour
market policy, enforcement measures, etc.) and the amount of ad-
ministrative and ‘social’ control.
6. The 2004 enlargement of the EU had a profound impact on the
structure and dynamics of irregular migrant work in Austria.
7. The ongoing process of EU enlargement has noticeable (substitu-
tion) effects on already established regularly and irregularly working
migrants in Austria.
Based on these rather general hypotheses, more specific hypotheses
and research questions were developed and operationalised in the for-
mulation of the guidelines and questionnaires for the implementation
of the expert interviews, the Delphi surveys and the migrant interviews.
We will return to the above hypothesis in the concluding Part 4 of this
report.
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1.5 Theories on migration and the labour market
As migration itself is a multifaceted social phenomenon that can be
understood in its entirety only through a holistic approach, the study
of migration tends to be multidisciplinary or it at least draws on a mul-
titude of theoretical models from a number of social science disciplines
(Hammar et al. 1997; Castles & Miller 2003). This has resulted in a
number of complementary – as well as competing – theoretical expla-
nations of migration processes (cf. Arango 2004; Massey et al. 1993;
Lebhart 2002). Among the many theoretical approaches to migration,
those emanating from the fields of economics and sociology stand out,
both in their prominence and in their usefulness for the explanation of
labour market-related phenomena such as irregular migrant work. We
will therefore provide a short review of such disciplinary approaches,
focusing on their potential contribution to our own research subject.
Sociological theories typically look at a broad spectrum of factors that
can give rise to, shape and sustain migration flows. One of the oldest
such models and one that has possibly contributed most in shaping
theoretical thinking about migration is the push-pull model as pro-
posed by Lee (1966). This model explains migration as the outcome of
two complementary sets of factors impinging on the individual deci-
sion-maker, i.e. the (potential) migrant. First, there are the detrimental
factors in the place of origin that make life hard and unpleasant for the
individual in question (the ‘push factors’); second, there are the desir-
able factors present in the place of destination that the individual per-
ceives as a positive contribution to his well-being (the ‘pull factors’). Be-
tween these two areas is a set of obstacles that has to be overcome if
the migration decision is to be carried out (the ‘intervening factors’).
These last factors will increase the costs of migration and work against
both push and pull factors. The decision to migrate for a given indivi-
dual, then, is based on a comparison of the total value of the set of rele-
vant factors at the place of origin (including the push factors) with the
value of the set of relevant factors at the place of destination (including
the pull factors), taking into consideration the intervening variables.
Although the model is rather general, it is attractive for a number of
reasons. Factors such as distance of migration, migration costs and mi-
gration risks (particularly to irregular migrants) can all be potential
variables in the model, as can labour demand, wages, unemployment
and other economic factors. The greater the (perceived) difference in
the net forces of attraction and repulsion at origin and destination, the
more likely migration will take place. Moreover, Lee argues that mi-
grants motivated primarily by pull factors would tend to be positively
selected (by age and qualification), while those driven by push factors
would tend to be negatively selected. Whether this is indeed the case,
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however, remains contested up to this day in the face of contradictory
evidence (cf. the discussion on the human capital approach to migra-
tion later in this section).
While push-pull models offer some generally useful elements to ex-
plain migration processes, approaches that focus particularly on labour
market and employment structures as key variables within such mod-
els are especially relevant for the current research subject (cf. Treibel
1990; Steinbeck 1994). Some authors have drawn attention to the exis-
tence of ‘global inequalities and differential opportunities’ (Borowski et
al. 1997: 44; see also Treibel 1990) and identify the unequal economic,
demographic, political and cultural conditions as the ‘root causes’ of
migration (Doomernik et al. 1997: 62). However, despite the seeming
plausibility of such aggregate, macro-sociological explanations, other
authors have pointed out that they cannot fully account for the com-
plexity of modern migration movements (cf. Borowski et al. 1997; Mu¨l-
ler-Schneider 2003).
Another major sociological contribution to migration theory focuses
not so much on the individual but on his socially embedded nature, re-
cognising that migrants often move together with their family and
friends or join their relatives abroad who have moved first (Massey
1988; Massey et al. 1998; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes 1995).
The concept of a migration network, as ‘sets of interpersonal ties that
link migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and desti-
nation areas through the bonds of kinship, friendship and shared com-
munity origin’ (Massey 1988) constitutes a form of social capital that
migrants can draw upon for help, information, access to jobs, accom-
modation, social protection and much more.
Migration networks cannot explain why migration has been initiated
in the first place, but they provide us with a powerful illustration why
migration from particular locations, once initiated, tend to become self-
sustaining and ‘progressively independent’ from their original condi-
tions (Massey 1989). Thus, network theory has become extremely im-
portant in the study of migration and may be particularly relevant in
the study of irregular migration and irregular migrant work. Several
empirical studies have demonstrated that for irregular migrants, assis-
tance in the process of migration, the provision of (irregular) accom-
modation and the avoidance of state controls will play even a larger
role than for regular migrants (e.g. Alt 1999a, 2003a; Lederer & Nickel
1997). In all these functions, networks can help to reduce the social,
economic and emotional costs of migration, as argued by the propo-
nents of migration network theory (Faist 1997; Light & Bhachu 1993;
Massey 1989).
Moreover, for access to irregular work, information about job oppor-
tunities is usually communicated within established networks, rather
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than advertised freely in front of law enforcement agencies (Doomer-
nik et al. 1997). Besides informal networks of family, friends and eth-
nic compatriots, professional networks of labour brokers and people
smugglers also act on the intermediary ‘meso’-level of migration actors
and have drawn the attention of the scientific community for over a
decade now (cf. Faist 1995, 1997; Heckmann 2004; Jandl 2007; Kyle &
Koslowski 2001; Mavris 2002; Salt & Stein 1997). In his monumental
study on illegal migrants in Munich and other German cities, Alt
(2003a) notes the parallel existence of private networks, characterised
by strong ties of interpersonal relationships, ethnic networks based on
weak ties of common heritage, commercial networks based on weak
ties of common interest (such as those of irregular labour brokers)
where illicit services can be bought on informal markets, as well as
criminal networks that involve the exploitation and deceit of irregularly
working and/or residing migrants. Alt (2003a) notes that there is no
inherent contradiction between the existence and usage of these var-
ious types of networks and estimates that for irregular immigrants in
Germany (the subject of his studies and interviews), non-criminal net-
works are dominant (330). Among other things, this conclusion is
based on his observation that for certain forms of irregular migration
(e.g. irregular circular migration from/to neighbouring countries to the
east of Germany), the significance of professional networks has de-
clined as migrants have accumulated their own migration-specific
knowledge and personal contacts.
A relatively recent field of migration research has focused on the
study of transnationalism, which is the simultaneous involvement or
attachment of migrants both in their host and sending society (Verto-
vec 1999, 2004). The study of transnationalism rejects the notion of
migration as a one-time process and recognises the (real or notional)
involvement of migrants both ‘here’ and ‘there’. It thus transcends the-
ories that focus only on the initiating factors of migration and those
that deal with the process of interaction (or integration) with the new
host society (cf. Collyer 2005). In transnational approaches, migrants
are conceptualised as acting in a transnational social space that
‘stretches’ the economic, political, social and cultural interactions in
which migrants were involved before migration, so that they remain ac-
tive following migration (Faist 2000). Writers on transnationalism
have identified a number of different types of transnational involve-
ment (cf. Baubo¨ck 1994; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Pries 1999), which has
broadly divided the field into studies of economic transnationalism, po-
litical transnationalism and transnational identities (Tamas 2004).
While the literature on economic transnationalism has not yet devel-
oped into a consistent theoretical approach that can guide our own re-
search project, there are many important elements, such as the study
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of cross-border networks, which figure prominently in the study of irre-
gular migrant work (cf. Faist, 2000).
Generally, we can expect transnational practices of migrants, regular
and irregular, to become much more common than in the past. On
one level, the ‘world-wide expansion of modern communication struc-
tures’ (Mu¨ller-Schneider 2003: 20) and lower costs for travel and trans-
port (Heckmann 1995) enable transnational ties to be maintained
much more economically than in the past (Vertovec 2004).7 On an-
other level, such increasing interactions are also suspected of reinfor-
cing a ‘global integration of values’, at least as far as expectations of a
‘good life’ and economic and social aspirations are concerned (cf. Hoff-
mann-Nowotny 1993). Taken together, such ‘globalisation’ forces may
account for both a higher willingness to migrate and a greater ability
of many to do so. Moreover, such socioeconomic and technological
trends also enable new forms of transnational mobility, such as more
circular migration across greater distances. As we will see, when such
enabling forces work together with national control policies (e.g. visas
that limit length of stay), transnational practices and particularly circu-
lar migration patterns are especially likely to be relevant for irregular
labour migration in Europe.
Economic theories of migration provide the second disciplinary
strand of major relevance to our research subject. Economics has long
treated migration in analogy to the movement of goods and capital in
pursuit of profit. Thus, in macroeconomic theory the movement of
people has come to be seen as the reallocation of scarce factors of pro-
duction (labour and capital), whereby ‘labour’ should always ‘flow’
from low wage to high wage areas, while capital should flow the other
way around (Heckscher-Ohlin theorem). Further, it has been argued
that, given the general efficiency of free markets, this is a necessary
and desirable process in the course of economic development (e.g. Le-
wis 1954).
Later, in view of the presence of considerable unemployment and
partly in reaction to Lewis’s model, it has been pointed out that the as-
sumption of full employment – underlying much of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory – does not fit with reality, and that individuals therefore
take the chance of being unemployed into account when making a mi-
gration decision. The expected income theory of migration (Harris &
Todaro 1970; Todaro 1976) essentially weighs prospective income (over
a certain period) from a job in destination areas against the probability
of getting such a job. The resulting ‘expected income’ is contrasted
with the ‘expected income’ in the place of origin by the prospective mi-
grant. The conclusion is straightforward: If the expected-income differ-
ential (net of migration costs) is positive, migration will occur. For an
extension of this theory, whereby the migration decision is based on a
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rational cost risk-benefit calculation, is provided by the more general-
ised ‘value-expectation theory’ (Esser 1999).
Common to both classical and neoclassical economic theories of mi-
gration is their fundamental assumption of rational individuals striving
to maximise utility (cf. Djajic 1989). Thus, migration is seen as the
outcome of a rational individual choice, which will occur as long as the
economic incentives (the differences in wage rates) are sufficiently
high. A further extension of the economic approach to migration has
been provided by human capital theory. Building on the work of Sjaas-
tad (1962), this theory argues that a rational individual will base his de-
cision to migrate on the present value of future income streams (his
‘human capital’) in any possible location net of migration costs (cf. Bor-
jas 1989; Massey et al. 1993). In the simplest case, where income is
the sole determinant of utility, the individual will choose to migrate to
a location that maximises the net present value of his human capital.
The human capital approach to migration has a number of interest-
ing implications. It provides some hypotheses on who the migrants are
(in terms of their characteristics), as well as when migration would be
most beneficial for them (i.e. at what stage in their life cycle). Probably
the most widely known hypothesis of this theory is the so-called ‘self-
selection hypothesis’: potential migrants will base their migration deci-
sion on the potential gain they can secure by transferring their existing
human capital to a different location, thereby increasing their future
real income stream. Because the gains in income will be higher for cer-
tain individuals than for others – owing to their specific endowment
with human capital – and because direct migration costs are supposed
to be the same for all, it follows that migration will preferably be un-
dertaken by individuals with certain characteristics. In the ‘normal
case’ (implying ‘positive self-selection’), the typical migrant is supposed
to be young, well-educated, in possession of an above-average human
capital endowment, and will therefore prove to have an above average
earnings profile (e.g. Chiswick 1979, 1999). However, under certain
circumstances, such as high unemployment in the country of origin, a
‘negative self-selection’ is possible as well (e.g. Borjas 1989).
While traditional economic theories of migration have focused on
the individual as the unit of decision-making and differences in wage
and (expected) income levels as determining factors, the ‘new econom-
ics of migration’ (Stark & Bloom 1985; Stark & Taylor 1989; Stark
1991) have been celebrated for drawing attention to a new set of genu-
ine motives determining migration processes. Key features of these ele-
gantly formulated economic models are a shift from individuals to
households as decision-making units; the introduction of additional
factors in the utility functions (e.g. risk aversion, the distribution of in-
come/wealth as relative deprivation); the conceptualising of migration
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as an ingenious strategy to overcome market failures and price distor-
tions (e.g. in credit markets, insurance markets).
The new approaches demonstrate that, under certain assumptions,
migration can be a rational strategy to pursue even in the absence of
income differentials (though it does not deny that these can still be a
powerful motivation for engaging in migration). The goal of diversify-
ing risk, the attempt to switch to new technologies in the absence of
sufficient capital, concern over one’s relative ranking in the income dis-
tribution and other factors all constitute valid and sufficient motives
for migrating (Stark 1991).
One of the most important deviations of the ‘new economics of mi-
gration’ from conventional economic migration theories is certainly the
redefinition of the ultimate decision-maker. Families or households
make a joint decision that can result in the migration of one of their
members (as in the case of risk-spreading). Individuals are said to
abide by the decision since the institution of the family can secure
‘economies of scale’ as well as ‘economies of scope’, maximising family
income and thus leaving everybody in the family better off. The links
between family members manifest themselves through remittances be-
tween migrants and non-migrants and through individual action on be-
half of the household. This new theoretical paradigm leads to several
testable hypotheses as to who the migrants are (e.g. those individuals
who can secure the maximum utility for their families through migra-
tion, persons from the lower end of the income distribution of their re-
spective reference group) and how migration processes evolve over
time. Once migration from a certain area has begun (innovation), the
environment in which further migration takes place is altered, facilitat-
ing and stimulating further migration (imitation), eventually leading to
the establishment of migration networks and transnational practices.
In this sense, the new economics of migration can also be seen as a
complementary model to network theories and transnational ap-
proaches.
In contrast to the classical and neoclassical economic theories dis-
cussed above, the so-called world systems theory draws on a fundamen-
tally different (neo-Marxist) theoretical tradition. In this framework, the
macrostructures are studied that give rise to worldwide migration
streams. This approach has a lot in common with dependency theory
in that its primary concern is with the expansion of the ‘core’ capitalist
economies to the underdeveloped countries of the ‘periphery’. Migra-
tion can then be linked to the institutional and socioeconomic inequal-
ities between the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery (e.g. Wal-
lerstein 1974; Parnreiter 1994). Other writers in this tradition have em-
phasised the importance of historical, cultural, linguistic and ex-
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colonial links for the emergence of migration systems (Portes 1995;
Sassen 1988).
Finally, an important strand of economic theory for our research sub-
ject is the so-called dual labour market theory, as applied to migration
(e.g. Piore 1979; Portes 1997). This theory focuses almost exclusively
on the receiving end of migration, arguing that international migration
is mainly caused by a permanent demand for cheap labour that results
from specific characteristics of labour markets in highly developed in-
dustrial societies. Thus, international migration responds to the needs
of modern industrial economies and serves and perpetuates the de-
mand for cheap labour in industrial societies, which arises because la-
bour markets are said to be fundamentally segmented. On the one
hand, there are the permanent, high-paying jobs that demand consider-
able skills and training from their workforce and, on the other hand,
there are the low-paying, labour-intensive, low-skilled, less permanent
and often irregular jobs. These positions are less attractive to natives
and are therefore increasingly filled by willing foreign workers. In this
world, employers can avoid wage increases for low-paying – and there-
fore unattractive – jobs by importing cheap labour (which is often ac-
tively recruited) and/or by employing migrants irregularly. The basic te-
net of this economic approach to migration is nicely summarised in
the following quote: ‘Contrary to widespread perceptions, immigrants
come to the wealthier nations less because they want to than because
they are needed’ (Portes 1997: 5).
In a modern interpretation of the dual labour market theory, economic
globalisation does not only create opportunities for highly qualified la-
bour but is also generating opportunities for poorly qualified and un-
skilled workers. Especially in the service industries, a wide range of job
opportunities evolved that require no special training or qualification,
while at the same time, social status and salaries connected with these
jobs are not attractive enough for the domestic population (Arango
2004). The resident population has little or no motivation to accept the
low wages, the unstable labour conditions and the few career prospects
these jobs might offer. Thus employers turn to immigrants in order to
satisfy shortfalls in this segment of the labour market. Due to the re-
strictive immigration and labour market policies imposed by most of
the industrialised states, existing vacancies cannot always be filled by
the use of legal immigration. As far as potential employees are con-
cerned, there is a virtually inexhaustible potential supply of manpower
on the international level. The wage and purchase power differentials
between industrial and developing countries turn even the lowest
wages in the West into an incentive for migrants to overcome all mi-
gration barriers.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 25
A specific hypothesis in this theoretical tradition is the Global City
hypothesis as developed by Saskia Sassen (1991). According to this ar-
gument, economic globalisation and the shift to a service economy in
industrialised countries has led to a demand for highly skilled labour
in large cities. However, the reproduction of these highly skilled work-
ers requires the help of many unskilled and flexible workers at the bot-
tom of the occupational hierarchy in the service economy, a demand
that is mostly met by a constant supply of migrant workers, many of
whom are employed irregularly (see also Section 1.6). Whereas Sassen
(1991) focuses mostly on the demand side of immigration to large ci-
ties, other authors have combined this approach with network argu-
ments to reinsert the supply side of migration. Light (2004) uses a
two-stage model to explain current migration processes, whereby im-
migration in the first phase is demand-driven and in the second phase
(through network effects) is supply-driven. Because migrants continue
to arrive in large cities even after the saturation of the mainstream ur-
ban labour markets, but need employment and income to survive in
their new host country, a process of ‘over-urbanisation’ takes place, that
is the spreading of immigrants into the informal sector and the so-
called ethnic economy, which act as a buffer (ibid.: 387f). According to
Light, these ‘ethnic economies and informal sectors enjoy an economic
capacity for virtually unlimited expansion in response to self-propagat-
ing migration’ (2004: 390). Thus, further immigration is not limited
by the economic absorption capacity of the labour market, but by the
political will and ability to control it.
1.6 Theories on irregular labour migration
Before turning directly to studies on the interlinkage of migration and
irregular work, it is instructive to look at a more general perspective on
informal economic activities. In their comprehensive study on informal
employment in advanced economies, Williams and Windebank (1998)
embed their analysis also in an assessment of wider changes in pat-
terns of employment and labour market structures. The authors define
informal employment as:
paid production and sale of goods and services that are unregis-
tered by, or hidden from, the state for tax, social security and/or
labour law purposes, but which are legal in all other respects.8
Evaluating various available quantitative approaches to the study of ir-
regular employment (including indirect non-monetary methods, indir-
ect monetary methods, income/expenditure discrepancy methods and
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direct survey methods), the authors conclude that each of these ap-
proaches has its own limitations, and that only a combination of differ-
ent methods is likely to generate valid estimates. What is clear, how-
ever, is that in most advanced economies it is native citizens, rather
than immigrants, who perform the bulk of underground activity, even
if a significant share of immigrants can be involved in underground ac-
tivity.
In their theoretical chapter, Williams and Windebank (1998) evalu-
ate two major hypotheses that have been put forward to describe trends
in informal employment: 1) the formalisation thesis, closely connected
with modernisation theory (as states modernise and develop, informal
employment relationships all but disappear) and 2) the informalisation
thesis (in advanced economies, employment is increasingly informa-
lised as a response to ‘over-regulation’ of the labour market). Criticising
their underlying assumptions, the authors dismiss both of these theses
as fallacies and suggest that it may be better to look for more contex-
tualised and geographically specific characteristics of informal employ-
ment, rather than try to establish universal trends for a globally diverse
phenomenon.
As we will see, however, most theoretical concepts put forward as ex-
planations of underlying trends in irregular migration and irregular
migrant work do exactly that – they are not contextually embedded, of-
ten monocausal and apparently time insensitive. Such concepts can be
roughly divided into demand, supply and regulatory arguments.9
One such structural demand-led explanation was already mentioned
among the general migration theories, namely the Global City hypoth-
esis, whereby the globalisation of the economy provoked the rise of a
service industry, coupled with the decline of the old manufacturing in-
dustries, which drives the growth of the informal economy as a charac-
teristic feature of post-industrial urban economies (Sassen 1991).10
These processes take place either directly (through flexibilisation of la-
bour and by contracting out specific tasks) or indirectly (by increasing
income inequality and the demand for personnel in cleaning, care for
children and the elderly). Such informal jobs in the service industry
especially attract people with a disadvantaged position in the labour
market, and natives are usually unwilling to take up such jobs because
of their low status and wages. Moreover, governments have become
more restrictive regarding the admission of low-skilled migrants –
hence the demand for irregular migrants. On the other hand, when
the specific demand for low-skilled workers at the bottom of the occu-
pational hierarchy cannot be filled, this may lead to ‘structural inflation’
(Joly 2000: 29). The Global City hypothesis has been widely debated
in the literature but has also drawn much criticism for its simplistic as-
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sumption of ever-widening polarisation of income and occupational
structures (see e.g. Samers 2002).
A more general hypothesis referring to globalisation argues that due
to increasing global competition, employers (especially small- and
medium-sized firms) are forced to cut wage (and non-wage) costs and
ensure flexibility by resorting to informal (migrant) workers (Overbeek
2002). Part of this flexibilisation takes place through outsourcing and
subcontracting of production processes that result in precarious em-
ployment relationships and violations of labour regulations (Mingione
1999). However, as has been pointed out elsewhere (Samers 2005),
while certain sectors may indeed face severe cost-cutting pressures due
to global competition and thus rely heavily on migrants working irre-
gularly, the need for flexibilisation does not necessarily lead to more
demand for irregular migrants and may even mean the opposite. As
Iskander (2000) points out in her study of the Parisian garment in-
dustry, the share of workers in an irregular work situation in this sec-
tor is apparently fairly low, while so-called ‘hybrid arrangements’ of
formal/informal work through ever more complex forms of subcon-
tracting seem to be increasing. She thus argues that:
…as these hybridised forms of informality become more wide-
spread, undocumented immigrant workers lose their competi-
tive edge of offering firms ‘no-strings-attached employment.’ [...]
As a result, being an undocumented immigrant is no longer an
advantage. In fact, it has even become something of a liability
because it means that they cannot work under semi-formal em-
ployment arrangements with one or more facets that are de-
clared and above board. (2000: 46)
Another demand-side perspective focuses on the industrial structure of
an economy, arguing that in economies dominated by smaller firms,
there would be a higher demand for informal work than in economies
made up of fewer, but larger, corporate firms. Smaller firms tend to be
less unionised and rely more on subcontractors (see also Williams &
Windebank 1998). Building on this analysis, Samers (2003) argues
that the massive decline of migrant workers in industry and the conco-
mitant increase of new service jobs also led to a rise of irregular work
(or informal employment, in his terminology). However, he also sees
no reason to believe that a growth in informal employment will inexor-
ably lead to a rise in the number of undocumented immigrants work-
ing in such jobs. Quoting Iskander (2000), Samers (2003) hypothe-
sises that the alternative labour supply of EEA citizens (mainly Portu-
guese unskilled workers) working in informal and semi-formal work
may have been important in reducing the demand for undocumented
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migrant labour in the French case. At the same time, the French state’s
massively expanded policing of undocumented migrants – coupled
with the fact that the advantages associated with the employment of
undocumented migrant labour were gradually eroding – contributed to
the decline of irregular employment of undocumented migrants. Sa-
mers concludes that ‘undocumented immigration is intimately bound
up with capital accumulation and the nature and regulation of labour
markets’ (2003: 575). Thus, by implication, an exclusive focus on nor-
mative categories like ‘undocumented migrants’ or migrants in an irre-
gular situation is bound to miss the really fundamental points – the
changing structures and power relations effective on labour markets
and changing state and employer strategies of regulating employment.
Another demand-side argument holds that the degree of affluence
experienced in many industrialised countries creates a demand for in-
formal work. In this view, formal and informal activities are comple-
ments rather than substitutes, and an increase in the former will lead
to an increase in the latter (e.g. Marcelli 2004). While this argument
may be more valid in certain contexts (e.g. for domestic workers in
cleaning and care) and at specific times and locations than in others,
in its generalised form, this ‘affluence thesis’ is certainly not supported
by available comparative data (see e.g. Reyneri 2001 on the relatively
high levels of informal economies in southern European countries,
compared to their more affluent northern European neighbours).
A related demand-led perspective refers to the demographic, socioe-
conomic and lifestyle developments that lead to a higher demand for
migrant workers, particularly female migrants irregularly working in
private households (e.g. Anderson 2000, 2001). According to this view,
demographic aging increases the demand for old-age care across Eur-
ope, while a rising female labour force participation leads to higher de-
mand for (irregular) domestic services (childcare, care for the elderly,
cooking, cleaning, etc.).
Regarding supply-side arguments on migration and irregular work,
the most prominent argument holds that the large (and apparently in-
creasing) volume of unsolicited migration experienced by high-income
countries is fostering the growth of informal or irregular economic ac-
tivities (cf. Light 2004). As we have seen in the previous section, mi-
gration is often explained by differential conditions in the country of
origin and destination that give rise to migration flows. The same argu-
ments can be applied to irregular migration and migration and irregu-
lar migrant work. For example, Jahn and Straubhaar (1998) argue that
‘if the utility difference between host and receiving society is large en-
ough, for some people the net present value of migration minus regu-
lar transaction and transportation costs of moving […] minus the ex-
pected risk of being caught and punished remains positive. This means
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they will offer their work in a host country even if this is only possible
irregularly. So we will have a supply of illegal foreign workers’ (1998:
10). While Jahn and Straubhaar continue by emphasising the impor-
tant role of the demand for irregular labour in this equation, others are
less balanced. In many cases, the arguments quickly take on a control-
centred view, according to which more irregular migration means more
irregular migrant work, driving down wages, constituting tax fraud and
leading to unfair competition between immigrants and natives, and
should therefore be prevented (cf. Bundesregierung 2000). Alterna-
tively, the argument can also take on a human rights perspective, ac-
cording to which a larger pool of both legal and illegal immigrants con-
stitutes a ‘reserve army of labour’ that is easily exploited in irregular
work. The most serious cases of labour exploitation, in fact, constitute
trafficking in forced labour, for which only little empirical evidence ex-
ists in Europe but which is given increasing attention by international
organisations and NGOs (cf. Andrees 2004). Another rights-based ap-
proach holds that the presence of foreigners allowed to reside in a gi-
ven state but not allowed to work legally (such as (rejected) asylum see-
kers or family members of established migrant workers), forces these
migrants to accept irregular work, thus ‘illegalising’ them (e.g. Fronek
2000).
Many supply-side arguments relate back to the general migration
theories discussed above, according to which network factors lead to
sustained, ‘progressively independent’ immigration flows, whether the
state tries to prevent further migration or not (Massey 1989). Accord-
ing to this perspective, the presence of a significantly large immigrant
community will foster irregular migration when new migration oppor-
tunities are restricted by state control (e.g. Doomernik et al. 1997). In-
creasingly, migration researchers have also drawn attention to a sophis-
ticated migration industry that facilitates migrants in overcoming state
regulations and physical barriers to migration (e.g. Bilger et al. 2006;
Kyle & Koslowski 2001; Mavris 2002; Salt & Stein 1997). A more opti-
mistic view looks at the potential significance of informal economic ac-
tivities for the social and economic integration of irregular and margin-
alised migrants, who are often employed by other (formal and infor-
mal) immigrant entrepreneurs (Rath 1999).11
In a comprehensive survey of such demand-side and supply-side the-
ories of the underground economy, Samers (2005) explores some of
these theoretical constructs further by asking what they can contribute
to explaining the apparent growth (which he, however, does not accept
as a given) of underground economies and particularly of the alleged
growth in the irregular employment of immigrants. After reviewing
the arguments for both demand-side and supply-side theories, he con-
cludes that neither of them offers a sufficient explanation for the ap-
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parent growth of irregular migrant work. Consequently, he turns to the
examination of regulation as a causal factor driving informal employ-
ment. Samers distinguishes between three approaches that focus on
regulation: The globalisation, the de-/re-regulation and the over-regula-
tion arguments. According to him, the globalisation argument stresses
the unwillingness or inability of national states to control (illegal) im-
migration, thus implicating states in the growth of underground em-
ployment. While Samers dismisses this thesis by noting that the sup-
ply of labour willing to work in the underground economy is not deter-
mined by state migration policies alone, the argument that states are
unwilling to control irregular migration should not be dismissed pre-
maturely. In fact, it may be more or less valid in particular national
contexts, and may be particularly salient in the case of the southern
European countries with frequent regularisation schemes, where states
seemingly tolerate a large informal economy with only minimal control
of the labour market (see e.g. Reyneri 1998; Abella 2002; Pastore
2008). However, when the globalisation thesis stresses the inability of
states to control (illegal) immigration – due, for example, to strong net-
work effects – the thesis becomes, in effect, a supply-side argument.
According to this argument, even strong mechanisms of control fail
when the incentives are strong and the social preconditions for migra-
tion are fulfilled (e.g. Massey et al. 1998). Located somewhere in be-
tween the assumptions that states are unwilling and/or unable to con-
trol irregular migration is an argument focusing on the nature of state
controls. Sciortino (2004b) argues that under modern conditions of ex-
panded opportunities for travel and communications, most internal
control measures aiming to prevent long-term settlement of irregular
migrants will fail to control the actual circular migration behaviour of
many irregular migrants. Under these conditions, circular irregular mi-
gration and restrictive migration policies may coexist for a long time
and even reinforce each other. To this we could add that national mi-
gration control policies are constantly negotiated among a number of
competing actors and demands, and are also subject to limitations im-
posed by international regimes (Cornelius et al. 2004; Brochmann
1999).
The second approach focusing on regulation is the de-/re-regulation
argument, whereby states tolerate the expansion of underground activ-
ities as a substitute for the progressive erosion of welfare entitlements
and to allow firms to remain competitive in increasingly globalised
markets (cf. Talbot 2004). However, while some states indeed seem to
be complacent about informal economic activities, many others are
going to great lengths to suppress them, precisely to prevent financial
losses to the social welfare system. What seems to be crucial in many
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cases, however, is the lack of enforcement of employment regulations
and employer sanctions (Martin & Miller 2000; OECD 2000).
The third regulatory argument examined by Samers (2005) is the so-
called over-regulation thesis, according to which employers are induced
to resort to irregular work due to the high levels of wages and non-
wage costs that come with regular employment (minimum wages,
taxes, social security payments and other benefits and restrictions on
regular employment). While Samers criticises several aspects of this
view, others remain less sceptical. Schneider and Enste (1999), for ex-
ample, conclude that their results:
show that the increasing burden of taxation and social security
payments, combined with rising state regulatory activities, are
the major driving forces behind the size and growth of the sha-
dow economy (1999: 44).
It is clear that this line of argumentation brings us back to the ‘infor-
malisation’ hypothesis examined by Williams and Windebank (1998;
see beginning of Section 1.6). The high level of indirect costs drives a
wedge between net earnings and wage plus non-wage costs for employ-
ers, creating a strong incentive for them to hire workers informally. In
principle, this should apply equally to native and foreign workers alike,
provided they are willing to accept work under these conditions.
The over-regulation thesis provides a strong argument for the expla-
nation of irregular work and it is likely that it also plays a role in the
employment of irregularly working migrants. Economic theory argues
that under certain conditions, over-regulation can lead to a demand for
irregularly working migrants, when employers see that the benefits of
employing workers irregularly outweigh the costs of doing so. In the
case of migrants working irregularly, this may simply be the expected
cost savings (presumably weighted by the risk of detection and the ex-
tent of expected fines, cf. Boswell & Straubhaar 2004). Thus, both the
level of regulation and non-wage costs as well as the strength of enfor-
cement play a role. However, neither the demand nor the regulation ar-
guments alone can suffice to fully explain irregular migrant work. The
existence of any market (even a market in irregular migrant work) re-
quires both supply and demand, and neither of them is effective with-
out the presence of the other (Jandl 1994). Markets left alone (i.e. with-
out any regulation and in the absence of market failures and external-
ities) would tend to clear on their own and, almost by definition, there
would be no ‘irregular’ market emerging. However, both from theoreti-
cal insights and empirical observations, we can conclude that there is a
strong demand for irregular work in certain sectors of many European
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economies, and we can also observe that this demand is often filled
through irregular migrant workers.
In reviewing the theoretical explanations for irregular migrant work,
we have thus come full circle. All of the above arguments have some
explanatory power to contribute and neither of them alone can provide
a self-sufficient explanation. In weighing the strengths of each theoreti-
cal argument for the concrete case of irregular migrant work in Aus-
tria, we need to apply a context-specific, empirically rich approach. Be-
fore doing so, however, we will review the existing empirical literature
on irregular migrant work in other European countries.
1.7 Research on migration and irregular work in Europe
Research on irregular migrant work has started only relatively recently
in European countries, reflecting the relatively recent concern with irre-
gular migration and irregular foreign employment in Europe. Up until
the mid-1970s and throughout the so-called guest-worker period, irre-
gular migration was not entirely absent in Europe, and it was often
possible for unsolicited migrants to regularise their status after enter-
ing the labour markets, thanks to the booming economy and wide-
spread shortages of workers (see e.g. Castles & Miller 2003). It was
only during the 1970s and 1980s that policymakers in European coun-
tries changed their perceptions and started to introduce specific sanc-
tions for irregular employment of migrant workers (Doomernik &
Jandl 2008).
In the 1990s, a number of research studies on illegal/irregular mi-
gration and the illegal/irregular employment of foreigners in Europe
were produced (for a brief overview, see Du¨vell 2005: 34-39). With the
progressive transfer of responsibilities in the fields of migration and
asylum – and in particular in the field of illegal migration – to the level
of the European Union, there is also a greater interest in comprehen-
sive Europe-wide or at least European comparative studies on illegal
migration (cf. Angenendt 2002; Boswell & Straubhaar 2004; Chah-
rokh et al. 2005; Commission of the European Communities 2006).
Many of these and other studies, however, remain on a theoretical, le-
gal or policy level, while few have gone to the trouble of collecting pri-
mary empirical data. Those that do engage in primary research are ty-
pically characterised by a regional focus, the use of qualitative methods
in research and relatively small sample sizes. A thematic focus of these
studies is the living and working conditions of the migrants. In the
past two decades, feminist migration researchers have made a great ef-
fort to investigate the global trend of outsourcing unpaid family work
to paid migrant domestic workers (see e.g. Anderson 2000 and Lutz
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2008 for Europe; Caixeta et al. 2004 for Austria), caregivers and
nurses (Gendera 2007; Lazaridis 2007; Yeates 2006). Studies, investi-
gating the international division of reproductive labour (Parren˜as 2001)
generally look at intersections of gender, ethnicity and class, migration
and welfare policies (Sciortino 2004a) in structuring the feminisation
of migration. Research on labour market structures (demand, segmen-
tation, etc.), however, is mostly lacking. While on their own, such stu-
dies often reflect regional, national or group particularities and are
hardly representative for the overall European situation (with the par-
tial exception of studies on domestic work), taken together this body of
research does provide important insights into reasons, characteristics,
patterns and trends of irregular migration and irregular migrant work.
In the following, we will give a brief overview of studies focusing on ir-
regular migrant work (rather than irregular migration in general), and,
in particular, cases involving Germany and comparative European stu-
dies that are considered most relevant for the Austrian case.
First of all, what emerges from the available literature is a very di-
verse picture that reflects the very heterogeneity of life situations and sur-
vival strategies of irregular immigrants in European countries (see e.g.
Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004 for a review of the recent German literature).
What many studies do agree on, however, is the centrality of irregular la-
bour markets for irregular migration systems in general and for the sus-
tainability of their livelihood for irregular migrants in particular. It is
clear that not all illegally residing migrants also work illegally. Many
can rely on their networks of family and friends, while on the other
hand there is only little evidence of systematic engagement in criminal
activities to generate income (see Anderson 1999 for the United King-
dom;12 Longchamps 2005 for Switzerland; Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004 for
Germany). Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that a majority of illegal
residents is in fact engaged in irregular work activities. According to
Boswell and Straubhaar (2004), some 70 per cent of illegal residents
in the EU countries are estimated to be engaged in illegal labour. Alt
(2003b) estimates that around 50 per cent of undocumented migrants
reside in Germany for the purposes of work, while another 10-15 per
cent work in the sex industry. While such estimates clearly illustrate
the importance of irregular work in the lives of irregular migrants, the
same conclusion cannot be made the other way around. Indeed, there
is a wide consensus that the bulk of irregular work (or informal, undo-
cumented economic activities in general) is carried out by natives,
rather than by foreigners. For example, Schneider estimates that only a
small share of the net value added in the informal economies of the
three German-speaking countries in 2003 has been produced by for-
eigners (Germany: 11.5 per cent; Austria: 12.7 per cent; Switzerland:
13.7 per cent) (2003: 12).
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However, both such precise estimations and such general statements
about irregularity always need to be treated with caution, as irregularity
as such is extremely context-specific and changes over time. Irregular-
ity in migrant work is defined and conditioned by differing and con-
stantly changing national laws and regulations on residence rights, access
to work, employment laws, etc. To provide just one example: Since
2004, all citizens of the ten new EU Member States have enjoyed un-
limited freedom of movement in all EU-15 Member States, while their
access to the labour market has been partly restricted in some coun-
tries but not in others. Over a seven-year transition period (2004-2011),
all restrictions on labour market access will be gradually lifted, albeit at
various speeds in the various EU-15 countries. This does not mean,
however, that all migrant work will automatically become regular, as
employment will still be subject to different national laws and regula-
tions such as tax and social security laws.
As mentioned before, many studies focus on the conditions of life,
the situations and survival strategies of irregular migrants and empha-
sise the very diverse living experiences that irregular migrants go
through, ranging from people in poverty and need (even in exploita-
tion) to those using opportunities to improve their life (Alscher et al.
2001; Alt 2003, 2004; Jordan & Du¨vell 2002; Vogel 2003). The same
diversity is attributed to the social characteristics of irregular migrants:
While most authors see a preponderance of low-skilled migrants work-
ing in jobs that are characterised by a high rate of ‘exchangeability’
(Bundesregierung 2005: 40) and that require little or no formal qualifi-
cations (the so-called ‘3D jobs’: dirty, difficult and dangerous) in the in-
formal economy (cf. Lederer & Nickel 1997; Stobbe 2004), others iden-
tify the typical irregular migrant as being exceptionally self-reliant, re-
sourceful, entrepreneurial and in possession of above-average skills.
For example, in his study entitled Entrepreneurial Illegal Migrants [own
translation], Elwert (2002) focuses on the demand side of irregular
(long-distance) migration in Berlin. According to his findings, the ma-
jority of long-distance migrants came to the industrialised countries of
the West because of existing earning possibilities rather than because
of persecution or poverty in their home countries. The majority of his
interviewees13 were well-educated, had excellent knowledge about job
opportunities and had come to Germany only after they had been given
the assurance that a job would be provided for them. That is to say,
they moved in reaction to a specific demand for their irregular work.
Regarding social characteristics, Elwert indicates that his interviewees
comprised individuals with middle and lower upper-class backgrounds
rather than members of the lower class of the population in their coun-
tries of origin. Many were ‘overqualified’ for the jobs they were doing
(ibid.: 17).
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The sample selection of Elwert’s study may prevent a generalisation
about other migrant groups and host countries. Moreover, the coun-
tries of origin are likely to matter in the self-selection of irregular mi-
grants even more than in the case of regular migrants, as irregular mi-
grants from distant countries have to invest more funds to overcome
migration barriers (for example, by paying smugglers or obtaining
documents). Depending on the specific context, the status of un-
authorised migrants, as well as that of irregularly working migrants,
can be an option determined by choice or by compulsion to varying de-
grees (cf. Anderson 1999 for the UK). Thus, the qualification structure
of irregular migrants in various countries remains an open question
subject to empirical testing. However, an important observation in this
context is that many irregular migrants may be well-qualified and even
highly skilled, but they have to accept unskilled work out of necessity.
Such a de-qualification process in irregular migrant work is confirmed in
qualitative interviews in Berlin and London by Jordan and Vogel
(1997). The majority of their interviewees had above-average educa-
tional qualifications, though they were doing unskilled work. Unplea-
sant, menial and insecure working conditions were accepted as part of
the sacrifices irregular migrants were willing to make in order to
achieve a higher living standard or for their long-term benefits: to re-
turn to the countries of origin with some savings and to build a better
future there. Cyrus refers to this process of de-qualification as ‘brain
waste’, which occurs when illegally-employed foreign workers are routi-
nely overqualified for their jobs (2004: 37). In this context, an interest-
ing observation has been made in a study of irregularly working mi-
grants in Geneva (Chimienti et al. 2003). Based on an analysis of 400
administrative cases against illegally employed foreigners as well as in-
terviews with migrants and employers, the authors conclude that while
all migrants were employed in less qualified jobs in Geneva, a dispro-
portionate percentage of them had university degrees. Moreover, irre-
gular migrants from more distant countries (in Latin America and Afri-
ca) had a higher share of university graduates than European countries,
indicating some form of self-selection mechanism referred to above.14
Moreover, most authors agree that due to the lack of legal protec-
tions as a consequence of illegality, irregular migrants often find them-
selves in a vulnerable position regarding economic and social security
(e.g. Anderson 1999 and Kofman et al. 2000 for the UK; Scho¨nwa¨lder
et al. 2004 and Cyrus 2008 for Germany). Due to their ‘exchangeabil-
ity’ on the informal labour market, they find themselves in precarious
employment conditions, as they usually lack any power and status and
are in a very weak position when they have to negotiate working condi-
tions and payment with their employers (Sinn et al. 2005; cf. also An-
derson 2000). On the whole, irregularly working migrants have little
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incentives and opportunities to challenge employers, since legal chal-
lenges will often automatically result in the termination of their stay,
while personal challenges often lead to the loss of the job (see Cyrus
2004 for Germany). Negotiating entitlements is especially difficult
when the employer-employee relationship is characterised by intimacy
and a web of affective bonds, as this generally is the case in paid do-
mestic and care work (Rodriguez 2007). Lederer and Nickel refer to
this as a ‘structurally-founded vulnerability to be blackmailed’ (1997:
29), a situation that in extreme cases may expose them to the risk of
forced labour, characterised by exploitation and enforcement through
the use of force (or the threat thereof) or the restriction of the freedom
of movement (see also Cyrus 2005: 29 and Anderson & Rogaly 2005
for a study on forced labour in the UK) and, in rare cases, even sexual
violence (Rodriguez 2007). However, the illegal employment of for-
eigners should neither be principally equated with exploitation and
forced labour, as there is a wide range of mutually beneficial working
conditions (Cyrus 2005: 14), nor should the migrants be perceived as
powerless victims, as they organise themselves in transnational net-
works. These networks provide them assistance in difficult situations
and constitute a useful tool in finding alternative employment (Gen-
dera forthcoming).
Most authors see illegality in residence status as a difficult situation
to cope with, although to different degrees in different countries de-
pending on the concrete legal, administrative and control regimes. Some-
times, it can prove useful to compare the migration and control re-
gimes irregular migrants are subject to in different countries. For ex-
ample, Jordan and Vogel (1997) compare the influence of national
policies on migrants’ decisions based on qualitative interviews with ir-
regular Brazilian migrants in London and Berlin. While emphasising
the importance of social and family networks for the migrants’ decision
to choose a specific country as their destination, they note that the sig-
nificance of these networks is closely tied to the existing labour market
regulations and controls. Whereas irregular migrants in London were
able to provide themselves with a job or a new accommodation soon
after their arrival, irregular migrants in Berlin (which is apparently
subject to a higher degree of legal and social control) heavily relied on
the assistance of established networks (legally resident friends or rela-
tives) to find access to the irregular labour market. Generalising these
findings for Germany and the UK, Cyrus, Du¨vell and Vogel (2004)
conclude that, once inside the country, irregular migrants are subject
to fewer controls in the UK and have easier access to social services
than in Germany, which is heavily oriented towards internal controls.
A similar conclusion is drawn by Stobbe (2004), who finds the ‘room
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 37
for manoeuvre’ much wider and access to the labour market much ea-
sier in the US than in Germany.
Related to the severity of controls and the ‘room for manoeuvre’ that
individual migrants may have is also the periodicity of irregular migra-
tion. As a general feature and from the perspective of individual mi-
grants, illegality is often perceived as a temporal and transient state
(even though it may last for several years), while from the perspective
of the host society, illegality may be a structural phenomenon. Thus, in
many European countries, the circularity of irregular labour migration
may play an important role, especially in countries and regions where
irregular migrants from Central and Eastern Europe make up the lar-
gest share of the undocumented workforce. This has been argued for
Germany (Cyrus 2004; Morokvasic 2003; Hess 2001; Scho¨nwa¨lder et
al. 200415) and is also valid in the Austrian case (see e.g. Gendera &
Haidinger 2007). These general observations are supported by much
anecdotal and some systematic empirical evidence. For example, in his
study on the life situation of irregular migrants in Leipzig, Alt (1999a,
1999b) confirms the hypothesis of the growing importance of circular
migration for irregular foreign employment. His interviewees, mainly
from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, stated
that the focal point in their lives remained in the countries of origin
and that they commuted between their places of origin and places of
work as often as possible.
The duration and periodicity of irregular migration is likely to be clo-
sely connected with the individual’s life choice and personal circum-
stances, as well as his or her opportunities for legalisation. However,
ways into illegality are as manifold as its motives and available options
are. Illegal entry could be the result of legal entry as a student, an au
pair, a tourist, etc., with subsequent overstaying, or it could result from
illegal entry, in which case circularity may not be a viable option at all.
Across these various cases, however, there generally seems to be a sig-
nificant link between legal and illegal migration, as irregular migrants
often rely on the assistance of already legally established migrant popu-
lations for access to jobs and accommodation (cf. Jandl & Kraler
2006). Thus, it has been argued that for Germany, besides geographic
proximity, existing legal migrant populations are likely to account for
relatively large irregular migrant populations from the same source
countries such as Turkey, the Western Balkan states, Vietnam, China
and India (Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004). Social capital – in the form of al-
ready established migrant populations – has also been identified as the
most important factor for the decision to come to the Netherlands (En-
gbersen 2001; Engbersen et al. 2006). Likewise, Chimienti et al.
(2003) find that the decision of irregular migrants to come to Switzer-
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land is usually related to the existence of social and familial networks
with already established migrant populations.
In this context, an interesting study drawing attention to the close re-
lationship between legal and illegal seasonal migration has been car-
ried out in Poland, the main source country of seasonal workers in
Germany (Lukowski 2004). Based on a survey of 800 seasonal migrant
workers as well as 27 interviews, the authors conclude that the structur-
al conditions of the German labour market (high demand for seasonal un-
qualified workers especially in agriculture) create a demand that is sup-
plied by young, energetic (and often overqualified) Polish workers, who
view the wages earned as additional income outside their normal em-
ployment back in Poland (e.g. during teachers’ school holidays). In fact,
the vast majority of their sample of migrant workers had some sort of
employment in Poland and 85 per cent of the money earned in Ger-
many was spent in Poland. Moreover, the authors found that the ex-
pansion of seasonal legal work opportunities in Germany during the
1990s (special quotas for seasonal workers) has resulted in the move-
ment of many Polish workers from illegal to legal employment.
Another interesting study on Poland (Kindler 2005) draws attention
to the fact that migrant-sending countries are often significant destina-
tion countries for irregularly working migrants as well. Based on quali-
tative interviews and participant observation methods, Kindler de-
scribes the significance of temporary irregular migration from Ukraine
to Poland, much of which has been transformed to pendular short-
term migration after the introduction of visa requirements for Ukrai-
nian nationals in Poland in 2003. While in the course of Poland’s inte-
gration to the EU the government had enhanced worksite inspections,
domestic workers (cleaning, day care, health care) who are not subject
to such inspections have little fear of detection and can establish work
contacts relatively easily (e.g. through newspaper ads). Despite signifi-
cantly lower wages for these workers in Poland, Kindler argues that
this temporary migration system has not become a springboard for
moving on to other countries for the particular migrants engaged in it,
the vast majority of whom are women. They are comparatively older,
less risk-taking and less qualified than other migrant groups, and have
to fulfil particular needs of their families back home, a situation which
has kept many of them in a state of ‘lasting temporariness’ (of their
temporary migration projects) for many years (2005: 6). Claire Wal-
lace’s research on migration patterns between Ukraine, Bulgaria and
Romania to Central and Eastern European countries comes to a similar
conclusion. Wallace draws attention to the fact that circular migration
patterns in the Central European region differ from migration between
poorer developing nations and developed ones. Migrants in Central
Europe tend to return to their countries of origin on a regular basis to
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make use of, respectively stay entitled to, welfare services: for health
care, educational or pension purposes (2002: 616).
A major question for this research project is which branches are most
affected by irregular migrant work, and what characterises these
branches and the type of work migrants are doing irregularly. On the
most general level, it is often stated that virtually all branches of the
economy are affected by the illegal employment of foreigners. For ex-
ample, in the regular reports of the German Federal Government on
the impacts of the ‘Law on the Combat of Illegal Employment’ (Bun-
desregierung 2000, 2005), the following areas are mentioned as signif-
icant for the illegal employment of foreigners: construction business
and associated businesses, hotels and restaurants, cleaning of indus-
trial facilities and buildings, agriculture and forestry, food, beverage
and tobacco industry, transportation of persons and goods, metal pro-
cessing industries and businesses in the entertainment sector (bars,
nightclubs, amusement arcades). Also in private households and on
private building sites, it is considered particularly likely that illegally
employed labour is used (Sinn et al. 2005).
Generally, there are good reasons to assume that the extent of irregu-
lar migrant work is linked to the extent of domestic irregular work in
the ‘shadow economy’, of which foreigners make up only a minor part
(cf. Biffl 2001; Schneider 2002, 2005, 2006). However, starting from
estimations provided by Schneider, namely that the share of irregular
employment of migrants in the total informal economy of Germany is
some 13 per cent, Cyrus (2004) indicates that this share is generally
larger in specific industries such as construction, agriculture, tourism
and domestic services. Similarly, in a 2003 workshop on migration and
illegality in Germany, the following branches and areas were men-
tioned as those being ‘most affected’ by irregular migrant work: the
building sector, work in private households, agriculture and the sex in-
dustry (AKI 2003).16 Turning to other countries, Cyrus et al. (2004)
mention the same sectors as the most notorious ones for irregular mi-
grant work in the UK. Similarly, Anderson (1999) lists the construction
industry, agriculture, hotels and catering, household jobs and cleaning
as well as courier services, small enterprise trades and the textile indus-
try as the main sectors where migrants work informally in the UK. For
Switzerland, Longchamp (2005) identifies the same sectors yet again,
namely households, construction, catering, cleaning, agriculture and
prostitution.
Going to the level of occupations and economic activities, Alt (2003a)
mentions the following activities and branches in which irregularly
working migrants are particularly active in Germany: as assistants,
bricklayers and foremen in the construction business, in landscaping
and as gardeners, in window cleaning and cleaning of buildings, in the
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field of domestic services, car repair, as workers in agriculture, restau-
rants and catering, sales assistants, newsagents and in prostitution. In
addition, irregular migrants may also work as self-employed, for exam-
ple, as traders, hawkers or musicians (Alt 1999). Similarly, Lederer and
Nickel (1997) see the access to job opportunities mainly limited to the
following sectors and occupations: domestic help (maids, nursery,
cleaning, renovation), construction trade, catering industry, tourism,
harvesters, seasonal workers, peddlers, ‘professional’ beggars, prostitu-
tion or transnational trade. Moreover, they point out that such informal
labour markets are highly segmented. In reality, specific ethnic groups
often control certain sectors of the informal labour market (e.g. Pakista-
ni nationals selling flowers in restaurants). Similarly, Elwert (2002) de-
scribes irregular labour markets as highly fragmented, as they have to
be sealed off from outsiders and depend on specific forms of organisa-
tion. In this situation, the existence of social and family networks is of
crucial importance. These networks not only provide information on
job opportunities, but also the necessary contacts with irregular job
providers, which are decisive for the actual choice of occupation.
For the UK, Anderson (1999) points to the importance of social and
ethnic networks in the access to specific job opportunities and as a
means of familiarity and protection, which is visible in the textile in-
dustry (notably, the Bangladeshi and Turkish communities) or in cer-
tain self-reliant structures (such as restaurants and small business). At
the same time, however, ethnic networks can also serve as a means of
exploitation of a lasting dependency that frequently devalue their own
people’s qualifications by ‘trapping’ them in low-skilled jobs in their
communities (1999: 174).
Given these many branches and economic activities that are routi-
nely mentioned as important for illegal employment, can certain char-
acteristics be identified that make these areas particularly susceptible to
irregular migrant work? According to the literature, the following fac-
tors seem to be most relevant: a standardised qualification profile (low-
skilled jobs), seasonal or generally high fluctuation of workers, labour
intensive jobs that are hard to mechanise and a relatively low risk of
detection. Moreover, it has been argued that – besides private house-
holds – it is mainly small- and medium-sized businesses that use the
services of irregular migrants in Germany, that is businesses whose
production methods are labour-intensive and that are not able to out-
source production to low-wage countries (cf. Alscher et al. 2001; AKI
2003, 2003a). Accordingly, we would expect irregular migrant work to
be higher in branches that have some or all of these characteristic fea-
tures (agriculture, construction, domestic services) but lower in other
branches (e.g. in industrial production, where firms are often larger,
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unionised, subject to a high level of control and can either mechanise
nor outsource their labour-intensive production).
Which of these factors predominates and structures irregular mi-
grant work cannot be established a priori. Cyrus (2004), for example,
argues that the employment of undocumented migrants in Germany is
limited to a few industries in which the risk to be controlled is also rela-
tively low, with the risk in domestic services being lowest. Because of
the nature of work in construction (many short-term tasks contracted
out) and the large number of construction sites, the risks to be con-
trolled in construction are also relatively low, even though law enforce-
ment is to some degree focused on construction. In the agriculture, ca-
tering and restaurant sectors, on the other hand, irregularity occurs
mainly in terms of ‘breach of wage and work condition regulations’
rather than in breach of immigration regulations (ibid.: 34).
The last observation refers to an important development that has
been observed and described in some recent studies on irregular mi-
grant work: the increasing proliferation of legal statuses, which blur
the lines between legal and illegal. This development has been linked
to the recent round of EU enlargements that created complex regula-
tions and restrictions in access to the labour markets of the EU-15 for
citizens of the new EU countries (cf. Favell 2006), but has also become
visible in those countries where no such restrictions were introduced.
For the UK, Anderson and Ruhs (2006) argue that the very flexibility
of the British economy has produced a flourishing demand for irregu-
lar work that is increasingly filled by irregular or semi-legal means, for
example, in the form of subcontractors or short-term fragmented irre-
gular work. In a study on the impact of EU enlargement on legal status
in the UK, based on a large survey with over 500 migrants from Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries as well as interviews with mi-
grants, employers and host families, they introduce the concept of
‘semi-compliance’ in the UK labour market and divide the legal status
of migrants into compliant (both in terms of residence and work
rights), non-compliant (migrants without residence rights) and semi-
compliant (legally resident but not complying with work regulations;
this was the largest group in the sample). Relevant examples of the lat-
ter are students working over twenty hours per week, au pairs working
and earning more than allowed, etc. In this view, immigrant status be-
comes a spectrum and not a dichotomy, which raises important ques-
tions on how the state can and should act on semi-compliance in the
migrant labour market.
Another set of important studies and data on irregular work stems
from NGOs that defend the rights of undocumented migrants. The
European Civic Forum focuses on the European dimension of labour
migration and irregular work and has done extensive studies on the life
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and work situation of seasonal workers in the region of Almeria, Spain,
a European centre of agricultural production (EBF/CEDRI 2004;
Bolyos & Behr 2007; Hahn, Behr & Dinhof 2007). Another NGO that
defends the rights of irregular migrant workers on a European level is
the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Mi-
grants (PICUM), which publishes regular reports on the living situa-
tion of undocumented migrants, as well as on the respective policy fra-
mework. The report ‘Undocumented migrant workers in Europe’ (Le-
Voy, Verbruggen & Wets 2003) analyses the EU policy framework with
regard to irregular work, but also presents working conditions of mi-
grant workers in different economic branches. A current report by PI-
CUM focuses on access to health care for irregular migrants in several
European countries, also including a chapter on the Austrian situation
(PICUM 2007).
Finally, we should say a few words on issues that have not been
touched upon in this comparative literature review, focusing on general
patterns and characteristics of irregular migrant work. Generalisations
are always hard to make in a field as diversified as our current research
topic, while the higher the level of abstraction of a statement or hypoth-
esis on the nature of irregular migrant work, the more likely it is that
it will be contradicted by place-specific and context-specific particulari-
ties. A good example is provided by residence patterns of irregularly/
illegally residing migrants and irregularly working migrants. One argu-
ment why irregularly/illegally residing migrants are thought to prefer
to live in larger cities rather than smaller ones (or even the country-
side) is that the anonymity of the city offers a form of protection
against detection – living in bigger cities minimises the risk of appre-
hension by enforcement authorities (Engbersen 1999b). Another argu-
ment is provided by the higher availability of irregular work opportu-
nities in larger cities, which is thought to contribute to a concentration
of irregularly/illegally residing migrants mainly in urban areas (cf. AKI
2003 for Germany). Others, however, have pointed out that irregular
migrants are seen to be present in rural areas as well, insofar as em-
ployment opportunities (mostly of a seasonal nature, in agriculture or
related industries) exist there (Cyrus 2004).
On a general level, then, the distribution of irregularly working mi-
grants cannot be sensibly predicted as long as we do not know enough
about the causal factors of irregularly working migrants’ spatial distri-
bution, and the distribution of job opportunities for irregular migrants
(e.g. in the catering and the tourist sectors, in childcare and elderly
care, in ‘ethnic’ businesses, etc.) in any given country or region. Based
on an empirical study on the spatial distribution of irregular migrants
in the The Hague, Engbersen et al. (2006) identify four important fac-
tors for the observed residential patterns of irregular migrants in this
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city: 1) existing social capital and network effects through legally estab-
lished co-ethnic migrants; 2) economic opportunities for irregular
migrants, which are partially provided in migrant-specific facilities
(mosques, shops, hairdressers, coffee houses, etc.); 3) the availability of
cheap and safe accommodation; and 4) patterns of relationships with
the native population (e.g. as spouses, partners, servants, cleaners).
Which of these factors predominates is subject to empirical observa-
tion.
Similarly, the gender distribution of irregular migrants cannot be es-
tablished a priori and depends mainly on the opportunities present in
various sectors. For Germany, for example, Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. (2004)
refer to police statistics for 2002 that show that around 75 per cent of
apprehended illegal migrants were male, but caution that this could re-
flect a bias in identification. They conclude that it is safer to say that at
least 25 per cent were female.
Other factors that are often treated in studies on irregular migration
in European countries are likely to be even more context specific, espe-
cially when they are tied to the concrete rules, regulations and imple-
mentation practices of national labour markets and welfare systems. In
the aforementioned review study of Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. (2004), the
authors indicate that for Germany, the overall impact of irregular mi-
grant work on wages and unemployment of nationals is likely to be
small, but there are likely to be sector-specific exceptions in which ille-
gal workers may be in competition with indigenous workers, mainly in
construction and private household services (but not in agriculture any-
more, as there is now easy access for seasonal workers). Likewise, the
impact on the German welfare system is seen as likely to be small, as
irregular migrants are mostly excluded from public services. While the
same is in principle true for other countries as well, the specific imple-
mentation practices of health and welfare agencies may lead to differ-
ent results in different countries. The easy availability of National In-
surance Numbers in the UK, for example, is known to significantly fa-
cilitate the access of irregular migrants to free universal health care
services (Jordan & Du¨vell 2002; Du¨vell 2005).
1.8 Existing research and data on illegal foreign employment in
Austria
In contrast to the significant number of research projects on irregular
migrant work (usually referred to as illegal foreign employment) that
have been carried out in other European countries, little attention has
been devoted to the subject by researchers in Austria. Studies and re-
ports referring to migration and labour markets have mainly focused
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on regular foreign employment, while irregular migration and infor-
mal work is mentioned only in passing, if at all (cf. Biffl 2003, 2005;
Bock-Schappelwein 2004; Demel et al. 2001; Fassmann & Stacher
2003). Other studies that do address irregular migration in Austria re-
main on a legal or theoretical level without going into the structure of
irregular labour markets in Austria (cf. C¸inar et al. 2000; Fronek
2000; Riedel 2000). A specific issue that has received much attention
in the recent literature on labour migration to Austria is EU enlarge-
ment and its effects on Austrian labour markets (cf. Commission of
the European Communities 2003; Fassmann & Mu¨nz 2002). In this
context, the potential for an increase in irregular migrant work by new
EU citizens due to the immediate validity of freedom of movement
and residence from May 2004 onwards, in connection with continued
restrictions in the access to the labour market, has been squarely pre-
dicted (Huber & Bru¨cker 2003; Jandl & Hofmann 2004) without, how-
ever, providing much empirical evidence for these claims.
A partial exception to the widespread omission of irregular activities
in studies on the effects of the 2004 EU enlargement is provided by a
project of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society for Social Research. In this pro-
ject, a group of researchers developed an instrument for a continuous
labour market monitoring in the border regions around Eastern Aus-
tria (including the greater Vienna region) and empirically tested their
approach. Based on extensive surveys of potential migrants within
commuting distance in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, the
study concluded that there is a considerable general migration poten-
tial within the region, but that the current ‘active migration potential’
(that is, persons with language skills who had already taken concrete
steps to work in Austria) was rather low (0.7 per cent, 1.2 per cent and
0.5 per cent of the respective samples in Hungary, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic). Moreover, the future development of actual labour
migration from Austria’s neighbouring regions is seen as highly de-
pendent on the extent of economic growth and development and con-
tinued regional wage differentials between the regions (Hudler-Seitz-
berger & Bittner 2005: 93). However, an analysis of 90 expert inter-
views carried out in the same region in 2004 as part of the same
project predicted a potential increase in the amount of illegal employ-
ment as well as in the number of self-employed migrants following EU
enlargement. More concretely, construction, agriculture, catering and
domestic services were identified as the main attraction points for irre-
gularly working migrants. According to the expert interviews, the share
of irregular migrant workers among the regular stream of commuters
to Austria was already relatively high before 2004, especially for mi-
grants from Hungary and Slovakia. Many of these commuters are
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young and well-qualified, but most are employed in jobs below their
qualifications (Paul Lazarsfeld Gesellschaft fu¨r Sozialforschung 2004).
A recent study on the quantitative effects of EU enlargement on the
labour markets in the EU-15 shows that labour migration from the EU-
8 (the ten new EU Member States minus Cyprus and Malta) has con-
siderably increased in Austria despite the restrictions imposed by the
transitional rules for access to the labour market (Tamas & Mu¨nz
2006). Between 2003 and the end of 2005, the share of EU-8 workers
increased from 1.2 per cent to 1.5 per cent (or 45,000) of the total la-
bour force in Austria (while it remained more or less stable in Ger-
many at 0.7 per cent). This increase was partly due a growing number
of EU-8 citizens with free access to the labour market (year end 2005:
15,700) and partly due to a flexible handling of short-term permits for
EU-8 workers (2003: 48,000; 2005: 56,000), in which EU citizens re-
ceive preferential treatment in the allocation of short-term permits (see
Section 1.9). At the same time, the number of EU-8 citizens who have
registered as self-employed service providers has tripled (2003: 2,000;
2005: 6,000), a development which, according to the authors, can at
least partly be interpreted as a way of circumventing transitional re-
strictions.
Apart from the few studies on general labour migration and/or the
effects of EU enlargement on migration to Austria that also address ir-
regular migrant work, there are only very few studies that specifically
deal with illegal/irregular employment of migrants as such. One early
exception is a study carried out by Hofer (1993), which relies mainly
on participant observation (Hofer himself worked irregularly in the in-
formal economy), as well as qualitative interviews with irregular Polish
migrants in Vienna conducted over the course of one year. At that time
(1992 – shortly after the fall of the Iron Curtain), Polish workers in
Austria were a rather new class of immigrants, with few established
networks. Consequently, most had to rely on finding work by standing
by the roadside (Arbeiterstrich), where workers offer their labour directly
to potential employers passing by. In the early 1990s, most of the
workers on the well-known Arbeiterstrich Herbsstrasse were Polish and
male. They were selected for their strong physical appearance and their
manual skills and had to endure hard and unpleasant work for little
money. Irregular migrants were hired for construction sites or for pri-
vate building sites, and sometimes the work was organised by workers
coming to Austria to fulfil specific tasks. Moreover, Hofer notes that
construction enterprises used migrant networks to keep their own en-
terprise as ethnically ‘clean’ as possible, to avoid conflicts and competi-
tion between different migrant communities. Generally, migrant work-
ers were used for unskilled work that needed to be done by assistants
to the – mostly Austrian – skilled workers. However, because they were
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less expensive to hire, they were also in competition with unskilled and
older migrant workers whose job opportunities decreased. In Hofer’s
opinion, the continued employment of irregular workers decreased the
ability – and the desire – of enterprises to expand the employment of
regular workers, and undermined labour and income standards on the
labour market.
The latter argument is also put forward in a Master’s thesis by Stau-
dinger (1992), who adds another important reason for employers to
pay their workers ‘off the books’, namely the existence of so-called
‘black money’. This is undeclared income that businesses receive with-
out providing a receipt, and it can be used to pay undeclared wages
without raising further suspicions by the tax authorities.
All over Europe, a growing number of migrants – generally female
and in many cases undocumented – are employed by private house-
holds as caregivers and cleaners. It was only in recent years that the in-
ternational discourse on domestic work and care-giving was picked up
by Austrian researchers. In 2004, two qualitative studies were pub-
lished by Caixeta et al. and Rechling, examining the living and working
conditions of the so-called live-out domestic workers (migrant women
generally employed on an hourly basis). Many of the interviewed wo-
men from diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds faced de-qualifica-
tion. As a consequence, it is not surprising that most of them assessed
their working situation as a temporary and transitory stage in their
work cycle. This fact is also connected to the low social status of do-
mestic and care-giving work. In a further publication, by Haidinger
(2004), the Austrian sector for domestic services is analysed from an
economic perspective. In her work, Haidinger collects, analyses and
compares quantitative data from various statistical sources and pro-
vides a good overview of existing data on the formal sector for domestic
services, as well as estimations on persons engaged in this sector of
the informal economy.
Another study carried out by a group of social scientists in 1999 ex-
amined the situation of illegally resident or illegally employed (foreign)
cleaning ladies in Austria (Social Impact 2000). The project resulted
from the cooperation of sociologists and artists in order to achieve a
combination of scientific rational and emotional subjective understand-
ing. The goal of the project was thus not only to study the living condi-
tions of irregularly working migrant women working as cleaning la-
dies, but also to contribute concretely to the improvement of their si-
tuation. The empirical part of the project relied on a limited number
(fifteen) of problem-centred qualitative interviews with migrant wo-
men, as well as with some of their employers. The interviews reflect
the main concerns of the respondents, which include the fear of get-
ting sick (which can lead to being fired) or getting caught and deported
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by the police, as well as worries about their children. Most of the inter-
viewees were overqualified for their jobs as cleaning ladies and wished
they could start to work in their own occupational field as they used to
do in their home country. This means that they wished to recover the
social identity they used to have in their country of origin. Finally, the
study draws attention to the crucial role of networks in the lives of irre-
gularly working migrant women. Similar to the findings of qualitative
studies in other European countries (e.g. Hofer 1993), social networks
seemed to play a much more important role than institutional or pro-
fessional help for finding a job or a flat.
An interesting study that sheds light on the conditions of production
in Austrian industrial agriculture and its relationship to irregular mi-
grant work is the Master’s thesis of Behr (2003). Though not restricted
to irregular work per se, this empirical study of seven different agricul-
tural enterprises in Marchfeld in Lower Austria demonstrates the poor
working and living conditions of seasonal migrant workers in vegetable
and fruit gardening. While the author argues that outright illegal em-
ployment (i.e. non-registration) of migrant workers in agriculture has
diminished due to the easy availability of work permits for seasonal
workers (up to six months) and harvesters (up to six weeks), the inter-
views with migrant workers and their employers show that minimum
employment conditions (work hours, rest periods, safety standards) are
systematically violated, which results in extreme work conditions and
exploitative work situations. While regular minimum wages are already
extremely low for seasonal agricultural workers (around 3.30 euro per
hour), most employers still save on taxes and social security contribu-
tions by registering workers as only part-time (e.g. twenty hours a
week, while actual working hours can amount to twelve hours a day or
more) and paying the rest informally in cash. Moreover, the particular
organisation of harvest work (foremen giving work orders, piece work,
accommodation with employer, food onsite, etc.) structures work rela-
tions and often leads to a high degree of dependency of the workers on
their employers and/or recruitment agencies. Even if seasonal migrant
workers are registered with the labour market services, they do not
have the opportunity to protest against their poor working conditions
or even to organise in trade unions. As the study shows, however,
much depends on the personal relationship of the migrant workers
with their particular employer and the way of recruitment. Sometimes
there is a privileged core group of workers that comes every year, while
others are recruited through specialised agencies. New (and more moti-
vated) workers may be hired as ‘competitors’ in order to mobilise re-
turning (already experienced but less motivated) workers to work more
efficiently. Proven and reliable workers are often employed as ‘control-
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lers’ and are given a privileged position in comparison to other workers
(better pay, cell phones, etc.).
Several of the agricultural enterprises studied by Behr (2003) were
‘specialised’ in hiring workers of some specific ethnic or national back-
ground, and farmers often consciously admitted they are not employ-
ing some specific groups that would differ in mentality (e.g. Roma-
nians, Serbs). Nevertheless, the author also notes a growing competi-
tion between workers from various countries of origin and predicts
that seasonal workers and harvesters from the (former) accession coun-
tries (Poland, Hungary, etc.) will be replaced by workers from more dis-
tant East European countries (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus), simply on the ba-
sis of wage differentials and the motivation to do hard and unpleasant
work for very low wages.
The project ‘Undocumented Worker Transitions’, which will be com-
pleted in 2009, researches the status transitions in the broader nexus
between labour and regular/irregular migration flows to Europe and
involves qualitative migrant interviews as well as legal analyses in five
European countries, one of them being Austria (FORBA 2007).
Besides these limited qualitative studies, very little research has been
done on the structure and processes of irregular foreign employment
in Austria. Some researchers have, however, attempted to provide esti-
mates on the quantitative extent of irregular foreign employment on
the Austrian labour market. An early figure (now somewhat dated) was
provided by Pichelmann (1994), who estimated that in the early
1990s, between 80,000 and 100,000 foreigners were illegally em-
ployed in Austria. Pichelmann based his figures on statistics from the
Inspectorate of Labour and extrapolated from a sample of illegally em-
ployed foreign workers found to be present at worksites during routine
controls.
In a comprehensive study on the economic integration of foreigners
in Austria by Biffl (2001), the leading labour market economist in Aus-
tria devotes a section to informal foreign employment in the ‘black’
economy and provides an excellent overview of the difficulties one may
encounter when: 1) attempting to estimate the actual quantitative size
of illegal foreign employment in a country and 2) trying to identify and
define different categories of illegal foreign employment as such. Ac-
cording to Biffl, the main reason for the growing significance of the
black economy – and of the illegal employment of foreigners in parti-
cular – lies in economic change and the resulting changes in forms of
labour organisation (growth of the service sector, new technologies,
flexibilisation, informalisation, etc.). In addition to such favourable fac-
tors on the demand side, there is also a growing number of individuals
willing or forced to engage in illegal employment on the supply side.
Among the latter category, migrants represent an increasingly impor-
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tant group – though by far not the only one. The wage differentials be-
tween Austria and its eastern neighbours provide clear incentives for
migrants from these countries to engage in irregular circular labour
migration. However, the very heterogeneity of illegal foreign employ-
ment often prevents the application of clear definitions and concepts
in research on the phenomenon, which further hampers the gathering
of representative and systematic data.
Given these caveats, Biffl then presents her own estimation method
on the extent of illegal foreign employment in Austria. Based on the as-
sumption that the black economy contributes about 8.7 per cent to to-
tal value creation in Austria (a figure included in official GDP esti-
mates), and given the fact that typical areas of illegal employment are
the more labour-intense sectors of the economy, it is estimated that the
actual labour force deployed to the black economy corresponds to 10
per cent of the total labour force in Austria.
It is further assumed that both Austrian nationals and migrants en-
gage in illegal employment. While it is often stated that migrants are
over-represented in this group (due to existing restrictions in their legal
access to the labour market), Biffl argues that this effect may be neutra-
lised by the fact that Austrian nationals are likely to have a broader
range of opportunities for irregular work at their disposal (e.g. free-
lance jobs), whereas illegal employment can be observed frequently.
Thus, while ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ illegal employment might appear
differently, the relative total extent is not likely to vary that much. As
foreigners represent an average of 10 per cent of the labour force, the
total extent of illegal foreign employment would then comprise 35,000
persons (in full-time equivalents), though the actual number of for-
eigners engaged in (full-time and part-time) illegal foreign employ-
ment is likely to be significantly higher (between 50,000-70,000). Biffl
further estimates that between 80 and 90 per cent of the illegal foreign
employees are migrants residing in Austria, while 10-20 per cent (or
up to 10,000 persons) engage in ‘labour tourism’ (irregular labour
commuting) every year. Ten to 20 per cent of the illegal foreign em-
ployees are estimated to be officially registered in ‘minor employment’
(geringfu¨gige Bescha¨ftigung). Ten to 20 per cent are estimated to be for-
eign students. Another 10-20 per cent are believed to be foreigners leg-
ally residing in Austria, who for various reasons do not have legal ac-
cess to the labour market. Only about 10,000 (again 10-20 per cent)
are estimated to fall under the category ‘illegal residence/illegal em-
ployment’.
These estimations on the extent of illegal foreign employment in
Austria differ quite significantly from those made by economist Frie-
drich Schneider for about the same period. In his estimations on the
sizes of the shadow economies (defined as ‘all unregistered economic
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activities that contribute to the officially calculated GDP’; see Schneider
& Klinglmaier 2004: 4), Schneider uses econometric models that at-
tempt to estimate unobserved variables (GDP, output) with the help of
observed variables (e.g. cash in circulation). The so-called currency-de-
mand approach is based on the idea that services in the shadow econo-
my are usually paid in cash and that the size of such transactions can
be estimated with properly specified currency-demand equations, while
the so-called DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes)
model links the unobserved variable (the size of the shadow economy)
with a set of indicators through a number of structural equations (cf.
Schneider & Enste 1999, 2000).
Schneider (2002) estimates that the absolute and relative size of the
shadow economy in Austria has grown considerably over the past 30
years. While it was only 1.89 per cent of the official GDP in 1970, it
grew to 2.69 per cent in 1980, 5.47 per cent in 1990 and 10.69 per
cent of the official GDP in 2002. However, later estimates (Schneider
2005) indicate that after the year 2000, the shadow economy in Aus-
tria has stabilised at 10-11 per cent, with a provisional estimate of 10.27
per cent for the year 2005. For 2006, a decrease to 9.70 per cent has
been estimated (Schneider 2006). This aggregate estimate for 2006
can be further refined by sectors of economic activity: construction and
handicraft 39 per cent, other trade and industry 16 per cent, service in-
dustry such as hotel and catering 16 per cent, leisure and entertain-
ment 12 per cent and household services and other 17 per cent. Based
on the estimations of the shadow economy output, estimates on the ex-
tent of ‘black labour’ involved are provided. For 2006, these are esti-
mated to involve 716,000 native Austrians (full-time equivalents, thus
a highly fictional number of a much larger number of Austrians in-
volved part-time) and 98,000 illegal foreign workers (full-time equiva-
lents; ibid.: 18).
1.9 The regulation of migration and foreign employment in
Austria
Although Austria has a long history of immigration, it has never offi-
cially defined itself as an immigration country. In the 1960s, Austria
introduced a guest-worker model along the lines of the Swiss and Ger-
man model to temporarily fill low-skilled jobs that could not otherwise
be filled by natives. This system of temporary labour migration offi-
cially ended with the advent of the first oil crisis in 1973. While many
of the foreign workers did return home in subsequent years, many also
stayed and brought their families with them. During the 1980s, even
more migrants settled in Austria on family reunification or humanitar-
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ian (asylum) grounds, until a new economic boom at the beginning of
the 1990s led to a short-lived liberalisation of the labour migration re-
gime, again boosting foreign employment in Austria. It was also dur-
ing this time of extraordinarily high migration that Austria instituted
its only-ever ‘legalisation’ campaign in 1990, when foreign workers
were able to regularise their status after very brief periods of residence
with no questions asked (around 35,000 persons took advantage of
such special administrative procedures). In addition to this new wave
of labour migration and the ensuing family reunification, Austria ad-
mitted around 95,000 war refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina be-
tween 1992 and 1995. As a consequence of all these developments, the
number of foreigners in Austria almost doubled from 344,000 in 1988
to 690,000 in 1993 (or around 9 per cent of the population), a level at
which it has since more or less stabilised. The two largest immigrant
groups today are still people coming from the traditional ‘recruiting’
countries: former Yugoslavia and Turkey (Jandl & Kraler 2003).17
At the beginning of the 1990s, Austria started to restrict further im-
migration through the introduction of a dual quota system. Already in
1990, a quota for the employment of foreigners (as an upper percen-
tage of total employment) was introduced, and in 1993 a new Resi-
dence Act established quotas for different categories of migrants, limit-
ing the number of new residence permits to be issued each year. These
laws have since been revised several times (most recently by the new
Aliens’ Act 2005) but have retained the dual quota system. Currently,
three major laws regulate migration and access to the labour market
for foreigners in Austria: the Aliens’ Act (Fremdengesetz – FrG) with
the Residence and Settlement Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsge-
setz – NAG) and the Employment of Foreign Nationals Act (Ausla¨nder-
bescha¨ftigungsgesetz – AuslBG). The Aliens’ Act regulates the en-
trance, residence and settlement of foreigners (non-EU citizens only)
in Austria and distinguishes between those who reside temporarily
(e.g. students, temporary employed persons, commuters) and those
who want to settle permanently in Austria. The latter group enjoys spe-
cial treatment such as the consolidation of residence status but also
has to fulfil special obligations: since 2003, they have had to fulfil the
so-called ‘integration agreement’ (Integrationsvereinbarung), involving
language courses for those with insufficient German language skills.18
In principle, then, new immigrants who are non-EU nationals and
are not otherwise exempted from immigration restrictions are subject
to an annual immigration quota. This quota is fixed each year by the
federal government after consultations with the relevant parliamentary
committee and the social partners. The Austrian-wide quota is then di-
vided into sub-quotas for the federal states, which are further divided
into subcategories according to the purpose of residence (family reuni-
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fication, ‘key personnel’, private and others). In addition, a special quo-
ta for seasonal workers and (since 2001) ‘harvest helpers’ has been in-
troduced. The annual quotas for the years 1998-2006 are given in
Table 1.2.
In reality, however, actual immigration is much higher than the an-
nual immigration quota would indicate because so many categories of
immigrants in Austria are not subject to the quota. As Table 1.3 indi-
cates, less than 10 per cent of all new immigrants are subject to the es-
tablished quota.
From the more than 100,000 immigrants registered in 2004, most
fall outside any quota restrictions due to international commitments
(EU nationals and their family members, asylum seekers, diplomats
and their personnel, etc.) or because they have otherwise managed to
evade restrictions (e.g. through illegal entry with subsequent registra-
Table 1.2 Annual migration quotas in Austria
Total quota of which:
Family
reunification
Key
personnel
Others*
1998 8,540 4,550 1,860 4,500
1999 9,565 5,210 1,130 5,500
2000 7,860 5,000 1,010 5,500
2001 8,338 5,490 1,613 15,000
2002 8,280 5,490 1,905 15,000
2003 8,070 5,490 2,405 15,000
2004 8,050 5,490 2,200 15,000
2005 7,500 5,460 1,600 15,000
2006 7,000 4,480 1,125 15,000
* Seasonal workers and harvesters
Source: Ministry of Interior
Table 1.3 Immigration and emigration of non-nationals to Austria
Immigration Emigration Net migration
1998 59,229 44,865 14,364
1999 72,379 47,279 25,100
2000 65,954 44,367 21,587
2001 74,786 51,010 45,372*
2002 92,567 38,777 53,790
2003 97,164 46,065 51,099
2004 108,947 48,326 60,621
2005 101,455 47,480 53,975
2006** 85,384 52,904 32,480
* Statistical break in series
** Provisional numbers
Source: Statistics Austria
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tion). In 2004, people who were exempt from the quota included
36,198 citizens from the EU-24, of whom 16,310 were from the ten
new EU Member States and 13,179 from Germany. After EU nationals,
the second largest group of quota-exempt immigrants was made up of
family members of Austrian and other EU citizens, including 23,308
third-country nationals who received a residence permit as a family
member of an Austrian citizen and 559 family members of nationals of
EU/EEA citizens (Ko¨nig & Perchinig 2005: 2).
It has already been mentioned that in addition to the entry, residence
and settlement of foreigners governed by the Aliens’ Act, the employ-
ment of foreigners in Austria is regulated under the Foreign Employ-
ment Law (Ausla¨nderbescha¨ftigungsgesetz – AuslBG). In principle, a
foreigner may only be employed if he or she has been granted an em-
ployment permit by the Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice –
AMS); if he or she possesses another entitlement to work (work permit
– Arbeitserlaubnis; certificate of exemption – Befreiungsschein, etc.); a
long-term residence permit (either an unlimited residence permit, a
settlement permit – unlimited or an entitlement ‘permanent stay –
EC’); or if he or she is otherwise exempted from the Foreign Employ-
ment Law. Among the latter, the major groups who do not require a
special work permit are family members of Austrian citizens, conven-
tion refugees, diplomats and all ‘old’ EU and EEA citizens. However,
with the accession of ten new Member States to the EU in 2004, a
new law (EU Expansion Adjustment Law) codified that nationals of the
‘new’ Member States (except for Malta and Cyprus) still remain subject
to the Foreign Employment Law for a transition period.19
To simplify, the Aliens’ Act and the Foreign Employment Law restrict
new labour immigration of non-EU citizens to a) ‘highly qualified per-
sonnel’ and b) so-called ‘seasonal workers’ and ‘harvesters’ (Ko¨nig &
Perchinig 2003: 6). These restrictions have been extended under tran-
sition rules to nationals of the ten new EU Member States (minus Mal-
ta and Cyprus) who joined the EU in 2004, first until 2006 and then
until 2009. A further extension (up to 2011) is only possible in case of
‘grave disturbances’ on the labour market and has to be agreed to by
the European Commission. In 2006, the transition rules have also
been extended to nationals of the new EU Member States Bulgaria and
Romania (in a first phase from 2007 to 2009). While these transition
rules prevent unrestricted access to the labour market for citizens of
the new EU Member States for the time being, these individuals never-
theless receive preferential treatment in access to employment permits
over third-country nationals (BMWA 2006).
The requirements for the issuing of an employment permit (Bescha¨f-
tigungsbewilligung) to new immigrants from outside the EU or from the
new EU countries subject to transitional rules are such that lower qua-
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lified migrants may only enter Austria as ‘seasonal workers’, ‘harvest-
ers’ or under very limited cross-border commuter schemes (in place
only with Hungary and the Czech Republic). Otherwise, in order to
qualify as ‘key personnel’ under the annual immigration quota, the
prospective immigrant has to demonstrate to the Employment Service
earnings of at least 60 per cent of the upper threshold for social secur-
ity contributions, which in 2007 amounts to a 2,304 euro gross
monthly salary, fourteen times a year (Beratungszentrum 2007). Em-
ployment permits for seasonal workers are issued for a maximum of
six months by the Employment Service within the quotas for seasonal
workers (employment permits for harvesters are issued for a maximum
of six weeks within the quota for harvesters). Citizens from the new
EU Member States again receive preferential access to seasonal work
permits and harvesting, which are normally issued for temporary em-
ployment in tourism and agriculture but are in principle no longer re-
stricted to these sectors.
To alleviate labour shortages in the health and care sector, in 2004
the minimum income threshold for key personnel in this sector was
lowered to 40 per cent of the upper threshold for social security contri-
butions (2007: 1,536 euro) for health care workers and caregivers from
the new EU Member States only. Foreign students may obtain an em-
ployment permit outside the quota, if the work to be performed does
not distract them from their studies, which is normally assumed for
work paying less than the threshold for so-called ‘minor employment’
(2007: 341 euro). Top managers and top researchers (2007 income
threshold: 4,608 euro) are exempted from the Foreign Employment
Law altogether. Foreign au pairs are also exempted from the require-
ment to obtain an employment permit, but their certificate has to be
renewed after six months, provided that they fulfil the conditions20 of
their status (BMWA 2006).
In addition to these regulations on the access to the labour market
for dependent employees from third countries and from the EU-8
countries (under transitional regulations), there is a complex set of
highly differentiated regulations on self-employment that restricts non-
nationals’ access of to self-employment in Austria. Generally, these
trade regulations (mainly the Austrian Industrial Code (Gewerbeord-
nung) and the EU Service Directive that includes the Posting of Work-
ers Directive enable EU citizens to freely register a trade and to offer
their services in Austria. However, for new EU-8 citizens, self-employ-
ment in many economic sectors such as construction and many con-
struction-related activities is also subject to restrictions under transi-
tional regulations. As we will see in the following chapters, this compli-
cated set of regulations has given rise to a sophisticated system of
circumventing existing restrictions through quasi-regular forms of self-
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employment. A more detailed description of the rules and the ways
they are circumvented is provided in Section 2 of Part 3 in this report.
1.10 Control of irregular migrant work at the workplace
As the preceding section shows, foreigners in Austria are subject to a
wide range of rules and regulations specific to their status as non-na-
tionals (e.g. in regard to their entry and residence, but also in access to
work). Compliance with these rules is also divided across a range of
authorities, most importantly the Aliens Police but also the Employ-
ment Service, the Border Police or the magistrates. Moreover, to control
the seemingly growing illegal employment of foreigners, a special unit
was established within the Ministry of Economy and Labour (MEL) in
the early 1990s: the Control Unit for Illegal Foreign Employment
(Kontrolle der Illegalen Ausla¨nderbescha¨ftigung, KIAB).
In recent years, however, it has become clear that irregular (illegal)
foreign employment is no longer primarily a problem of the illegal re-
sidence of foreigners, but of a wider range of irregularities that may oc-
cur alongside a legal residence status of foreigners. At the same time,
more attention has been paid to the irregular work of natives, which of-
ten occurs alongside that of foreigners in the workplace. As a conse-
quence, the focus of controls has been shifted towards detecting and
preventing all forms of irregular employment (that is, all employment
in contravention to labour, tax and social security regulations) by na-
tives and foreigners, as well as employment in contravention to foreign
employment regulations.
In July 2002, the KIAB first came under the supervision of the cus-
tom authorities in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). In 2004, the unit
was renamed from the Control Unit for Illegal Foreign Employment to
the Control Unit for Illegal Employment, though still maintained its
German acronym KIAB. Over the past few years, the control unit has
quickly expanded from a staff of 39 in 2000 to a staff of 93 in mid-
2002, to a staff of 186 in May 2004 (conforming to the date of EU en-
largement and the expected increase in irregular employment from
new EU nationals). From 2006 onwards, the unit is supposed to be
supplemented by another 300 staff members.
Conforming to this increase in control staff, the number of worksite
inspections (sometimes small workplaces, sometimes large construc-
tion sites involving dozens of worksite inspectors and including tax
authorities, Aliens Police and others) has grown enormously in recent
years. Consequently, after decreasing in the second half of the 1990s,
the number of foreigners detected in illegal employment has also
grown over the past five years (see Table 1.4).
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If we divide the number of foreigners detected in irregular employ-
ment at Austrian worksites by the number of inspections, we can see
that the average number of detected foreigners per worksite fell to 0.24
in 2001 and further to 0.20 in the second half of 2002.21 Since 2003,
however, this indicator steadily increased to 0.41 in 2005 and was 0.37
in 2006. It would be too easy, however, to attribute this increase in the
efficiency of inspections (almost a doubling in the ‘success’ of inspec-
tions) solely to an increase in illegal foreign employment, as the work-
site inspections are not performed randomly across all Austrian work-
sites. Rather, most inspections are carried out on the basis of certain
prior information received by the control bodies. Such tip-offs can
come from private individuals (e.g. neighbours of employers hiring ir-
regular workers) or from regular employees of firms that also employ
irregular workers. Other hints are provided by unsuccessful bidders in
tender (e.g. for big construction projects that were won by employers
of low-cost workers working irregularly) or from other public authori-
ties (e.g. health or sanitary inspectors). In addition to worksite inspec-
tions based on such cues, the KIAB devises its own control strategy.
For example, they might control all firms of a certain branch in a pre-
defined district and time period. Therefore, an increased success rate
may also indicate more denunciations or a better organisation and
higher level of training of the inspection staff.
Looking more closely at the raw data on foreigners apprehended for
irregularities in their employment status, it must be noted that there is
indeed a growing disconnection between irregularity of work and ille-
gal residence. As mentioned, this has been anticipated by the transfor-
Table 1.4 Apprehended illegally employed foreigners in Austria
Year 1) Number of worksite
inspections
2) Number of apprehended
illegally employed foreigners
2) / 1)
1995 11,513 4,210 0.37
1996 14,363 4,083 0.28
1997 14,452 3,858 0.27
1998 15,537 2,999 0.19
1999 14,027 2,550 0.18
2000 13,211 2,881 0.22
2001 12,765 3,010 0.24
2002* 6,602 1,293 0.20
2003 21,140 5,690 0.27
2004 23,222 6,201 0.27
2005 18,579 7,641 0.41
2006 22,367 8,206 0.37
* Second half only
Source: Ministry of Economy and Labour (up to 2001); Ministry of Finance (from second
half of 2002)
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mation of the KIAB into an outfit of the Ministry of Finance responsi-
ble for all kinds of irregularities on the labour market. As already out-
lined, since May 2004, foreigners from the Central and Eastern Eur-
opean countries that joined the EU cannot (by definition) be illegal re-
sidents in Austria any longer, yet they still face restrictions in their
access to legal employment for the time of the transition periods (at
least until 2009 and possibly longer). According to the KIAB, the ma-
jority of apprehended foreigners on worksites are from Central, Eastern
and South-Eastern European countries.
If we look at a breakdown of apprehended foreigners illegally em-
ployed at worksites in the three regions this study focuses on, we can
see that generally the most notorious branches are, as in other Eur-
opean countries, construction and related industries and catering and
tourism. This is true both before and after EU enlargement in 2004,
as can be seen from the following three tables (Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7).
In interpreting these data, we should ask two main questions. First,
does the recorded distribution of apprehended illegally employed for-
eigners across sectors conform to the actual distribution of irregular
migrant work across these sectors and, second, how can we interpret
changes in the recorded distribution over time? Both questions are clo-
Table 1.5 Apprehended illegally employed foreigners in Austria, 2003
Construction
and related
industries
Catering
and
tourism
Transport Agriculture Service
industry
Trade and
industry
Other Total
Vienna 891 476 98 12 73 22 73 1,645
% 54% 29% 6% 1% 4% 1% 4% 100%
Burgenland 129 50 9 66 31 5 36 326
% 40% 15% 3% 20% 10% 2% 11% 100%
Tirol 163 123 11 19 17 2 5 340
% 48% 36% 3% 6% 5% 1% 1% 100%
Source: BMF-KIAB
Table 1.6 Apprehended illegally employed foreigners in Austria, 2005
Construction
and related
industries
Catering
and
tourism
Transport Agriculture Service
industry
Trade and
industry
Other Total
Vienna 241 658 21 4 61 110 89 1,184
% 20% 56% 2% 0% 5% 9% 8% 100%
Burgenland 126 85 12 53 167 64 190 697
% 18% 12% 2% 8% 24% 9% 27% 100%
Tirol 116 133 15 4 28 29 75 400
% 29% 33% 4% 1% 7% 7% 19% 100%
Source: BMF-KIAB
58 MIGRATION AND IRREGULAR WORK IN AUSTRIA
sely related to the intensity and the success of controls in each region
and sector. To simplify, putting more (human) resources into the con-
trol of a certain sector will yield more detections of irregularities.
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 reflect the number of worksite inspections per sector
and region in 2005 and 2006.
As can be seen from these tables, the intensity of worksite inspec-
tions varied widely between sectors, regions and years, and this can be
linked to the numbers and shares of apprehended illegally employed
Table 1.7 Apprehended illegally employed foreigners in Austria, 2006
Construction
and related
industries
Catering
and
tourism
Transport Agriculture Service
industry
Trade and
industry
Other Total
Vienna 464 596 52 13 119 138 125 1,507
% 31% 40% 3% 1% 8% 9% 8% 100%
Burgenland 129 32 5 19 201 25 77 488
% 26% 7% 1% 4% 41% 5% 16% 100%
Tirol 151 172 12 8 27 37 58 465
% 32% 37% 3% 2% 6% 8% 12% 100%
Source: BMF-KIAB
Table 1.8 Number of worksite inspections, 2005
Construction
and related
industries
Catering
and
tourism
Transport Agriculture Service
industry
Trade and
industry
Other Total
Vienna 290 1.157 69 8 121 181 95 1.921
% 15% 60% 4% 0% 6% 9% 5% 100%
Burgenland 965 279 110 59 114 281 217 2.025
% 48% 14% 5% 3% 6% 14% 11% 100%
Tirol 358 277 91 13 35 112 98 984
% 36% 28% 9% 1% 4% 11% 10% 100%
Source: BMF-KIAB
Table 1.9 Number of worksite inspections, 2006
Construction
and related
industries
Catering
and
tourism
Transport Agriculture Service
industry
Trade and
industry
Other Total
Vienna 1.011 1.576 580 30 233 595 359 4.384
% 23% 36% 13% 1% 5% 14% 8% 100%
Burgenland 658 107 70 36 153 163 143 1.330
% 49% 8% 5% 3% 12% 12% 11% 100%
Tirol 682 579 298 9 113 221 355 2.257
% 30% 26% 13% 0% 5% 10% 16% 100%
Source: BMF-KIAB
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foreigners recorded in Tables 1.6 and 1.7. For example, the number of
worksite inspections in the construction industry in Vienna increased
more than three-fold in absolute numbers (or from 15 per cent to 23 per
cent in relative terms), resulting in almost a doubling of apprehensions
in absolute numbers (an increase from 20 per cent to 31 per cent of all
apprehensions in Vienna). The number of inspections in catering and
tourism also increased in absolute terms (but decreased in relative terms
from 60 per cent to 36 per cent), resulting in a somewhat lower absolute
number of apprehensions in that sector (and a relative decrease from
56 per cent to 40 per cent of all apprehensions in Vienna). We could
thus conclude that the absolute numbers of apprehensions of illegally
employed foreigners, as well as their relative distribution, is a simple
reflection of control intensities, which varies erratically over time.
Although this is a valid argument, it is also not the whole story. As
the distribution of worksite inspections (where the control body KIAB
concentrates its resources) is not completely random but is guided by
some prior knowledge and tip-offs on likely irregularities in certain sec-
tors and enterprises, we may assume that the control intensities do in
fact follow some real developments in irregular migrant work. While
such targeted controls can never be completely efficient (as reflected in
the varying ‘success rates’ of controls), by and large we may assume
that a consistently high number of controls and apprehensions in a cer-
tain sector also indicates a relatively high intensity of irregular activity
in that sector.
Given these caveats and reflections, we can now attempt to provide
some careful interpretation of some regional patterns reflected in the
above data. While the share of detected irregularities in construction
and related industries is high in all three regions, catering and tourism
are clearly more important in Vienna and Tirol (both with a large tour-
ist industry) than in Burgenland. On the other hand, there are more
detected irregularities in agriculture in Burgenland (a border region to
Hungary with many agricultural enterprises) and Tirol (with a strong
horticulture) than in Vienna.
An interesting case is provided by the service industry: while appre-
hensions in this area (mainly in private households) are relatively low
in Vienna and Tirol, they are relatively high in Burgenland. However,
data on the service sector are likely to suffer from an especially severe
data bias, namely the fact that irregular work in private households
(e.g. cleaning, babysitting and caretaking) is generally not subject to
worksite inspections, as KIAB inspectors do not usually have access to
private homes. Moreover, as the recent (2006) discussion on the irre-
gular care sector in Austria has shown, there has long been a wide-
spread (political) consensus that irregular work in the care sector
should not be subject to controls and legal proceedings, as that would
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interfere with other social policy goals (most obviously in the area of
caregivers for elderly persons, who mostly come from neighbouring
countries and provide care-giving services far below Austrian wage le-
vels). Worksite inspections in the care sector included in the above sta-
tistics thus refer exclusively to controls of the (presumably irregular)
placement agencies, but not to controls in private households.
Finally, statistics and reports of the KIAB indicate that the detected
irregularities at the worksites take on various forms in different
branches. Common forms of irregularities in the construction sector
are tax and social security fraud through the use of subcontractors and
sub-subcontractors (who quickly file for bankruptcy before paying their
employees and the tax authorities) and employment as pseudo-self-em-
ployed. In catering and tourism (bars, hotels, restaurants), there are
many cases of underreporting of the extent of employment, in care-giv-
ing it is paid employment through membership associations, while in
other industries it is often simple non-registration for social insurance
and tax purposes (BMF 2004a, 2004b). In Part 2 of this report, we will
provide a systematic typology of the various forms of irregular migrant
work as seen by a group of experts in the field.
Notes
1 Such convincing evidence is also conspicuously lacking in the accompanying back-
ground paper to the policy proposal. See Commission of the European Communities
(2007b).
2 In the accession negotiations, a transitional period of up to seven years was agreed
upon, during which time the ‘old’ Member States individually may still regulate ac-
cess to their labour markets for citizens of eight new Member States (the AC-10 ex-
cept Malta and Cyprus, often referred to as the AC-8). Between 2004 and 2006, all
countries of the EU-15 except Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden had made
use of transition periods for the free access to their labour markets for the AC-8.
From 2007 onwards, only Austria and Germany continue to apply the same restric-
tions on citizens from the AC-8, while all other ‘old’ EU Member States have fully or
partially lifted them.
3 When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, all EU-15 countries except Fin-
land and Sweden (but including Ireland and the UK) announced they would make
use of transition periods for the free access to their labour markets. Italy and Hun-
gary announced they would partially open their labour markets, while the ‘new’ EU
Member States Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slove-
nia and Slovakia opened their labour markets immediately to Romanians and Bulgar-
ians.
4 Croatia and Turkey formally started membership negotiations in 2006. Macedonia
received candidate status in December 2005, but has not yet formally started mem-
bership negotiations.
5 For a more extensive typology of types of irregular migrant work, see Part 2 of this
report. From this discussion of frequently encountered types and forms of irregular
migrant work, it should also become clear why we have chosen not to use some of
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the other terms that are commonly used in the literature. For example, the terms
‘undocumented work’ and ‘undeclared work’ are not used because they would ex-
clude work that is, in fact, declared (or at least partly declared) yet irregular in some
other important dimension of the definition provided above.
6 For a classification according to legal/illegal entry, residence and work, see Tapinos
(1999: 231), who details six important categories of clandestine status.
7 On the contrary, the report ‘Transnational involvement and social integration’ (Snel,
Engbersen & Leerkes 2006) argues that while transnational identity increases the so-
cial and economic position of a migrant, this does not directly correspond to actual
transnational involvement, as such may be very cost-intensive.
8 According to this definition, informal employment is characterised by one or more of
the following: evasion of taxes, social security fraud, and violation of labour legisla-
tion. Adding a fourth dimension, the violation of aliens legislation, results in a defini-
tion that is close to the one adopted for irregular migrant work above.
9 A fourth line of argumentation, the so-called ‘cultural acceptance’ argument, is not
further explored here (cf. Samers 2005).
10 Still, this demand is not the only factor that ‘drives’ migration in this model, as mi-
gration to rich countries is seen as interlinked with capital flows to poor countries
(Sassen 1991).
11 However, it should be noted that Rath focuses specifically on self-employed immi-
grants, a subject that has traditionally received only scant attention by migration re-
search. In much of the literature on economic activities of migrants, regular (and
even more so, irregular) migrants are mainly perceived as being ‘workers’ only, while
immigrant entrepreneurs have long remained ‘unsung heroes’ (Klosterman & Rath
2003: 1).
12 While Anderson finds little or no evidence for involvement of irregular migrants in
the UK in organised crime, he finds some indications of involvement in petty crime
(small-scale drug dealing, prostitution, social security fraud (1999: 176). Engbersen
et al. (2006) find evidence for a rise in subsistence crime among irregular migrants
in The Hague.
13 It has to be stated that Elwert’s study comprised only a small sample size and mi-
grants with specific social characteristics and a specific migration strategy.
14 However, Chimienti et al. (2003) also report that their sample is likely to suffer from
a serious selection bias, as certain sectors that also employ irregular workers (albeit
more qualified ones such as IT, banking and insurance) are usually excluded from of-
ficial control strategies. In this case, qualified irregular workers would be underrepre-
sented in their sample, but the extent of de-qualification would be overestimated.
15 Police statistics show that the majority of apprehended illegal migrants in Germany
were from Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Viet-
nam, China and India (Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004).
16 In the AKI report, it is pointed out that migrant sex workers in Germany may be
either illegally residing women or women who live here as tourists, wives or with a
tolerated status (AKI 2003: 9).
17 Annual net immigration to Austria at the beginning of the 1990s was approximately
80,000, while it was only around 20,000 during the second half of the 1990s. At
the same time, 20,000-40,000 foreigners were naturalised annually during the
1990s. In the early years of the 21st century, net migration again increased to around
40,000-60,000 annually.
18 EU citizens are exempted from this requirement.
19 However, immediate free access to the labour market has been granted to those new
EU nationals who have been working legally in Austria for at least twelve months,
have been settled in Austria for five years or have fulfilled the requirements to receive
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a long-term work permit according to the Foreign Employment Law before 1 May
2004.
20 Au pairs are foreign students between eighteen and 28 years of age who are allowed
to work in households up to 25 hours a week, performing childcare and light house-
keeping duties. They are provided with free room and board and receive spending
money of at least 60 euro a week.
21 However, the year 2002 is an exception, as the responsibility for inspections was
transferred from the Ministry of Economy and Labour to the Ministry of Finance,
with an organisational restructuring of the responsible unit (KIAB).
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2 The Delphi study
2.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the results of a multi-round Delphi study on
migration and irregular work in Austria, carried out between 2005 and
2006.1 The goal of this survey was to provide in-depth expert assess-
ments of the structure and dynamics of irregular foreign employment
in Austria following the fifth enlargement of the EU in 2004. As one
of several methods employed in the overall research project, the struc-
tured use of expert opinions by way of a Delphi study can provide valu-
able insights into irregular labour markets, the effectiveness of current
or planned policy measures towards irregular foreign employment and
can also serve as a qualified means of forecasting future developments
with regard to irregular labour migration (especially regarding further
rounds of EU enlargement).
2.2 Methodology
To learn more about irregular economic activities of foreigners in Aus-
tria and particularly about recent developments in this area after the
latest rounds of EU enlargement, we employed a method that is differ-
ent from those employed in earlier studies of the subject – the so-called
Delphi method. In general, this method involves a larger number of in-
dependent experts in an interactive process of exchange through the
use of written questionnaires, designed to foster convergence and con-
sensus.2 The Delphi method is particularly valuable when confronted
with complex social and economic phenomena where only little well-
established knowledge is available, or where such knowledge is dis-
persed across a wide range of experts whose subjective evaluation can
enrich the understanding and analysis of the research subject. Further-
more, the evaluation of policy measures (Policy Delphi) and the prog-
nosis of future developments (Prognostic Delphi) are two main applica-
tions of the method.3 The goal is to bring together existing but frag-
mented knowledge and expertise in an interactive process. Experts are
given the opportunity to state their views on a given topic and react to
the (anonymous and consolidated) views and assessments of other ex-
perts in a second (and possibly third) round. The primary value of a
Delphi survey is not in the (quantitative) representativeness of its find-
ings, but in the qualitative input of a diverse collection of experts that
helps to elucidate a broad view of the research subject.
The following characteristics of the Delphi method are important
conditions for the achievement of relevant results: a multi-stage pro-
cess, a balanced composition of the group of participating experts and
anonymity. In order to allow for exchange, revision or refinement of
opinions expressed by experts, the survey must include valid feedback
mechanisms. Therefore, the Delphi method includes several consecu-
tive stages (a minimum of two rounds of written questionnaires). In
this process, the role of the researcher is to summarise the points
made by the experts and to communicate both the contested and the
consensus views back to the participants, who are then called upon
either to adjust their views in light of the new arguments or to better
justify their own opinions.
Our Delphi study involved the administration and processing of two
rounds of Delphi questionnaires, which were answered by 37 experts
in the first round and (out of this group) by 22 experts in the second
round. However, the first questionnaire was guided by a preceding
round of in-depth interviews with 37 experts in the same field. The re-
sults of this preceding interview phase were reflected in the first round
Delphi questionnaire. Therefore, we can designate the current Delphi
survey as a ‘two-and-a-half-round’ Delphi Study. All these stages of the
Delphi study were implemented between October 2005 and September
2006.
When choosing the participating experts for a Delphi survey, re-
searchers should strive to achieve large heterogeneity within the group
of experts in order to cover as many aspects of the research subject as
possible. On the other hand, once the interactive process is started, the
group has to remain closed. No new experts may participate as they
have not been involved in previous feedback rounds, even if some par-
ticipants will drop out of the process. For valid results, however, the
number of participating individuals should not fall below fifteen (Gor-
don 1994).
The institutional background of the participating experts in our Del-
phi survey are reflected in Table 2.1. In both rounds, there was a good
distribution of experts regarding their institutional affiliation. The im-
portance of such heterogeneity became apparent in the analysis of the
responses – an example was when experts from a certain professional
or institutional background often expressed similar opinions towards a
certain topic, or when certain subgroups as a whole differed in their as-
sessments from other subgroups.
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Finally, it is important that the participating experts remain anon-
ymous before, during and after the Delphi survey in order to allow an
even-levelled process of communication across institutional and status
barriers. This is especially important for sensitive research topics like
irregular migrant work, where institutional affiliations may otherwise
impede the free expression of personal opinions. In our Delphi study,
the anonymity of participating experts remained safeguarded during all
stages of the research process.
Taken together, these methodological principles can maximise the
explanatory power of Delphi studies. Nevertheless, there are also signif-
icant constraints in the use and interpretation of Delphi surveys. The
main constraint is the fact that the Delphi survey can only reflect the
opinions, however well-argued and justified, of the participating ex-
perts and cannot deliver representative or quantifiable results. Never-
theless, the main achievement of our Delphi survey is a well-grounded
assessment of the theoretical, political, structural and economic dimen-
sions of the subject under study. In addition, the prognosis of likely fu-
ture developments and the assessments of more than twenty current
and planned policy measures meant to address irregular migrant work
will be particularly interesting for policymakers looking for effective
means for tackling this complex issue.
Table 2.1 Institutional background of participating experts
Number of
respondents
in Delphi 1
Number of
respondents
in Delphi 2
Governmental
(ministries, labour market service, worksite inspectors,
social security bodies)
12 8
Non-Governmental
(charitable organisations, migrant organisations, aid and
advice bodies)
8 5
Special interest groups
(Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Labour, trade
unions)
7 3
Research
(labour market researchers, migration researchers, other
researchers)
10 6
Total 37 22
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2.3 A short definition
The subject matter of our research is the irregular work of migrants
(or irregular migrant work – IMW), a term that has not been com-
monly used so far and requires some explanation. Traditionally, irregu-
lar economic activities of immigrants have been referred to as ‘illegal
foreign employment’ (Illegale Ausla¨nderbescha¨ftigung), and this is also
the legal term commonly used in Austria and other German-speaking
countries. However, already at an early stage of research, it became
clear that this traditional terminology fails to capture essential ele-
ments of the phenomenon. Today, irregular income-generating activ-
ities of immigrants increasingly take place between legality and illegal-
ity and encompass various forms of irregularity, both with regard to
the legality of residence status and employment status. As has been
noted elsewhere, a simple dichotomy of legality-illegality of employ-
ment and residence status is no longer sufficient, particularly after the
latest rounds of EU enlargement have created various levels of access
to the labour market for foreigners (cf. Anderson & Ruhs 2006).
For the purposes of this Delphi study, the definition of the term ‘irre-
gular migrant work’ (IMW) was deduced from the expert interviews car-
ried out at the beginning of the research process. In the first place, we
are interested in the economic activities of migrants (defined here as
foreigners or non-nationals) only, thus excluding economic activities of
Austrians, but including both those of EU nationals and third-country
nationals. Furthermore, we are not interested in all aspects of migra-
tion and all activities of migrants, but mainly in those aspects that re-
late to irregular work. ‘Work’ is conventionally defined as gainful eco-
nomic activity (employment or self-employment), while the irregularity
in such activities can include many forms of semi-legal, quasi-legal or
grey areas of employment relationships of migrants. Such arrange-
ments often take place at the margins of legal regulations or try to cir-
cumvent them in various disguised forms. For the purposes of this
study, irregular migrant work has been defined as follows:
Irregular migrant work comprises all paid work of foreigners
(non-citizens) that conflicts with one or more of the following
laws and regulations: foreign employment law (including resi-
dence law), social insurance laws, tax laws, labour legislation
and trade regulations.
Thus, in a legal sense, irregular work of foreigners is distinguished
from irregular work of nationals (Austrian citizens) only insofar as cur-
rently only non-nationals (except EU-15 Member States plus Malta and
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Cyprus) can violate the terms of foreign employment law, and only
third-country nationals can violate residence law.
2.4 Forms of irregular migrant work
The definition of irregular migrant work used in this study enables us
to incorporate a variety of irregularities occurring on the Austrian la-
bour market. And the legal or illegal residence status of economically
active migrants is but one aspect that assumes ever less importance for
irregular migrant work in Austria. Based on information gathered dur-
ing the initial interview phase of the project, our expert panel was
asked in Round 1 to identify and describe the most important forms of
IMW prevalent in Austria and to link them to certain notorious sectors
and branches (construction, agriculture, catering and tourism, domes-
tic services and industry). In Round 2, the information gathered pre-
viously was evaluated by the experts and was supplemented with addi-
tional information. All together, the experts described ten ‘typical’
forms of irregular migrant work, which often occur in combination
with each other and clearly show the complexity of the concept of
IMW, which is increasingly characterised by the blurring of legal
boundaries.
1. Working without a work and/or residence permit
According to current immigration and employment laws,4 all employed
non-nationals, except EU citizens of the EU-15 plus Cyprus and Malta,
have to get a work permit; third-country nationals must also get a resi-
dence permit before being able to get a regular job in Austria. Working
without the required work permit generally also implies the migrants’
non- registration at social insurance and tax institutions as will be ex-
plained later, while the same is not necessarily true the other way
around.
According to most experts, this form of irregular migrant work is espe-
cially dominant in private households (both in cleaning and care-giv-
ing), where traditional household structures have led to a widespread
public attitude according to which housework as such is perceived as
‘traditionally unpaid work’. Accordingly, the outsourcing of household
duties (to cleaning ladies, for childcare or elderly care) to unregistered
migrant workers is perceived as almost normal or in any case only a
minor irregularity. Moreover, the special protection of the private
sphere of households (with no worksite inspections) renders this parti-
cular form of IMW relatively ‘risk-free’ for both employers and employ-
ees. In addition to work in private households, this form of IMW was
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also seen as important in construction and industry, but not so much
in agriculture and in catering and tourism.
2. Non-registration at social insurance institutions
The registration of the employee at one of the social insurance institu-
tions is the duty of the employer, except for self-employed persons. In-
terestingly, this registration at a social insurance institution is de-
coupled from the possession of a work permit. That means that even
persons who are irregularly employed in terms of not having a work
permit theoretically have the right to social insurance payments by
their employers (and can theoretically even claim this right after the
fact before labour courts, something that is almost Utopian for people
without a secure residence or employment status and almost never
happens in practice).
As already mentioned, this form of IMW is seen by our experts as clo-
sely related to the first form (not having a work and/or residence per-
mit), therefore the same sectors and branches were considered as im-
portant in this context. In addition, it was argued that non-registration
at social insurance institutions often occurs in ‘short seasonal jobs’ in
agriculture, where employers may simply not bother to overcome the
few ‘bureaucratic hurdles’ for registration.
3. Non-registration at tax institutions
Registration for tax purposes is also the duty of the employer, who has
to shoulder part of the non-wage labour costs, except for self-employed
persons. However, registration with tax authorities requires a valid
work permit for all foreigners not exempt from this obligation.
This form of IMW will occur mostly in combination with other forms
of IMW, usually with non-registration at social insurance institutions.
For persons working without a valid work permit but who require one,
the combination occurs automatically. On the other hand, even persons
who have a valid work permit will often not be registered for tax pur-
poses. Consequently, our experts have rated this form of IMW as rela-
tively common in all branches except tourism and industry, where the
dominant form is seen to be ‘under-registration’ of the hours worked
(rather than complete non-registration). The reason for this apparent
difference could be in the relative risk of detection faced in each sector:
migrants working irregularly in service provision in bars, restaurants
or hotels are presumably more exposed to this risk than migrants
working in occupations that do not involve direct contact with custo-
mers.
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4. Violation of workers’ rights
Although it can be argued that a violation of workers’ rights lies in the
nature of all irregular work, we have chosen to include it as a separate
form of IMW when the systematic occurrence of such violations is an
inherent characteristic of the migrants’ work. Thus, even if a specific
job of a migrant is ‘regular’ in all other aspects of residence and em-
ployment laws (including registration with residence and work permit),
a systematic violation of workers’ rights (labour law) can still justify its
classification as irregular.
The statements of our expert panel reveal that such systematic viola-
tions are particularly widespread in temporary and seasonal work in
the catering and tourism sector. Examples are extremely long working
hours, unpaid overtime, unpaid holidays, no holidays at all, payment
below minimum wage, excessive deductions for room and board, etc.
While such violations were also attributed to other sectors (agriculture,
construction and, partly, industry), it is interesting to note that they
were hardly mentioned for work in the private sphere (cleaning, care-
giving). Apparently, our experts already assumed that labour standards
are generally not enforceable (and thus of little relevance) when it
comes to work in private households.
5. Insufficient registration of employment contract
In these cases, the migrant worker may be officially registered as only
part-time or minimally employed (and will thus be able to produce offi-
cial documents during inspections), but in fact works much longer
hours than the official timeframe of the contract. In many such cases,
a regular work permit exists but social insurance contributions and
taxes are paid only for part of the total income. The difference in in-
come is paid out informally in cash.
Our experts judge this specific form of IMW to be far more common
in the catering and tourism sector than in other sectors, again indicat-
ing the apparent use of a legal cover for the irregular employment of
migrant workers in this sector. As a special case within this form of
IMW, foreign students were mentioned. Foreign students are exempted
from employment laws if their work is only part-time, does not inter-
fere with their normal course of studies and is not their primary source
of subsistence. Using these special provisions, many foreign students
are apparently registered as part-time employees, but are in fact work-
ing full-time.
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6. Irregular extension of a regular work permit
Our experts mentioned this as a specific form of IMW, whereby the
time limits on temporary work permits for foreign employees are ex-
ceeded after their expiration. In the case of third-country nationals, this
often affects not only the legality of employment, but also their resi-
dence status, which is usually tied to legal employment.
This form of IMW has been mentioned most often for seasonal em-
ployment in agriculture but also in catering and tourism. For these sec-
tors, work permits for seasonal workers are issued for a maximum per-
iod of six months, and several experts indicated that such periods of
regular employment are often followed by periods of irregular work, at
least until the next (temporary) work permit again legalises the employ-
ment relationship. A special case is provided by short-term seasonal
workers in agriculture (harvesters) who are granted work permits for a
maximum of six weeks only during the harvesting season.
7. ‘Pseudo-self-employed’ (‘Scheinselbststa¨ndigkeit’)
This form of IMW constitutes an irregular evasion of foreign employ-
ment law, but also implies the non-payment of social security contribu-
tions by employers. It makes use of the fact that self-employed foreign-
ers are generally not subject to foreign employment laws (no quota re-
strictions) and can practice their trade with relative ease by obtaining a
trade licence for certain (restricted) occupations. In many cases, how-
ever, such work does not constitute genuine self-employment but
rather a disguised form of employment involving dependency on an
employer. The latter then orders the work to be done, provides the ne-
cessary materials and ‘buys’ the services of the ‘self-employed’ subcon-
tractor. While this constitutes a breach of foreign employment legisla-
tion, such disguised forms of dependent employment can be hard to
prove in legal proceedings.
Besides circumventing foreign employment law and other labour stan-
dards, this form of IMW is very advantageous for employers, who addi-
tionally save on the employer’s share of social security contributions.
Our experts mentioned this relatively new phenomenon in relation to
the May 2004 EU enlargement in particular, which has since been fol-
lowed by the registration of several thousand newly ‘self-employed’ citi-
zens of the new EU-8 Member States in Austria, mostly in certain con-
struction-related activities. The fact that dubious subcontractors are
most often used in the construction sector (see also form 9 below)
makes this form of IMW particularly notorious in that sector. Accord-
ing to several experts, however, this form of IMW is becoming increas-
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ingly common in certain branches of trade and industry, as well as in
other areas.
8. Violation of trade regulations
The fact that genuine self-employment by foreigners outside foreign
employment law (that is without a work permit) is permitted in certain
trades but not in others (such as mainstream construction work) can
also give rise to another form of IMW. In this case, the foreigner is a
genuine self-employed person with a trade licence for one of the per-
mitted trades, but works in another (restricted) trade and thus violates
trade regulations. The foreigner might also work as a self-employed
person without any trade licence at all.
There was again widespread agreement among our experts that this
form of IMW is mainly present in construction and construction-related
areas, and became more frequent after the latest round of EU enlarge-
ment.
9. ‘Pseudo-companies’ (‘Scheinunternehmen’)
This category actually refers to a specific form of organisation of irre-
gular work in which irregular migrant work is often involved. Pseudo-
companies are companies that are specifically set up with the intention
of committing tax and social security payment fraud. Such companies
often officially register and employ migrant workers but very quickly
(within a few months) declare bankruptcy and disappear before ever
paying regular wages and non-wage labour costs. In such cases, the mi-
grant workers may or may not be implicated in this fraudulent scheme
and often fall victim to the withholding of promised wages.
According to several experts and official enforcement data, ‘pseudo-
companies’ appear almost exclusively in the construction sector. This
sector is characterised by complicated subcontracting and sub-subcon-
tracting arrangements for the fulfilment of larger building projects,
making it difficult to trace and apportion the responsibilities for irregu-
larities and fraud when the company ‘disappears’.5 Legal matters can
become even more complicated when ‘pseudo-companies’ themselves
subcontract work to ‘pseudo-self-employed’ migrants as subcontractors.
10. Organisation in membership associations
This form of IMW has been designed to shift completely irregular em-
ployment situations (no work permit, no registration, etc.) in the pri-
vate sector to a less obvious ‘grey area’, where the employment relation-
ship is disguised as social work within charitable associations. The very
moderate payments for long working hours are designated as ‘pocket
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money’, and there is no official registration, tax or social security con-
tributions.
According to our experts, this form of IMW has been specifically ‘in-
vented’ to link supply and demand for irregular care services in pri-
vate households. Care personnel and patients are registered as mem-
bers in (usually transnational) membership associations with branches
in the countries of origin and in Austria. Officially such associations
claim to provide a simple referral mechanism for ‘neighbourhood
help’, but the fact that both the migrant workers (usually qualified fe-
male nurses from Austria’s neighbouring countries) and the patients
(usually elderly handicapped persons who receive special financial as-
sistance for their needs from the state) have to pay significant fees to
these associations suggests a predominant profit motive on the part
of the organisers.
To summarise, our experts have listed and described a number of
different forms and manifestations of IMW and have also provided us
with their assessments of sector-specific patterns and structures. The
various forms of IMW are reflected here as ten ‘ideal types’ for the pur-
pose of clarity, but in reality they are likely to occur in various combina-
tions and with considerable overlaps. In fact, the findings of our Del-
phi survey suggest that IMW occurs in greater heterogeneity today than
it did only a few years ago. Moreover, we found that both irregularly
working migrants and their employers are constantly looking for ways
to circumvent existing laws and regulations by using available loop-
holes, and that, consequently, the ‘grey area’ between regular and irre-
gular migrant work has become larger if not more blurred.
2.5 An assessment of the impact of irregular migrant work
One of the questions we asked our experts in the Delphi survey con-
cerned the overall impact of irregular migrant work. In particular, we
asked about the likely impact of IMW on the national economy and on
national finances. Furthermore, they should assess the effects of IMW
on employers and regular employees. The options given ranged from
‘strongly positive’ and ‘positive’ to ‘neutral’, ‘negative’ and ‘strongly ne-
gative’.
Not surprisingly, the analysis of the answers shows that there are
both winners and losers where irregular migrant work is concerned.
According to some comments received, IMW leads to replacement pro-
cesses, which have a negative impact on native-born workers, migrants
already integrated into the labour market and, especially, those who are
low-skilled. Additionally, the social financial system is said to be hol-
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lowed out by diminishing the tax base for the provision of public infra-
structure such as public education, health care, security and means of
transport. This, in turn, reduces the demand for these goods and ser-
vices and the possibility of future investments. Thus, most experts
agreed that there are strongly negative effects of irregular migrant work
on national economic development.
However, some experts also saw positive impacts of irregular mi-
grant work on the national economy. Here, experts stressed economic
growth, investments of the ‘saved’ capital, a higher national income in
Austria and a more cost-effective production. A common argument
made was that irregular migrant work plays a significant role in the na-
tional economy because some sectors simply could not exist without it.
Others have pointed out that such perceived positive effects are overes-
timated and in most cases would only benefit employers.
Concerning the impact of irregular migrant work on public finances,
experts assessed it as strongly negative or negative (26 out of 37 ex-
perts). Several respondents pointed out that this concerns also irregu-
larly employed Austrians. The most important effects were seen in the
defrauding on income taxes, value added tax and social insurance dues.
In regard to the effects of irregular migrant work on employers, a re-
lative majority of experts (sixteen out of 37) agreed on its positive
impact. The following advantages for employers were particularly
stressed: high profits without taxes and a high dependency of employ-
ees on employers, without having to provide employees with legal pro-
tections. Lower wages were mentioned as one further advantage. How-
ever, it was also mentioned that for all honest employers, the distortion
of normal trade conditions has negative effects on their businesses (e.
g. when they cannot win a bid due to their higher prices).
When it comes to the impact of IMW on regular employees, a large
majority of respondents (29 out of 37) agreed that it is negative or
strongly negative. They referred mostly to wage dumping on the level
of unskilled workers and displacement competition. In the view of sev-
eral experts, the cheaper labour supply by irregularly working migrants
generally depresses the level of wages and the competitiveness of regu-
lar workers.
In the second round of our Delphi survey, our experts were con-
fronted with a reformulation of the above theses. The new statement to
be evaluated now read: ‘The general impact of irregular migrant work
is negative, especially for economic development, public finances and
for regular employees in Austria’.
The overwhelming majority of experts agreed with this statement.
From the additional comments provided, we may conclude that our re-
spondents mainly saw the distortion of fair competition, the defraud-
ing of taxes and social security payments and wage dumping as the
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main problems. However, it was also stated that these general negative
effects should not be overestimated, as there are also many actors who
profit from irregular migrant work. These are not only enterprises, but
also private households, for example, those in need of elderly care and
home health care. As one of the experts claims: ‘The competition
[there] is not distorted, as some occupations are simply not offered on
the regular market in a sufficient volume, as for example, in the care
sector.’
As this is an important issue, we will now take a better look at the
question of unfair competition through irregularly working migrants.
2.5.1. Competition on the labour market
In the first round of our Delphi survey, experts were asked to assess
four theses concerning competition on the labour market through irre-
gular migrant work. In the second round, these theses were reformu-
lated and again submitted to the experts for a re-evaluation of their re-
sponses. The first thesis concerned the assertion that migrants already
integrated on the labour market are pushed into the irregular sphere
by the arrival of new EU-8 citizens. The evaluation of the first round of
questionnaires showed disagreement on this point among experts. A
narrow majority agreed with this thesis, among them most representa-
tives of trade unions and NGOs. The opinion of experts oscillated be-
tween two positions. On the one hand, new EU-8 citizens were not per-
ceived as competitive as they would not yet enjoy automatic access to
the Austrian labour market because of the transitional rules. They
would first have to muddle through the long and complicated system
to get a work permit. On the other hand, they were seen as favoured
due to the ‘community preference’ principle and because they enjoy
freedom of residence (and, additionally, because they often have a bet-
ter education). Some experts thus thought that they could be at least
potentially competitive. However, they also noted that there was no sig-
nificant displacement within the foreign labour force, with the excep-
tion of specific sectors, where there was a demand for unqualified and
cheaper labour and where the aim was to avoid official labour stan-
dards, taxes and social insurance contributions. Significantly, the sec-
ond Delphi round yielded a similar result. ‘Displacement’ was por-
trayed as a continuous process that happens within the irregular labour
market. The transitional rules also provided some exceptions for the
new EU-8 citizens. Thus, it was argued that both groups (established
third-country nationals and new EU-8 migrants) sometimes covered si-
milar labour market segments and would thus be in direct competition
with each other. For example, the seasonal quotas for catering and tour-
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ism prior to 2004 were covered mostly by third-country nationals,
while since EU enlargement migrant workers from the new EU Mem-
ber States have received preferential access to seasonal work permits.
In 2006, no new seasonal work permits were issued to first-time sea-
sonal workers from third countries and the number of regularly
returning third-country seasonal workers (‘core workers’) was cut by 50
per cent.
The second thesis – that the supply of low-cost, irregularly working
migrants makes the job placement of unemployed persons more diffi-
cult – was supported by nineteen of 37 experts (among them many re-
presentatives of NGOs, public administration and representatives of
employees). Eleven experts rejected this assumption. The main argu-
ment presented was that only part of the tasks of irregularly working
migrants could be occupied by unemployed persons, as they are not as
motivated and flexible as the former. In addition, the very ‘advantage’
of irregular employment was seen in the resulting irregularity, whereas
a regular job placement would lead to regular employment. It was also
noted that in the most notorious sectors (such as in catering) employ-
ers would hardly be willing to pay higher wages and offer better work-
ing conditions to make them more attractive for the unemployed. In
practice, some of the unattractive professions are almost never filled
through the AMS, as there is the experience that it is extremely diffi-
cult to motivate unemployed persons to take them. To test this thesis
in the second round of the Delphi survey, our experts were confronted
with a new formulation of the above thesis. We now asked whether
some specific unattractive professions are not offered to unemployed
persons due to their lack of motivation and flexibility. In their reac-
tions, some experts argued that this situation is attributable not to the
lack of motivation or flexibility of unemployed persons per se, but to
the specific characteristics of the unemployed (often persons over 50
years old with health problems) and to the nature of the unattractive
jobs.
The third thesis, that long-term employees who already make higher
demands to their employers are replaced in certain branches through
newly arriving EU-8 citizens, was approved by a large majority of ex-
perts in both Delphi rounds. This was seen to be especially valid for
low-skilled migrants from the new EU countries. Some experts related
this to a general trend of ‘outsourcing’ tasks previously performed by
employees to borrowed staff from personnel companies (who often
subcontract) and to self-employed migrants. At the same time, doubts
were raised by migration and labour market researchers. They were of
the opinion that the thesis was not valid in those branches where long-
term employees already possessed specific valuable knowledge, skills
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and experience, making them less likely to be easily replaced by new
workers.
With regard to the fourth thesis – that employers favour irregularly
employed Austrians over irregularly employed migrants – almost half
of our experts did not take a position. Representatives of NGOs, migra-
tion and labour market researchers were especially sceptical about it,
with the partial exception for fields and occupations where German
language skills are of importance. Generally, it was argued that the
weaker position of migrants and their higher dependency rate seems
to favour irregular migrant employment rather than that of Austrians.
The second round of the survey found a significant majority of experts
(77 per cent) agreeing to this position. Moreover, it was argued that it
depends more on the capacity, motivation and the personal reputation
of reliable workers.
2.6 Reasons and motives for employers to employ migrants
irregularly
In the first round of the Delphi survey, our experts were asked about
their assessments and comments in regard to the reasons for irregular
employment of migrant workers. The analysis of the results shows a
clear consensus among experts. The consensus view is that the main
motive behind irregularly employing migrants is to save on additional
wage costs (taxes, social security contributions and other dues) and, to
some degree, on generally lower wages. However, some experts
stressed that the ‘cost argument’ is not the only one that is relevant. Ac-
cording to them, it is more an interplay of many different motives,
such as ‘a flight from labour legislation’ and a general non-compliance
with employees’ rights.
Furthermore, there was wide agreement among our respondents that
for persons in need of 24-hour-a-day home care, there is currently no
other option than to employ a migrant worker irregularly. Thus, ex-
perts demanded a restructured official framework for those in need of
health and elderly care (see also Section 2.11).
Experts were asked if the large number of foreign workers available
influences the decision of employers to hire migrants irregularly. The
analysis shows that the easy availability of foreign manpower is seen as
a main precondition for irregular migrant work, as the irregular labour
market is shaped by both demand and supply. As far as the role of eth-
nic businesses in urban centres and their influence on the size of irre-
gular employment is concerned, a majority of experts agreed that there
is a connection. It was pointed out that just as native businesses, also
ethnic businesses often use the helping hands of their family members
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(sometimes irregularly), but that for foreign business owners, the re-
strictive regulations on labour migration often lead to a breach of im-
migration legislation.
There was more disagreement among experts concerning the argu-
ments of flexible working conditions and administrative barriers, which
are often said to influence the decision of employers to hire irregularly.
Some experts mentioned the missing job security of irregularly work-
ing migrants as a central motive, giving employers a free hand in em-
ploying someone without any obligatory contractual obligations in hir-
ing and firing. However, it was also pointed out that some flexibility is
also in the interest of irregularly employed migrants, as it gives them
the possibility to earn more money and furthermore, to plan their tra-
vels to their country of origin in a flexible manner.
As far as the administrative obstacles are concerned, there was no
agreement among experts about their influence on employers’ motives
to hire irregularly. Generally, representatives of NGOs were of the opi-
nion that administrative obstacles promote irregular migrant work. On
the contrary, representatives of trade unions were of the opinion that
there are enough possibilities for regular employment of migrants, and
that a majority of them actually had official access to the Austrian la-
bour market, if only they would use it.
We also wanted to know whether a general labour scarcity in specific
sectors may lead employers to hire migrants irregularly, as had been ar-
gued in the preceding round of oral interviews by several experts. Such
labour scarcities may be rooted in the unattractiveness and low prestige
of certain occupations, in inconvenient working hours, hard working
conditions and other factors. However, several experts argued that it
was mainly the low wages in certain occupations that were to blame
and that, moreover, these wages would have to rise in the absence of ir-
regularly working migrants. A typical argument is provided by the fol-
lowing expert statement: ‘When the payment is good and the working
conditions fair, also hard and “dirty” jobs are attractive.’
In the second round of the Delphi survey, we asked our experts to re-
fine their positions by attaching the mentioned motives to specific la-
bour market sectors. According to the respondents, the main motive in
the construction sector, which is particularly characterised by high
competition, is clearly the saving of labour costs. In the catering and
tourism sector as well as in agriculture, an additional motive seems to
be the avoidance of labour market regulations and a higher flexibility
of irregularly working migrants willing to work long hours, especially
for smaller enterprises. For private households (care and cleaning) it
was argued that, apart from the cost-saving, it is the easy availability of
migrant manpower that induces employers to hire migrant workers ir-
regularly. In this area, a high and rising private demand (due to demo-
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graphic and socioeconomic developments) was said to be met by an
ample supply of irregularly working migrants.
Overall, the results of the first Delphi round were confirmed in the
second round. Thus, according to our expert panel, the main motives
for employers to hire migrants irregularly are:
1 The saving of costs through lower hourly wages and the non-pay-
ment of payroll taxes and social insurance premiums (85 per cent
agreement in the first round and 82 per cent in the second round).
2 The easy availability of irregularly working migrants (68 per cent
agreement in the first round, 64 per cent in the second round).
3 The higher flexibility, lower social protection and greater dependency
of irregularly working migrants compared to regular employees.
On the other hand, restrictive labour immigration policies and admin-
istrative obstacles were not seen as a main motive for employers to hire
irregularly (49 per cent agreement in the first round and only 30 per
cent agreement in the second round).
Apart from these general motives and reasons for irregularly employ-
ing migrant workers, we also wanted to learn more about the impact of
broader developments on the labour market on IMW. The results are
summarised in the next paragraphs.
2.6.1 Deregulation, flexibilisation, liberalisation and globalisation
As our economies, societies and labour markets are undergoing pro-
found changes, some of these developments are likely to have signifi-
cant effects on the structure and extent of irregular labour markets as
well. To gain insight into the impact of such changes, we presented
our expert panel with a number of hypotheses and asked them to an-
swer and comment on them. One such thesis, which found almost
universal approval in the first Delphi round (89 per cent), was the
claim that de-regulation and outsourcing to sub-enterprises promote
and enable more irregular migrant work. Similarly, the thesis that flexi-
bilisation of employment relationships facilitates IMW was approved
by a growing majority of respondents (54 per cent in Delphi 1 and 73
per cent in Delphi 2). A third thesis, namely that the ongoing liberali-
sation of the labour market increases the extent of IMW, was also
agreed upon by a growing majority of respondents (57 per cent in Del-
phi 1 and 64 per cent in Delphi 2), while the thesis that globalisation
(in the form of higher competition) pressures employers into irregu-
larly hiring more migrants was met with a high but decreasing share
of positive answers (67 per cent in Delphi 1 and 50 per cent in Delphi
2).
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Against these four theses that found significant approval among our
expert panel are several other theses that found little consensus, many
abstentions or even sharply opposing viewpoints. For example, there
was little agreement on the impact of general demographic develop-
ments (aging, population decline, labour scarcities, etc.) on IMW, on
the influence of growing incomes and wealth, on the relationship with
the business cycle and the level of unemployment in Austria. Our re-
spondents put forward a range of arguments in favour of, or against,
these propositions, but the overall picture remains inclusive.6
2.7 Recruitment and social networks
In order to get a better understanding of recruitment processes and
the functioning of social networks, experts were asked to evaluate dif-
ferent search strategies of migrants when looking for irregular work.
By far the most important strategy mentioned here was referral by fa-
mily and colleagues (also colloquially referred to as ‘word of mouth’).
Our experts drew attention to this form of search strategy especially for
private households and personal services (home nursing, home health
and elderly care, babysitting, cleaning) as well as in agriculture. How-
ever, it was also suggested to play a significant role in the construction
and catering sectors.
In a ranking of the most frequently named search strategies, the sec-
ond place is occupied by recruitment agencies. Our experts pointed out
that these play an important role especially when looking for a job in
the care sector. In addition, this search strategy was also seen to be in-
creasingly prevalent in the construction sector, but less so when it
comes to agriculture and seasonal jobs.
Contacts from previous employment in Austria were seen by our ex-
perts as the third most important strategy when looking for a job. This
form of direct access to irregular jobs was considered particularly valid
for the tourism sector and for jobseekers from the new EU-8 countries.
The fourth important form of recruitment mentioned by experts was
subcontractors. This should be true especially for IMW in construction
and related industries.
The fifth place in the ranking is occupied by the ethnic community.
One respondent adds that several empirical studies have already proven
that networks play a central role when looking for a job. However, as
another expert pointed out, ethnic communities are often limited to
specific regions and urban centres where such structures can develop.
Most respondents assigned only a minor role to digital and print med-
ia in the countries of origin, when looking for irregular work in Aus-
tria. According to one expert, only a minority makes use of this strat-
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egy, as jobs found through newspaper advertisements later often turn
out to be non-existent. Others pointed out that it could still be a popu-
lar strategy in the recruitment of personal services (e.g. au pairs) as
well as in tourism and agriculture.
Finally, other search and recruitment strategies have been assigned
only limited roles by our expert panel. This concerns both the street
market (Arbeiterstrich) for irregularly working migrants that used to be
an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in the early 1990s but is reportedly
less frequented these days, and the strategy of ‘going from door to door’.
Anecdotal evidence shows that the latter sometimes still occurs in agri-
culture, catering and construction but is limited geographically or to
specific groups such as asylum seekers. Finally, finding a job through
offering their services in advertisements in newspapers is seen to be of
little relevance, mainly because other options are available.
To sum up, on the basis of our expert assessments, we can distin-
guish three major recruitment strategies. They are as follows: contacts
through social and family networks (at the core), professional contacts
and recruitment and searching for work by means of one’s own initia-
tive or advertisements in the media.
Particular search and recruitment strategies of irregularly working
migrants have an obvious and logical relationship to the observed pre-
sence of specific nationalities in particular segments of the irregular la-
bour market. Therefore, our experts were asked to relate this phenom-
enon to either professionally organised recruitment or informal net-
works of irregularly working migrants.
The majority of our experts shared the opinion that the ‘clustering’
of specific migrant groups in specific segments of irregular labour mar-
kets is clearly connected to the existence and functioning of informal
networks. Experts pointed to the well-known phenomenon of ‘chain
migration’ through contacts with long-established migrants in Austria,
who are themselves employed in specific sectors of the labour market.
Others referred to the role of language within informal migrant net-
works. A significant deviation from this view is noticeable in the an-
swers from representatives of public control bodies, who believed that
the clustering phenomenon is mostly connected to professionally orga-
nised recruitment in the country of origin, particularly for irregular
work in construction, agriculture and care work. Overall, the argu-
ments brought forward indicate that there is often no clear difference
between organised recruitment and recruitment through informal net-
works, as both exist close to each other and often intersect and overlap.
Finally, the majority of respondents argued that especially the so-
called ‘ethnic businesses’ (as present, for example, in the catering and
service sectors) draw upon existing ethnic networks (specific groups
mentioned were migrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, China and
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Asia in general). In the next section, we will take a more detailed look
at the social characteristics of irregularly working migrants in Austria.
2.8 Social characteristics of irregularly working migrants in
Austria
Important points in the discussion of irregularly working migrants in
Austria are often their gender ratios, their qualification and work pro-
files and their countries of origin. We will examine each of these one
by one.
2.8.1 Gender ratios
In regard to the sex ratio, the results of our Delphi survey indicate that
this is seen as highly sector-specific and, moreover, that the situation
in the most important sectors in not much different than that in regu-
lar employment. Generally, experts pointed out that the labour market
is divided along gender lines and used labels such as ‘classical role
images’, ‘traditional educational domains’ or simply ‘sexual discrimina-
tion’, which would lead to gender segregation on the labour market.
One expert mentioned the historical development of migration to Aus-
tria, which was traditionally dominated by men and was related to the
dominance of the male workers in specific sectors. This would be espe-
cially true for the traditional countries of origin of the guest workers
and asylum seekers in Austria and sectors such as construction and in-
dustry, which are dominated by a high proportion of migrants from
former Yugoslavia and Turkey. On the contrary, the care sector is domi-
nated mainly by caregivers from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary, where 97 per cent of respondents judged this sector to
be female-dominated. A similar situation is assumed for the cleaning
sector, with a high proportion of women from the successor states of
former Yugoslavia.
According to another view, however, the prevailing gender ratio is re-
lated more to the traditional role images for certain occupations than
the history of labour migration to Austria. It was also mentioned that
the various ethnic groups have different images of the gender role and
tasks, and that the connection between gender and country of origin in
irregular migrant work would therefore be only indirect.
On the whole, more than 70 per cent of experts assessed the gender
ratio for all sectors together as balanced, while 28 per cent judged it to
be male-dominated. There was no one who evaluated the overall gen-
der balance as female-dominated. At the same time, our experts tended
to the following sector-specific assessments:
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– Construction is explicitly dominated by men.
– Care is explicitly dominated by women.
– Cleaning is explicitly dominated by women.
– Trade and industry is gender-balanced though with a tendency to
male dominance.
– Agriculture is gender-balanced though with a tendency to male
dominance.
– Catering and tourism is gender-balanced though with a tendency to
female dominance.
These tendencies are furthermore accentuated or qualified depending
on the region and the various activities within specific sectors.
2.8.2 Qualifications and work profiles
Another important question on the social characteristics of irregularly
working migrants concerns their qualifications and their work profiles.
In the first round, experts were asked to present their assessments
of the qualification profiles of irregularly working migrants and to
compare these to their work profiles. Questions asked were: ‘Is the edu-
cation level of the irregularly working migrants in … [the particular sector]
low, middle or higher?’ and ‘Is the nature of their work skilled or unskilled?’
Additionally, experts were asked to differentiate between EU-8 citizens
and other migrants.
Our experts assessed the qualification profile of irregularly working
migrants to be generally higher than the nature of the work done by ir-
regularly working migrants (their work profiles) in all sectors apart
from private home care. The strongest contrasts in this relationship
were assigned to agriculture, household/cleaning and catering and
tourism, where the nature of the work performed was almost univer-
sally judged to be ‘unskilled’, yet many experts assessed the qualifica-
tion level of workers in these sectors to be at least ‘middle’ or ‘higher’,
suggesting a strong ‘de-qualification effect’ when migrants accept irre-
gular work. The only exception was seen to occur in private home care,
where qualified care personnel (trained nurses) perform skilled work
even when their employment relationship is irregular.
Moreover, irregularly working migrants from the EU-8 countries
were generally seen to be more qualified than other migrants working
irregularly across all sectors. At the same time, the nature of their work
tasks were also seen to require a higher skill level in all sectors except
household/cleaning, which suggests the same type of ‘de-qualification
effect’ albeit at a higher level.
Responding to several questions and arguments in both the first and
second Delphi rounds, our experts came up with several explanations
84 MIGRATION AND IRREGULAR WORK IN AUSTRIA
for this apparent ‘de-qualification effect’. One argument links this ef-
fect to labour migration in general, irrespective of whether it is regular
or irregular – for example, language difficulties or the non-recognition
of foreign education and diplomas may compel migrants to accept jobs
below their qualification levels. Another argument relates to the nature
of irregular jobs on offer: mostly unskilled, hard, unpleasant and re-
quiring manual labour (the 3D jobs: dirty, difficult and dangerous). A
third line points to current immigration regulations, which provide
only limited options for very highly qualified non EU-15 workers (so-
called ‘key-employees’) to come to Austria for work purposes. Thus,
even middle-qualified workers would have no other option but to ac-
cept any irregular work options on offer. Finally, it was pointed out that
accepting work below one’s educational level is often pursued as a ne-
cessary entry-level strategy by irregularly working migrants. Over time,
when migrants learn the language and the ways and means of the
country, they would gradually move up the skill ladder through a
change in occupation – either within the same sector or by moving to a
different sector.
2.8.3 Countries of origin
Asked about the major countries of origin of irregularly working mi-
grants in Austria, our experts listed (in order of frequency of their
mentioning) citizens of Poland, former Yugoslavia7, Slovakia, Hungary,
Turkey and Romania as the most numerous. This overall ranking was
further differentiated according to specific sectors.
In the construction sector, Poland and former Yugoslavia were men-
tioned as the two most important countries of origin by far. Next came
Turkey, Slovakia and Hungary and, with far fewer listings, the Czech Re-
public, the CIS countries, Romania and Bulgaria. (The latter two coun-
tries were believed to assume an increasingly important role in IMW
over the coming years). Some regional specificities were also distin-
guished. For Vienna and Tyrol, experts mentioned workers from former
Yugoslavia; for Burgenland, they cited workers from neighbouring
Hungary.
In agriculture, Poles were mentioned most often as well, followed by
workers from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. In the view of our ex-
perts, catering and tourism are dominated by workers from former Yu-
goslavia, Slovakia and Hungary. Irregularly working migrants from Po-
land, the Czech Republic, Romania and Turkey received far fewer list-
ings. In ethnic businesses, persons from China and Egypt as well as
Germany were also mentioned. In the case of workers from Germany,
this could, however, be a simple reflection of recent developments in
that sector (a large inflow of seasonal workers from eastern Germany
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to seasonal jobs in catering and tourism). Moreover, for bars and night
clubs, women from the CIS countries, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria
were mentioned.
For household/cleaning, our experts listed Poland, former Yugoslavia
and Slovakia as the most important countries of origin followed (by a
large margin) by Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania.
An interesting case is provided by the household/care sector, which
according to our experts should be mostly covered by persons from
EU-8 countries, mainly Slovakia and the Czech Republic (in the north,
centre and west of Austria), Poland and Hungary (in the eastern part
of Austria). With far fewer listings, Romania and the Philippines were
also mentioned.
Finally, our experts were quite unsure concerning the main coun-
tries of origin in trade and industry. Despite many abstentions, their
listings indicate that irregularly working migrants from former Yugo-
slavia play an important role, followed by workers from Poland, Turkey,
Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania. The higher propor-
tions of former Yugoslavians and Turks were sometimes justified with
the importance of ethnic businesses and food shops, where family
members of foreign owners may find easy, if unofficial and irregular,
employment.
2.9 Quantitative developments
2.9.1 Assessments of trends over time
To gain insight into what our expert panel thought about recent
changes in the extent of irregular migrant work (IMW), we asked them
to provide assessments of recent quantitative developments in IMW.8
In Delphi 1, the experts were asked whether they thought that IMW
has ‘strongly increased, increased, stagnated (stayed about the same),
decreased or strongly decreased’ in each five-year period since 1990. In
addition, they were asked to answer the same question about the short-
er time period since EU enlargement in May 2004. The cumulative re-
sults are reflected in Table 2.2.
Generally, most of our experts were of the opinion that IMW has in-
creased across all five-year periods since 1990 – though with important
qualifications and in various intensities. A significant majority thought
that IMW increased or strongly increased between 1990 and 1995
(after the fall of the Iron Curtain to the east of Austria) and again after
EU enlargement in 2004; only a small minority thought that it has ac-
tually decreased or strongly decreased during these periods.9 A smaller
majority also thought that IMW increased or strongly increased in the
period 1995-2000. There was less consensus on the period 2000-
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2005, for which equal numbers of experts said it increased and stayed
the same.
It is interesting to compare the opinions and the supporting argu-
mentation of our experts by their institutional affiliation. Experts from
public administration and control bodies argued that the assumed in-
crease in IMW since 2004 is mainly due to the decreased risk for new
EU citizens to live and stay in Austria while at the same time working
irregularly. These experts also pointed to a recent increase in irregular
employment relationships designed to circumvent existing regulations
and in particular the transitional rules on the labour market. The
group of migration researchers largely concurred with this assessment,
but as an additional argument, several respondents from this group
emphasised the importance of a generally higher demand for IMW. Re-
spondents from NGOs showed a surprising amount of variation in
their answers. In contrast, respondents from special interest groups
displayed more familiar patterns of argumentation: while our experts
from trade unions saw alarming increases in IMW, those affiliated with
employer interests saw decreases or stagnation in irregular dependent
employment, but a noticeable increase in irregular self-employment.
2.9.2 Quantitative assessments of trends by economic sectors and branches
To gauge recent quantitative developments of irregular migrant work
in certain sectors and branches, we asked our expert panel to assess
whether they thought IMW had increased, decreased or stayed about
the same in selected economic branches over the past five years. The
selection of sectors and branches was based on the previous round of
expert interviews, in which our respondents indicated the most notor-
ious branches for IMW.
The first round yielded 132 substantive answers (all answers without
‘don’t know’ responses) from 37 returned questionnaires, out of 222
possible answers to our questions (59 per cent). Out of these, 74 an-
swers (56 per cent) indicated increases, while 34 answers (29 per cent)
Table 2.2 The development of irregular migrant work in Austria over time: Expert
assessments (Delphi 1)
Period/
assessment
Strongly
increased
Increased Stagnated
(stayed about
the same)
Decreased Strongly
decreased
Don't
know
Total
1990-1995 6 12 4 1 2 12 37
1995-2000 2 12 8 1 1 13 37
2000-2005 2 13 13 1 0 8 37
Since May 2004 3 17 9 2 0 6 37
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indicated stagnation (no change) and only twenty answers (15 per cent)
indicated sector-specific decreases. While these trends are clearly influ-
enced by the selection of branches, on the whole they support the gen-
eral assessments on the development of IMW in the period 2000-2005
reflected in the previous section. The aggregated answers by sectors/
branches of Delphi 1 are summarised in Table 2.3.
The aggregate results and the supporting argumentation of the first
Delphi round were summarised and the experts were asked in the sec-
ond round to reassess their statements in light of the arguments of
their colleagues. The second round yielded relatively more substantive
answers than the first round (102 substantive answers from 22 re-
turned questionnaires out of 132 possible answers, or 77 per cent). Out
of these, 56 answers (55 per cent) indicated increases, while 36 answers
(35 per cent) indicated stagnation (no change) and only ten answers (10
per cent) indicated sector-specific decreases. The results are sum-
marised in Table 2.4.
The overall assessment of our expert panel on quantitative develop-
ments of IMW in selected sectors and branches can thus be sum-
marised as follows (see also Figure 1): an overwhelming majority of
substantive answers indicated an increase in IMW in private house-
holds (care) (89 per cent in Delphi 2 against 92 per cent in Delphi 1)
and in private households (cleaning) (78 per cent in Delphi 2 against
Table 2.3 The development of irregular migrant work in Austria over the last five
years: Branch-specific expert assessments (Delphi 1)
Increased Stayed the same Decreased Don't know Totals
Private households (care) 23 2 0 12 37
Private households (cleaning) 14 8 1 14 37
Construction 13 6 3 15 37
Catering and tourism 11 8 5 13 37
Agriculture 8 8 5 16 37
Trade and industry 5 6 6 20 37
Table 2.4 The development of irregular migrant work in Austria over the last five
years: Branch-specific expert assessments (Delphi 2)
Increased Stayed the same Decreased Don’t know Totals
Private households (care) 16 2 0 4 22
Private households (cleaning) 14 4 0 4 22
Construction 11 5 2 4 22
Catering and tourism 9 6 2 5 22
Agriculture 3 12 1 6 22
Trade and industry 3 7 5 7 22
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62 per cent in Delphi 1). An absolute majority also stated an increase
in construction (61 per cent in Delphi 2 against 59 per cent in Delphi
1) and in catering and tourism (53 per cent in Delphi 2 against 46 per
cent in Delphi 1). In the remaining two sectors, there were significant
shifts in the relative answer patterns between Delphi 1 and 2: reacting
to the arguments of their colleagues, in Delphi 2 only 19 per cent of re-
spondents saw an increase of IMW in agriculture, while 75 per cent
saw no changes and 6 per cent saw decreases (compare to Delphi 1: 38
per cent; 38 per cent; 24 per cent). For trade and industry, only 20 per
cent saw increases, while 47 per cent saw no changes and a substantial
33 per cent share even saw decreases (against 29 per cent, 35 per cent
and 35 per cent in Delphi 1).
The intuitive impression gained from a simple comparison of the re-
sults of Delphi 1 and Delphi 2 is that of a much clearer picture on sec-
tor-specific quantitative developments as seen by our experts. This in-
tuition is confirmed by a statistical analysis of the answer patterns in
Delphi 1 and 2. Standardising the answers ‘increased’, ‘stayed the
same’ and ‘decreased’ with the numerical values +1, 0 and –1, and mul-
tiplying the frequency of the respective answers by these values, the
statements for most sectors become on average more pronounced.10 At
the same time, the standard deviation of the aggregate answers thus
quantified decreases for all sectors and branches except private house-
holds (care), where it increases slightly but remains at the lowest level
of all sectors and branches.11 There is thus more consensus and less
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Trade and industry - D2
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Construction - D1
 Private households (cleaning) - D2
 Private households (cleaning) - D1
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Increase d Stayed the same Decreased
Figure 1 The development of irregular migrant work in Austria over the last five
years: Branch-specific expert assessments (Delphi 1 & 2)
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heterogeneity on the subject among the experts. Moreover, as noted
above, there were relatively more substantive answers given and fewer
abstentions on the part of the respondents.
2.9.3 Expert estimations on the extent of irregular migrant work
Given the difficulties of producing qualified estimates on the extent of
IMW in various sectors and branches, experts are usually quite hesitant
to come forward with their own estimates. To collect a broad sample of
opinions, insights and relevant statistical indicators, we asked our ex-
perts in the first Delphi round to give their opinions on a predefined
set of estimates on the extent of IMW in various sectors and branches
(these were based on estimates gleaned from the literature and our pre-
ceding expert interviews), and to justify their judgements in free text
answers. While around half of all respondents abstained from any sub-
stantive answers to these questions, there were also a number of rele-
vant opinions and insights that were then analysed and provided as
feedback in the second round. In addition, we asked our respondents
in Delphi 2 to provide numerical estimations on the extent of IMW (as
a percentage of total employment) in selected sectors and branches.
As can be seen from Table 2.5, only about half of the respondents
provided their own detailed estimates in the second round of the Del-
phi study.12 On average, our expert panel estimated the extent of IMW
as a percentage of total employment to be highest in construction and
in catering and tourism (around 15 per cent, in both cases with a large
range from 10-30 per cent). Next comes agriculture (13 per cent), with
a range from 3-20 per cent. The average estimate for trade and indus-
try was substantially lower (5.2 per cent), while the range of estimates
for this sector was surprisingly narrow (5-7 per cent). Finally, the esti-
mated share of IMW in total employment in Austria comes out at 5
per cent, with a large range from 2.5-7 per cent.13
Besides the arguments reviewed elsewhere in this paper on the
forms and developments in IMW in Austria, some experts put forward
Table 2.5 Estimated share of irregular migrant work in total employment by
branches: Expert estimations (Delphi 2)
Minimum Average* Maximum Number
of estimates
No
estimates
Total
respondents
Construction 10 15.4 30 13 9 22
Catering and tourism 10 15.0 30 13 9 22
Agriculture 3 13.3 20 10 12 22
Trade and industry 5 5.2 7 10 12 22
Whole economy 2.5 5.0 7 10 12 22
* If a range was given, the average of the range was taken.
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new justifications for estimations strongly deviating from the average.
For example, one relatively high (25 per cent) estimate for IMW in con-
struction was justified by the plausible argument that there is a great
amount of irregular construction activity in private homes (renovation
work, gardens and parks, swimming pools), especially in the sprawling
suburbs of Vienna and other cities, and that this would be indicated by
the booming business of home improvement stores (home depots, do-
it-yourself stores, etc.). Another interesting observation relates to the
large variability in the estimations for agriculture and catering and
tourism: as these sectors have high seasonal variations, much of IMW
is likely to be of a seasonal nature (e.g. during tourist seasons or at har-
vest time), followed by periods with less IMW.
In addition to the quantitative estimates (see Table 2.5.), our experts
were asked to provide estimates on the absolute numbers of irregularly
employed foreigners in care and cleaning in private households. With-
in a broad range of 15,000-50,000, the average estimate of IMW in the
care sector in private households was around 29,000. In a more nar-
row range of 20,000-40,000 for cleaning in private households, it was
around 24,000. Around half of all respondents in Delphi 2 abstained
from giving any estimates (Table 2.6).
Many experts again provided elaborate justifications for their estima-
tions. These are especially interesting for widely deviating estimates.
For the household sector, for example, estimates on the high end were
backed up with evidence from surveys on household expenditures,
which allegedly indicate some 60,000 illegally employed household
helpers (cleaners, cooks, etc.). However, these totals cannot be broken
down by nationality, and many irregular workers in private households
would be nationals and non-migrants.14 For IMW in private home care,
many estimates were based on the number of persons receiving special
disability and care allowance from the state. This comes in the form of
cash benefits, with the amount varying on the extent of the disability
and care needs (divided in seven steps). The number of beneficiaries in
steps five, six and seven (basically those in need of intensive care
Table 2.6 Estimated number of irregular migrant workers in private households
(Delphi 2)
Minimum Average* Maximum Number
of estimates
No
estimates
Total
respondents
Private households
(care)
15.000 28.636 50.000 11 11 22
Private households
(cleaning)
20.000 24.444 40.000 9 13 22
* If a range was given, the average of the range was taken.
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around the clock) amounts already to over 30,000 persons, most of
whom would employ irregular foreign care workers. Added to these
should be a substantial part of beneficiaries at step four (42,000 per-
sons) and below. Another indication comes from evidence on the so-
called membership associations that link care workers and their pa-
tients. One expert stated that there are currently 50,000-70,000 irregu-
lar care workers ‘parked’ in these associations.
To conclude this section, a few final observations are in order. First,
rather than accepting or rejecting any of the quantitative assessments
made by our experts a priori, it is instructive to view them in their total-
ity and to describe them objectively in statistical terms as a range of es-
timates with a certain mean value. There is no inherent reason why
that calculated mean estimate should be closer to the ‘real’ value of the
unknown quantity other than the fact that it reflects not one particular
point of view, but the whole range of opinions by our panel of experts.
The mean thus reduces the weight of the more ‘extreme’ estimates on
the high and low end. Second, such ‘extreme’ estimates may still be va-
lid estimates, but due to their deviation from the consensus view are
likely to be in particular need of argumentation of how they came
about. Third, such justifications provided by our experts often indicated
their reasoning or ‘estimation methods’, and sometimes brought for-
ward new data on which certain estimates were based. In many cases,
insights on the methods of estimation are at least as interesting as the
estimates themselves, particularly when they lead to results that
strongly deviate from the mean.
Finally, we may ask ourselves how the numerical results of our mean
expert estimations compare to other figures put forward in the litera-
ture. As indicated above, there are only two quantitative estimates gi-
ven in the recent relevant literature that are serious enough to provide
their estimation methods with them. Biffl (2001) estimated 35,000 and
Schneider (2006) estimated 98,000 full-time equivalent foreign work-
ers working illegally in Austria.15 While we may note that our mean es-
timate for the share of IMW in Austria would be considerably higher
than either of these estimates (5 per cent of total employment would
be equal to some 150,000 irregularly working migrants), we should be
aware that we employed a particularly broad definition of IMW that
goes well beyond the one used by Biffl (2001); it may also be broader
than that of Scheider (2006). At the same time, we consider this broad
definition to be particularly valid under current circumstances as ex-
plained above.
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2.10 Controls in the workplace
As all of our experts have many years of experience in the area of mi-
gration or irregular work, we asked them to provide us with their as-
sessments on the effectiveness of repressive measures – in particular
on enforcement measures through border controls and controls at the
workplace. In Delphi 1, we asked for an evaluation of a list of prede-
fined statements regarding controls. The aggregate responses can be
grouped into three relevant types. The first group contains statements
in which a strong majority either accepted or rejected the statement
and a certain ‘consensus view’ emerged from the supporting argu-
ments. The second group concerns two statements that received widely
diverging or unclear answers. These were reformulated and – together
with additional feedback – included in Delphi 2 for clarification. The
statements and answers in these two groups are briefly described in
this section. The third group concerns statements in which the an-
swers lead to much more comprehensive strategies and options against
IMW than only repressive control measures. These options were
further explored in the second Delphi round and are recounted in the
next section on political measures against IMW.
First, there was wide consensus that ‘the effectiveness of controls (at the
workplace) is limited by the fact that controls are selective’ (eighteen agree,
seven disagree and twelve abstentions). However, it was also pointed
out that comprehensive (100 per cent sample) controls are neither fea-
sible nor desirable, and that the efficiency of current control measures
is largely sufficient in view of their cost.
Second, the statement that the ‘effectiveness of controls is limited by the
fact that fines for irregular employment are too low in comparison to the le-
vel of payroll taxes and social security payments for regular employment’
was overwhelmingly approved by our experts (21 agree, eight disagree
and eight abstentions). At the same time, one dissenting expert pointed
to the deterrent effect of non-monetary sanctions for employers (e.g.
exclusion from public tenders).
Third, the statement that ‘the effectiveness of controls is limited by the
fact that certain criminal entrepreneurs will always employ irregularly’ was
approved by an overwhelming majority of respondents (twenty agree,
five disagree and twelve abstentions). It was also pointed out that such
criminal employers are often short-lived (and then dissolve and disap-
pear) or work in transnational legal arrangements, which further limits
the effectiveness of sanctions.
Fourth, the statement that ‘the effectiveness of controls is limited by the
fact that economic interests (e.g. home improvement stores) prevent a suffi-
ciently high density of controls’ was agreed to by a majority of respon-
dents (thirteen agree, eight disagree). At the same time, this statement
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drew the largest number of abstentions (sixteen out of 37 returned
questionnaires) and strongly contradictory comments. While some ex-
perts pointed to the economic interests of many employers in irregular
migrant work, others emphasised that it is precisely in the interest of
firms to have rigid controls to prevent unfair competition from employ-
ers hiring irregularly.
Fifth, the statement that ‘the effectiveness of controls is limited by the
fact that border controls have no influence on the irregular employment of
migrants’ was largely approved by our respondents (22 (59 per cent)
agree, eight (22 per cent) disagree and seven (19 per cent) abstentions).
Several experts pointed to the effects of EU enlargement in 2004: since
then, new EU citizens have had freedom of travel and residence and
cannot be rejected at the borders any longer, but they still face restric-
tions in their access to the labour market under transitional rules.
Others, however, pointed to the deterrent effect of border controls for
non-EU citizens that would effectively limit irregular migration and
therefore also the potential pool of irregularly working migrants. To
clarify the issue, we asked the same question again in Delphi 2 and
provided the comments made in the first round. As a result, an even
greater percentage of respondents agreed on the limitation of border
controls for the suppression of IMW: sixteen (73 per cent) agree, five
(23 per cent) disagree and only one (4 per cent) abstention.
Sixth, the statement that ‘the effectiveness of controls is limited by the
fact that the KIAB (Control Unit for Illegal Employment) has no access to
private homes’ was answered affirmatively by a large majority of respon-
dents (eighteen agree, six disagree and twelve abstention). Finally, se-
venth, the parallel statement that ‘the effectiveness of controls is limited by
the fact that there are certain areas that are for political reasons “off-limit”
for control measures’ received the highest degree of approval (26 agree,
one disagree and ten abstentions). Despite the high level of approval to
both questions, the comments indicated that experts disagreed on
whether or not this represented a satisfying situation or not and what
should be done about it. While some saw the dawn of a new age of ‘pri-
vate servants’ and advocated stronger controls, others were concerned
about the protection of privacy and felt that the possible extent of mis-
behaviour against the law by employing irregularly in private homes
would not justify a erosion of that principle. To learn more about what
our expert panel actually thought about such opposing views, we fol-
lowed up in Delphi 2 (after providing feedback on the comments from
other experts) with the following direct statement: ‘The private area
should be more controlled’. In line with their previous reactions to the
statements concerning the private area, our respondents overwhel-
mingly rejected that statement (seventeen disagree, four agree and one
abstentions). Interestingly, however, there was a shift in the argumen-
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tation brought forward to justify these opinions. Rather than the pro-
tection of the private sphere, several experts now questioned the very
feasibility of efficiently controlling the private sector and, given limited
resources, called for prioritising controls of business employers.
To shortly summarise our discussion of control measures, there was
a widespread tendency among our experts to argue that, for a variety of
reasons, sheer control measures have only a limited impact on irregu-
lar migrant work in Austria. Moreover, among our expert panel, the
opinion predominated that effective solutions for addressing IMW can-
not be found in more controls and a higher control density alone, but
that other, more comprehensive political measures must be found. The
options and limits of such wider measures are the subject of our next
section.
2.11 Political measures against irregular migrant work
In the first Delphi round, we asked experts to evaluate four measures
that were recently introduced or were already decided upon by political
authorities with the aim of reducing irregular migrant work in Austria.
The results brought few surprises but a number of interesting com-
ments that were integrated into the questionnaire of the second Delphi
round. Thus, between two-thirds and three-quarters of all respondents
in Delphi 1 agreed that the following four measures were ‘sensible’ or
‘highly sensible’ instruments for reducing IMW in Austria: 1) further
increasing the staff of the KIAB (control unit for illegal employment)
by 200 persons; 2) enlarging the scope of current trainee programmes
with Austria’s neighbouring countries16; 3) strengthening the controls
of the so-called ‘pseudo-self-employed’ (see Section 1.10); and 4) in-
creasing the maximum penalties for the irregular employment of mi-
grants.
While any single one of these recently established measures found
broad support among our expert panel in Delphi 1, many respondents
voiced their doubts and concerns in additional comments. Several saw
the overall impact of these measures as fairly limited or, in the words
of one respondent, as a ‘cure of the symptoms’ rather than a compre-
hensive strategy. Many experts followed our request and outlined their
own suggestions for dealing with irregular migrant work.
Out of these ideas, demands and suggestions, we compiled a list of
24 possible measures that go beyond simple short-term control mea-
sures but have a wider scope and timeframe that requires discussions
and decisions at the political level (e.g. through the passing of new
laws or ministerial ordinances). These political options were then put
to the vote by our expert panel in the second Delphi round. Following
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a well-established procedure in past applications of the so-called Policy-
Delphi (see Section 2.2), we asked our experts whether they judged any
particular measure to be ‘desirable’ (yes/no/don’t know) and ‘feasible’
(yes/no/don’t know).17 Of the 22 respondents in Delphi 2, most an-
swered at least some of the questions on political options for dealing
with IMW, and many added further verbal comments. In the next sec-
tion, we will provide a short overview and description of the results. A
summary table of the expert evaluations is provided in Annex A.
2.11.1 Expert assessments of political measures
Opening of the labour market
1) The opening of the labour market for certain occupations for which
there is a particularly high labour demand was seen by our experts pre-
dominantly as desirable (fifteen) and even more so as feasible (sixteen).
Nevertheless, dissenting opinions pointed to certain areas (e.g. private
care) where existing problems could not be solved by a simple opening
to foreign labour.
2) An even higher level of consensus found the suggested option of
opening the labour market for certain groups of third-country citizens,
who already have a long-term residence permit in Austria but face re-
strictions in their access to the labour market (e.g. family members of
established foreign residents, students).18 Twenty-one respondents saw
this option as feasible and sixteen as desirable.
3) While a majority of respondents judged a regionally limited opening
of the labour market for certain branches and occupations as feasible
(fourteen yes against six no), there was wide disagreement on the desir-
ability of this option (ten yes against eleven no). Experts noted that
much would depend on how such a policy would be designed and im-
plemented concretely, and that there would be the danger of a prema-
ture opening of the labour market with many negative effects.
4) There was a particularly high level of disagreement in the evaluation
of a possible early phasing out of the transitional rules on the access to
the labour market for EU-8 citizens. Nine respondents judged this op-
tion as politically feasible but twelve did not. Similarly, ten experts wel-
comed this step as desirable, while twelve found it undesirable. Those
in favour of an early abolition pointed to the experiences with the EU
accession of Spain and Portugal, among other things, while those re-
nouncing it argued, for example, that the ‘labour supply shock’ would
come too early.
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Labour standards and foreign employment law
5) A clear majority of fourteen respondents thought that a liberalisation
of current labour standards (e.g. facilitating the hiring and firing of
employees, more flexibility in work-hours, etc.) was feasible and some
pointed to recent examples in other countries (the Netherlands,
France). At the same time, such a policy was highly unpopular among
our expert panel, with seventeen respondents judging the option as un-
desirable (and only five as desirable).
6) Even more than the previous suggestion, the option of adjusting the
current levels of minimum wages downwards was met by unanimous
opposition by our expert panel. Out of the 22 respondents, twenty
deemed this option undesirable (with two abstentions) and a majority
did not consider it feasible (thirteen not feasible against six feasible).
7) Similar to option 2, but going beyond it in its scope, a general mer-
ging of the right to reside and the right to work in Austria19 was predo-
minantly seen as desirable (sixteen yes against four no) and also as fea-
sible by our experts (eighteen yes against four no). While some com-
ments added that this should not automatically be the case for short-
term residents, others explicitly included asylum seekers in their con-
siderations (by granting access to the labour market after a certain peri-
od of stay, e.g. one year).
Measures for addressing irregular private home care
8) In view of the current debate on irregular care work in private
households,20 our expert panel largely agreed that a considerable in-
crease of the state-funded disability and care allowances (to enable the
regular financing of 24-hour-per-day care services for patients) would
be desirable (seventeen yes against three no). At the same time (reflect-
ing the current dilemma of policy in this area), a clear majority of four-
teen respondents judged this option as not feasible (against seven feasi-
ble).
9) On the other hand, the chances to realise an alternative option for
private home care were seen to be more favourable: to establish a legal
right for persons receiving public care allowances to receive certain ser-
vices in kind rather than in cash (e.g. short-term care services, care
substitutes) was seen as a feasible option by a clear majority (fourteen
yes against seven no). Moreover, this idea was almost universally wel-
comed by our expert panel as desirable (twenty yes against two no).
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10) To remedy current labour shortages in the care sector, there was
also a clear vote for providing access to the labour market for foreign
household helpers in households with persons in need of care (follow-
ing the German example of 38.5 hours per week). This option was seen
as desirable by seventeen respondents (one against and four absten-
tions) and also as feasible by fourteen experts (three against and five
abstentions).
Incentive systems, sanctions and support mechanisms
11) There was little agreement among our panel on the establishment
of special incentive models for the creation of regular low-wage jobs
(combination wage that would partly be subsidised by the state). While
a clear majority of respondents considered such a model as principally
feasible (fifteen yes against four no), only eight assessed it also as de-
sirable while eleven thought it was not desirable. Against familiar argu-
ments that low-wage jobs should not be supported, proponents of the
scheme stated that it would at least allow the transformation of irregu-
lar to regular jobs.
12) There was a clear vote on the suggestion of introducing sanctions
or fines against irregularly working migrants.21 While a clear majority
of sixteen respondents deemed this measure as feasible (sixteen yes
against four no), an equally clear majority considered such an option
as not desirable (sixteen no against five yes).
13) On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of respondents saw
the strengthening of legal support services for irregularly working mi-
grants in court cases against their employers as a desirable measure
(eighteen yes against three no). Almost as many (sixteen yes against
five no) considered this option also as a feasible one.
14) In a similar vein, the creation of specialised advisory services for ir-
regularly working persons (e.g. a ‘service hotline’) was strongly fa-
voured by eighteen experts as desirable (two said not desirable) and
also as feasible (eighteen yes against three no). One commentator
pointed out that this would especially be a task for the trade unions.
15) The majority of respondents (fifteen desirable against six not desir-
able) would further welcome a mandatory representation of the Cham-
ber of Labour or the Austrian Confederation of Trade Unions in legal
proceedings. However, regarding the feasibility of this option, only
around half of the respondents were optimistic (eleven yes against ten
no).
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16) Another suggestion that has recently drawn some attention was
equally viewed sceptically by our expert panel. The ‘skimming off’ of
profits (by employers) gained through irregularly employing workers
was seen as desirable by a large majority of our experts (seventeen yes
against three no), and yet, the chances for implementing this policy
were doubted by many (twelve not feasible against nine feasible). One
commentator pointed out that ‘in theory, irregularly gained profits should
already now be skimmed off’ in the form of back-payments of taxes and
social security contributions, but that in many cases such payroll taxes
and duties turn out to be irretrievable in practice.
17) The suggestion to make more use of sanctions in the form of ex-
cluding perpetrators from public tenders and public work contracts
rather than levying fines was seen as both desirable and feasible by the
majority of respondents (in both cases fourteen yes against four no).
However, a number of commentators qualified their approval by noting
that such exclusionary sanctions should be used in addition rather than
in lieu of fines. A combination of both sanctioning instruments would
be necessary especially ‘for those irregularly employing who never receive
(or tender for) public contracts’.
EU-wide regulations
18) The overwhelming majority of respondents found a common legal
EU framework for the cooperation of institutions tasked with combat-
ing irregular work desirable (sixteen yes against three no), but only a
smaller majority deemed the implementation of such a framework also
feasible (twelve yes against six no). One expert noted critically that ‘the
discussion for many years on the EU Service Directive clearly shows the com-
plexity of establishing such an EU-wide legal framework’.
19) Our experts were even more hesitant in the evaluation of a possible
EU-wide approximation of economic framework conditions (e.g. for
taxes, social security contributions, etc.). While such approximation
was seen as desirable by a large majority (fourteen yes against six no),
among other reasons to ‘prevent wage dumping’, opponents warned that
this could lead to a ‘significant worsening of Austrian living standards’. In
any case, only around half of the respondents judged an EU-wide regu-
lation in this area to be feasible (ten yes against nine no).
Other political measures
20) Measures designed to raise the awareness of employers hiring irre-
gularly to change their behaviour are seen as desirable by a large ma-
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jority of our panel (sixteen yes against three no). At the same time,
only eleven respondents thought awareness-raising a feasible strategy
(against seven who did not), indicating widespread doubts about the ef-
fectiveness of such measures.
21) Also assessed as feasible by a relative majority of respondents were
measures to strengthen control systems through the use of modern
technologies such as the use of biometric data (twelve yes against seven
no). However, an overwhelmingly large majority of eighteen respon-
dents judged such measures as not desirable (against three who
deemed them desirable).
22) A large majority of our experts advocated a faster and less bureau-
cratic recognition of foreign training certificates and diplomas (sixteen
yes against five no). An even larger share of respondents regarded such
measures as feasible (eighteen yes against two no).
23) The suggested option of using legalisation of irregularly working
migrants as a policy measure to reduce irregular migrant work in Aus-
tria produced some contradictory statements by our experts. While on
the whole such measures were viewed as both feasible (fourteen yes
against seven no) and desirable (fourteen yes against six no), both ad-
vocates and opponents of such schemes pointed to the additional pull-
effects created by collective regularisations and noted that legalisations
would be only desirable when certain criteria are met (e.g. discretionary
case-by-case regularisations).
24) Finally, the list of policy options evaluated by our experts is com-
pleted with a proposal that found broad consensus among respondents.
A better networking and information exchange among responsible la-
bour market institutions (social security institutions, labour market ser-
vice and others) was mostly seen as feasible (eighteen yes against one
no) as well as desirable (eighteen yes against two no). One commenta-
tor added that this should concern mainly the linking up of existing da-
tabases, rather than the creation of new control systems.
2.11.2 EU enlargement and the end of transition periods on the labour
market
As already noted, our experts were divided when it came to the foresee-
able end of the transition periods for access to the Austrian labour mar-
ket for new EU citizens (for the EU-8 in 2009 or 2011, and at a later
stage for citizens of Bulgaria and Romania. In Delphi 1, only a small
majority of respondents (52 per cent) were in favour of ending the tran-
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sition periods before 2011. Some of these proponents justified their po-
sition with a rising demand for additional migrant workers over the
coming decade and the resulting chance for migrants already working
irregularly in Austria to move to a regular job. Others supported only a
gradual opening of the labour market as a preparation to the free
movement of workers later on. On the other hand, opponents argued
that over the coming years, the high wage differentials between Austria
and its neighbouring countries will continue to exist, leading to ex-
treme pressure on the labour market with substantial substitution pro-
cesses, especially in low-skilled occupations.
To learn more about the likely impact of the end of transition peri-
ods (which will come sooner or later, irrespective of the political will in
Austria), we asked our expert panel whether they think that the extent
of irregular migrant work will increase after the end of the transitional
regulations or not. It is interesting to note that when confronted with
the above arguments made by their colleagues in response to that ques-
tion in Delphi 1, relatively more experts thought that this would be the
case: the rate of agreement rose from 44 per cent in Delphi 1 to 60 per
cent in Delphi 2. Some of the experts justified their change in position
by arguing that the migration-supporting factors – at least in the short
run – would prevail. The demographic and development factors would
only become important in the longer run (after 2020). A detailed look
at possible future scenarios of irregular migrant work in Austria is pro-
vided in the next section.
2.12 Prognoses and scenarios on the future development of
irregular migrant work
2.12.1 Sector-specific prognoses of irregular migrant work
Prompted for a prognosis about the future development of IMW in the
most notorious sectors and branches over the next ten years, our expert
panel made the following predictions: an overwhelming majority pro-
jected further growth of IMW in the private care sector, and a majority
also foresaw further growth of IMW in cleaning in private households
and (relatively fewer) in catering and tourism. Interestingly, IMW in
construction and agriculture was largely predicted to remain stagnant
(albeit at a high level). Finally, IMW in trade and industry was forecast
to remain stagnant or on be on the decline. Generally, IMW as a share
of total employment in Austria was predicted to grow further by a sub-
stantial majority of respondents (nine out of fifteen) (Table 2.7).
It is interesting to review some of the arguments made by our re-
spondents to justify their branch-specific and sector-specific prognoses.
For both care and cleaning tasks in private households, several experts
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pointed to a continuously rising demand due to demographic develop-
ments (more old people in need of care and a higher labour force parti-
cipation of women, who ‘outsource’ household tasks to irregular mi-
grants). And yet, the predicted stagnation of IMW in both construction
and in trade and industry was related to a generally lower employment
dynamic in these sectors, due to the possibilities to mechanise and ra-
tionalise low-skilled tasks and to relocate labour-intensive production
processes to low-wage countries abroad.22 The same argument was re-
peatedly made for agricultural production as well; however, several ex-
perts argued that mechanisation in this sector would be limited by the
need for manual work in the production of high-quality food products.
As indicated by this brief discussion, our experts based their sector-
specific prognoses of IMW in Austria generally on considerations of
demand-side factors and their future development. Among these, de-
mographic and technological factors figured most prominently.
2.12.2 Future scenarios of irregular migrant work
At the end of the questionnaire in Delphi 2, our expert panel was
asked to briefly sketch the one scenario that in their opinion reflects
the most likely development of irregular migrant work in Austria over
the coming decade. Seventeen out of 22 respondents outlined such a
scenario, formulated in free text. While the very openness of the ques-
tion invited a broad range of possible forecasts, there were several key
predictions that were shared among several experts.
First of all, it is interesting to notice that, contrary to the sector-speci-
fic prognoses summarised above, the general focus of the outlined sce-
narios was on the supply side of irregular labour markets. The follow-
ing prospects were the most important factors in the deliberations on
future developments:
Table 2.7 Will the extent of irregular migrant work in Austria increase, stay the same
or decrease over the coming ten years in the following branches? Branch-
specific expert prognoses in Delphi 2 (in absolute numbers)
Increase Stay the same Decrease Subtotal Don’t know Total
Private households (care) 14 0 1 15 7 22
Private households (cleaning) 9 6 0 15 7 22
Catering and tourism 7 5 2 14 8 22
Construction 5 9 1 15 7 22
Agriculture 4 10 1 15 7 22
Trade and industry 1 9 4 14 8 22
Total employment 9 5 1 15 7 22
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– The projected end of current transition periods on the Austrian la-
bour market for EU-8 citizens (2009 or 2011) and the resulting
‘supply shock’ on the regular labour market.
– The timing and duration of transition periods for Bulgarians and
Romanians on the Austrian labour market.
– The possible lifting of entry and residence restrictions for citizens
of other EU-candidate countries (especially South-Eastern European
countries and Turkey).
– The economic development (projected income convergence and job
creation) of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries
over the coming decade.
– ‘Crowding-out’ processes of various groups of labour migrants from
different origins on the regular and irregular labour market in
Austria.
– The possible return of irregularly working migrants from Austria to
their newly prosperous countries of origin.
Various combinations of the strength and possible effects of each of
these factors on irregular migrant work, then, resulted in diverging sce-
narios on the future of IMW in Austria.
The following quote is typical for those forecasting strong distur-
bances from a labour supply shock:
The end of the transition periods will lead to more competition
between workers, an effect that will be exacerbated by the lifting
of residence restrictions for citizens of the Western Balkan states
and possibly Turkey. The resulting oversupply of labour will lead
to wage pressures and a higher willingness of workers to enter
into and to accept irregular employment opportunities (for ex-
ample, part-time jobs with unpaid overtime, et cetera).
On the other hand, the following scenario illustrates the position of
those projecting a decrease of supply pressures due to a rapid econom-
ic convergence process of new EU members and candidate countries:
The end of transition periods...will surely create new incentives
for workers from neighbouring countries to search employment
in Austria and other European countries. However, with favour-
able economic growth across Europe, the labour market will be
able to absorb additional workers; especially in the new EU
Member States themselves, with growth rates of 5 per cent to 6
per cent per year, new jobs will become available.
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However, such optimistic prognoses are regularly followed up with
comments on a suggested ‘crowding-out’ effect by new groups of la-
bour migrants, as in the following quotes:
There will be a shift of irregular employment to [citizens of ] Bul-
garia and Romania, and additionally to Moldova and Ukraine,
resulting in a crowding-out of current irregularly working mi-
grants, who will return to Poland.
For [citizens of ] the new EU Member States, there will be oppor-
tunities to change from illegal to legal employment. On their be-
half, [citizens of ] Romania and Bulgaria will follow as they will
face long transition periods. In the new EU Member States,
there is a large segment of illegal work carried out by Russians,
Belarusians and Ukrainians. The lifting of border controls could
then result in a movement of these irregularly working persons
to the ‘old’ EU Member States.
The extent of irregular migrant work will remain about the
same, if Turkey does not accede [to the EU]: the mobility of
workers from Central and Eastern Europe will decline due to de-
mographic shifts, but irregular migration from the rest of the
world will keep the share [of IMW] about stable. However, if Tur-
key accedes [to the EU], there will be a migration wave that can
no longer be socially integrated.
Generally, then, we can conclude that the supply-side arguments show
a strong tendency towards predicting a continuously high pressure on
the Austrian labour market, accompanied by a shift to irregularly work-
ing persons from ever more remote countries of origin, with clear con-
sequences for irregular migrant work in Austria.
On the demand side, however, there are two opposing views that can
be attributed to differences in the experts’ position on the underlying
reasons of IMW. The first, optimistic forecast is illustrated by the fol-
lowing quote:
With the end of transition periods, many migrant workers will
leave their status of illegality. Demographic changes will lead to
labour scarcities and hence an increase in regular employment.
This optimistic scenario runs counter to several forecasts that base
their assessments on the underlying structural reasons of IMW:
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Irregular migrant work will continue to increase slowly. Efforts
of legalisation will be able to transform only some irregular em-
ployment relationships into regular ones, while the additional
costs related to regular employment will still favour irregular
employment on the whole.
The liberalisation of labour laws and standards (in regard to
part-time or ‘minor’ employment, for example) has created the
basis for irregular employment. Therefore, irregular employ-
ment will by no means decline over the coming ten years. Those
migrants, who [then] have the opportunity to access regular
work and who are economically integrated, will follow the model
of many native workers – a combination of [unemployment]
benefits and irregular work […].
[There will be] few changes, except that for citizens of certain
[EU Member] States, there will be no more need for work per-
mits under foreign employment laws; but this will only make it
easier for dubious employers (especially from abroad) to pay
wages below the minimum standards; there will be a strong
expansion of the ‘grey area’! Consequences: wage levels will fall,
legitimate firms (small- and medium-sized enterprises) will not
be able to compete and will find it difficult to survive.
2.12.3 And the world goes round…
Generally speaking, the suggested scenarios of our expert panel, give
us little confidence to predict a general decrease in irregular migrant
work in Austria. However, the prognoses of several experts point to sig-
nificant shifts in the countries of origin of irregularly working mi-
grants, coupled with a ‘crowding-out’ between migrant groups at the
lower ends of the labour market. At the end of this section, we would
therefore like to quote one elaborate scenario that pointedly combines
many of the above-mentioned elements:
Following its long-term trend, irregular employment will con-
tinue to increase, parallel to the shadow economy as a share of
GDP. The end of transition periods for citizens of the EU-8 will
bring a supply shock on the labour market that will stimulate
growth but at the same time increase unemployment of both na-
tive and foreign workers […]. The labour market will become
even more segmented according to qualifications and ethnic/re-
ligious background. One way out will be an increase in self-em-
ployment (bazaar capitalism). With the end of the transition per-
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iods, migrant workers from the EU-8 will shift from the irregu-
lar to the regular labour market and workers from the new EU
accession countries will take their places as irregulars. And the
world goes round…
2.13 Concluding remarks
As this study demonstrates, research on difficult issues (such as irregu-
lar migrant work) can clearly benefit through the use of the Delphi
method. Experts from various backgrounds and institutional affiliations
often possess a lot of insight and information that would otherwise be
unavailable to the researcher and can offer a wealth of knowledge for
further analysis. At the same time, the very divergence of expert opi-
nions points to the main shortcomings of the method: experts may
have only partial insights into a complex and multi-faceted phenomen-
on and may mistakenly base general conclusions on partial or invalid
indicators. The Delphi method is designed to overcome some of these
problems by involving a larger number of independent experts in an
interactive process of exchange through the use of written question-
naires. By fostering convergence and consensus, the method should re-
sult in an overall picture of a hidden phenomenon that is a better re-
flection of reality than simply the sum of the individual opinions.
Against this background – and keeping in mind the strengths and
weaknesses of the research method employed – our Delphi survey has
produced a number of interesting results on the most important as-
pects of irregular migrant work. Our experts provided their assess-
ments on: the most important forms of IMW, the effects on various
parts of the economy, the main motives of employers to engage irregu-
larly working migrants, search and recruitment strategies, countries of
origin, gender and educational levels of workers, the most notorious
branches and their developments with regard to IMW, the extent of
IMW, a scenario forecasting of future developments, an evaluation of
control strategies and political measures against IMW and much else.
As the analysis of these issues is laid out in detail in the preceding
sections and is taken up again in Part 4 of this report, they will not be
repeated here. Rather, we would like to point to one particular feature
of our Delphi survey, which is likely to be a valid characteristic of ex-
pert-based research in general: the great majority of participating ex-
perts in our survey are not only ‘knowledge carriers’ for the purposes
of this particular research, but are actively involved in shaping or im-
plementing policies and regulations that in turn will have an effect on
the research subject as such – as officials in public administration or
enforcement bodies, activists in NGOs, professionals in special interest
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organisations, policy advisors, authors of influential reports or, simply,
as experts asked for special advice on the subject by the government,
administration or the media.
It is for this reason that the sections on control strategies and policy
measures assume a special weight in our Delphi study. And while the
effectiveness of controls (at the workplace) and sanctions is predomi-
nantly seen as limited, there is much less agreement on which alterna-
tive policy measures could or should be taken to address irregular mi-
grant work. By dividing the evaluation of policy measures into two di-
mensions – what is (politically) feasible and what is (generally) desirable
in the eyes of our experts – we gained a picture of what could and
should be done about irregular migrant work that is sometimes clear-
cut and in other cases strongly contested. This should not be surpris-
ing. Insofar as our experts are opinion leaders and/or attached to insti-
tutions that represent certain interests and positions, their views are
likely to reflect the contested standpoints on irregular migrant work
currently prevalent in Austrian society. Luckily, this is not the end of
the story. By specifying, justifying and revising their views in the
course of this Delphi survey, our experts have helped to sharpen a
blurred picture and to clarify the desirability and feasibility of available
policy options. This in itself is no mean achievement, and we whole-
heartedly thank all our participating experts for their contributions.
Notes
1 Parts of this chapter have been published as a working paper of the International La-
bour Office and are reproduced with the ILO’s kind permission; see Jandl, Hollomey
and Stepien (2007).
2 General information on the Delphi Method is provided in Linstone and Turoff (1975).
A good overview is provided in Masser and Foley (1987).
3 See, for example, Rowe et al. (1991). For a recent application of the method, see Lach-
manova´ and Drbohlav (2004).
4 Mainly, the Foreign Employment Law (Ausla¨nderbescha¨ftigungsgesetz – AuslBG)
and the Aliens’ Act (Fremdengesetz – FrG), which includes the Residence and Settle-
ment Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz – NAG).
5 To increase the chances of successfully prosecuting such cases, organised tax and so-
cial security fraud has been made a criminal offence (rather than an administrative
offence with fewer powers of investigation) by the new Social Security Fraud Act of
2005 (Sozialbetrugsgesetz 2005).
6 For example, a common argument made with regard to demographic developments
(aging and more need for elderly care) and socioeconomic developments (higher em-
ployment rates of women and more need for childcare) is vigorously opposed by
those arguing that the relative need for these services (currently often supplied by ir-
regular migrant workers) should be satisfied by accommodating social policies (more
childcare facilities, retirement homes, etc.). Demographic developments will also lead
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to scarcities on the labour market, which can either be filled by more regular or more
irregular workers. And so on.
7 The designation ‘former Yugoslavia’ was generally used by our respondents when re-
ferring to the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Although no longer a ‘state’
or a ‘country’, we use this term as a regional designation.
8 In addition, for all assessments of quantitative developments, we also asked our ex-
perts to justify their statements with qualitative arguments. These arguments formed
an important part of the feedback we provided to the respondents of the first Delphi
round and which led experts in many cases to reconsider their earlier assessments in
the second Delphi round. For clarity, and to avoid duplication, such qualitative argu-
ments have been integrated in other sections of this report and will not be repeated
here.
9 An interesting justification of the latter opinion is provided by the observation that
the one-time legalisation campaign of some 30,000 irregular migrants in 1990 led
to a momentary decrease in the number of illegally employed foreigners.
10 The resulting average values for Delphi 2 (Delphi 1) are as follows: for private house-
holds (care) 0.89 (0.92); for private households (cleaning) 0.78 (0.57); for construc-
tion 0.50 (0.45); for catering and tourism 0.41 (0.25); for agriculture 0.13 (0.14); for
trade and industry -0.13 (-0.06).
11 Using the above-listed numerical values for the three answer categories, the standard
deviation for the aggregate answers in Delphi 1 and Delphi 2 decreases for private
households (care) from 0.59 to 0.43; for construction from 0.74 to 0.71; for catering
and tourism from 0.79 to 0.71; for agriculture from 0.79 to 0.50; for trade and in-
dustry from 0.83 to 0.74. For private households (care), it increases from a low 0.28
to a still relatively low 0.32.
12 Out of 154 possible estimates from 22 respondents in seven sectors/branches, 78 nu-
merical estimates were made. Experts from NGOs and from public administration
abstained relatively more often than others.
13 One expert pointed out that a share of 5 per cent in total employment would amount
to some 150,000 migrants in irregular employment in Austria, and that this would
thus certainly be too high. However, no justification as to why this would be too high
was given. Another expert, providing a relatively high estimate, argued that IMW
takes place also in many other sectors and branches than those listed in the question-
naire, and that 5 per cent could thus be substantially too low. Again, no further justi-
fication was provided.
14 The comment pointed out that there are some 3.2 million households in Austria,
many of which employ household helpers. At the same time, regularly employed
cleaners and gardeners are still the exception rather than the norm.
15 Both authors point out that the actual (non-full-time) number of illegal foreign work-
ers is likely to be considerably higher than these figures.
16 Such trainee programmes are currently agreed upon with Hungary and the Czech
Republic in the form of trainee and border commuter agreements only, and comprise
several thousand persons per year. For 2007, the quota for Hungary was fixed at
1,800 trainees and 2,350 border commuters. For the Czech Republic, the quota for
2007 (the first year in which the agreement was applied) was set at 300 trainees and
500 border commuters (BMWA 2006).
17 The following definitions were provided: ‘Feasibility means the high probability that
this measure can be politically implemented’ and ‘Desirability is taken to reflect your
personal evaluation of whether this measure should be implemented in order to re-
duce irregular migrant work, taking into account all positive and negative effects this
measure could have (effectiveness and costs of measure, ethic criteria and effects on
higher-level goals)’.
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18 It was also pointed out that this issue has by and large already been addressed by re-
cent changes in foreign employment law required by existing EU regulations. How-
ever, some groups with residence rights still face certain restrictions in the access to
the labour market.
19 Currently, these two rights are not fully aligned, as can be seen in the existence of
two separate permits for residence and work purposes. A full merging of these rights
would abolish all work permits needed under foreign employment law and grant the
right to work to anyone with a residence permit, thus going beyond recent approxi-
mations in the two sets of rights.
20 At the time of carrying out this study, the issue of irregular migrant workers in pri-
vate home care became a hotly debated political topic, especially in the run-up to the
elections in October 2006. With few realistic solutions for establishing affordable
home care in sight, it was eventually decided in a typical political move to establish a
commission that would study the issue and suggest solutions. To allow time for this,
a general amnesty until 30 June 2007 for irregular care workers and their employers
(that is, the patients) was announced by the Minister for the Economy and Labour.
After months of bitter negotiations and political bickering, however, no politically ac-
ceptable solution was in sight that would allow both upholding labour standards and
regularising irregular care workers. Therefore, in mid-June 2007, the government ex-
tended the amnesty until the end of the year.
21 Under current legislation, only the employers of irregular migrant workers are sub-
ject to sanctions and fines but not the irregular workers themselves. However, for
third-country citizens, the fact of being apprehended for irregular work will in most
cases lead to expulsion from Austria.
22 However, a counter-argument fielded by some experts was that in the medium term,
higher competition in international product markets would lead to more cost pres-
sures in certain industries, and thus more demand for irregular (low-cost) migrant
workers. This argument was sometimes also related to irregular migrant work in so-
called ‘ethnic businesses’ (e.g. family members of migrant entrepreneurs). For con-
struction, a common counter-argument against a future decrease in demand for irre-
gular migrant workers was a perceived boom in construction and renovation activities
in private households.
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3 Empirical results from migrant interviews
3.1 Methodology and sample description
In order to get a broader picture of the meaning of irregular migrant
work in Austria from an insight perspective and to get in-depth knowl-
edge on the evolvement of labour market strategies and the impact of
legal admission schemes in the context of EU enlargement, we decided
to carry out problem-centred qualitative interviews (Witzel 2000) with
individuals who have first-hand knowledge themselves: migrants work-
ing irregularly. Qualitative interviews are based on the assumption that,
in contrast to experts who are able to distance themselves from the
subject in question, affected persons can convey their very personal
and subjective perspective of a process or a situation and can thus be
considered as ‘experts’ for their individual situations (Gla¨ser & Laudel
2004). Personal experiences bring new aspects to the research topic
and can shed light on aspects otherwise underrepresented.
3.1.1 General sample description
As our research interest was to gain in-depth knowledge on a phenom-
enon in a certain geographical and temporal context, namely irregular
migrant employment in the context of EU enlargement in Austria, we
decided for selective sampling (Schatzman & Strauss 1973; Sandelows-
ki et. al. 1992) and therefore to sample subjects ‘according to a precon-
ceived, but reasonable initial set of dimensions [we had] worked out in
advance for the study’ (Glaser 1978: 37).
We carried out qualitative interviews with 50 migrants working irre-
gularly in the most notorious branches and activity areas, in times of
high and low seasons and in various geographical regions where irre-
gular migrant work is deemed to be concentrated: construction and re-
lated industries, catering and tourism, agriculture and domestic ser-
vices.
In addition, interviews were conducted in three regions: the Federal
State of Burgenland as a region that borders the relevant states of Slova-
kia and Hungary and serves as an important agricultural region; the
Federal State of Tyrol as a region that borders only ‘old’ EU Member
States and depends heavily on tourism; and the capital city of Vienna,
which provides urban structures and anonymity.
The objective of our research was to explore the impact of EU enlar-
gement on irregular foreign employment in Austria. Therefore, respon-
dents originated mainly from new EU Member States. Only in cases
where it seemed to be relevant for our research did we include third-
country nationals originating from countries bordering the EU (Uk-
raine and, before 2007, Romania and Bulgaria), but also individuals
from other states who, due to their long-term involvement, could draw
on comprehensive knowledge about irregular foreign employment in
Austria. In order to gain insight into changing strategies, most selected
individuals had already started to work in Austria before the May 2004
enlargement and could therefore reveal a great deal on changing strate-
gies associated with their changed legal status under EU residency
rights. Those who arrived after the enlargement were generally young-
er and had decided to come to Austria to work or study after having
finished school or some other educational training. Of the 50 persons
interviewed, 23 were male and 27 were female (see Table 3.1).
Most of the persons interviewed were aged between twenty and 29
years at the time of the interview. Only four were older than 50, while
twenty persons were aged between 30 and 49. No one was younger
than twenty, as interviewed persons generally came to Austria only
after having finished school or a professional education.
Of the 50 persons we interviewed, many were engaged in several ac-
tivities and some across various sectors at the time of the interview, as
the earnings from one job alone would usually not be sufficient to
Table 3.1 Composition of interview sample by nationality, gender and time of
first arrival
Male Female Total First arrival
before 2004
EU enlargement
First arrival
after 2004
EU enlargement
Poland 12 12 24 19 5
Slovakia 2 3 5 4 1
Ukraine 1 3 4 2 2
Czech Republic 1 2 3 2 1
Former Yugoslavia 1 2 3 2 1
Hungary 1 1 2 2
Romania 1 1 2 2
Bulgaria 1 1 1
Belarus 1 1 1
Other 3 2 5 4 1
Total 23 27 50 38 12
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make a living. In addition, most respondents could look back on a
good deal of ‘careering’ in various sectors and therefore could provide
information on several branches and several types of job arrangements.
As the assignment of accurate numbers of interviewees according to
sectors and branches would simply be inaccurate (due to the involve-
ment of many migrants in several branches simultaneously or over
time), the following table (Table 3.2) provides only an indicative over-
view on the extent our sample was distributed according to branches
and activities, ascending from – (no one) to xxx (many).
3.1.2 Interviewing and analysis
We applied a combination of problem-centred interviews (Witzel 2000)
and expert interviews as outlined by Gla¨ser and Laudel (2004), who ad-
vocate a very broad concept of who is an expert and who possesses ex-
pert knowledge. In accordance with Gla¨ser and Laudel (2004), the par-
ticipating narrators were not only ‘objects’ to the research but, at the
same time, they were viewed as experts in the sense that they are not
only personally involved but witnesses of certain processes and struc-
tures (Gla¨ser & Laudel 2004: 10). In this case, they were witnesses to
irregular migrant work in various sectors and over time. In addition,
we chose the problem-centred interview as it allows for the revealing of
biographical evidence such as specific conditions, types of interactions,
emotions, personal assessments, strategies and consequences. At the
same time, the semi-structured prompts allow for better comparison
and embedding the biographical evidence in the bigger context of
structure, dynamics and changes in irregular migrant work in the most
notorious sectors in Austria (cf. Witzel 2000).
This research technique is characterised by face-to-face encounters
between the researcher and his or her respondents, but in contrast to
other face-to-face interviews that follow a pre-determined structure, al-
lows respondents to put their own emphasis on particular aspects they
want to highlight. The goal is the examination of specific events and
how these are interpreted by persons who are themselves part of the
Table 3.2 Composition of interview sample, according to regions and sectors
Region
Sector
Vienna Tyrol Burgenland
Construction xxx xx x
Catering and tourism xxx xx -
Agriculture x xxx xx
Domestic services xxx xx -
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(social) context in question. Therefore, we used an interview manual
containing specific problem-centred subtopics, and narrators were not
confronted with a standardised list of questions, but were invited to
speak freely about their experiences.
Combining these two approaches served to get insight into the gen-
eral structure of irregular migrant work, but also to explore the impact
of irregular work on living and working conditions of migrants. It also
looked into how workers make sense of their irregular situation and
what coping strategies they develop.
All interviews were carried out by researchers who had pertinent ex-
perience with the interview technique applied. The research team was
fully transparent in its aims and procedures and obtained the informed
consent of all research participants prior to the interview. Respondents’
anonymity and confidentiality were respected throughout the entire re-
search process – from the point of first contact to dissemination of re-
search results. Participation in the research was voluntary and respon-
dents received fifteen euro as compensation for their time and effort.
Duration of the interviews varied between one and three hours.
Interviews were carried out in the narrators’ first language or in Ger-
man, if the language skills of the person allowed for it. The written or
taped records were then transposed to German or English and analysed
using thematic coding as developed by Flick (1995). We chose thematic
coding because it seemed the most appropriate means to achieve our
aim of addressing already defined themes and questions prior to con-
ducting the research, while at the same time being flexible enough to
identify new aspects. Although based on Grounded Theory (Glaser &
Strauss 1967), thematic coding foresees the interplay of inductive and
deductive category acquisition and therefore allows for case comparison
and for the analysis of responses from predefined groups.
Thematic coding foresees several analytical steps:
– A brief summary of each case was produced containing background
information on the person interviewed (age, sex, legal status, time
of arrival, sector, type of employment, country and region of origin,
etc.), as well as basic characteristics specific to this particular case.
– In several steps, categories were developed by applying open as well
as selective coding. Those interviews that had appeared to be most
representative of the group were analysed paragraph by paragraph,
first in order to identify all the possible codes that may be relevant
for answering the research questions. As a next step, these codes
were grouped together in so-called thematic fields that were derived
from both the interview material and from pre-existing theories and
earlier research findings already used to compile the interview man-
ual. In this way, the thematic structure of the interview emerged,
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which was then applied to all interviews. Applying this thematic
structure to all interviews enabled constant comparisons between
the different cases and allowed the modification and complementa-
tion of emerging new aspects and themes to the original thematic
structure.
By implementing thematic coding, it was possible to identify, analyse
and compare differences and similarities between groups along criteria
such as gender, age, ethnicity or nationality. At the same time, this
mode of analysis remains sensitive to the individual case.
3.1.3 Methodological challenges and possible sample biases
When designing the research, it was decided that the samples drawn
would aim to be broadly representative according to sectors, seasons
and regions in which potential interviewees are likely to be concen-
trated.1
However, gaining access to possible interviewees proved to be the
most difficult part of our fieldwork, as the building up of trust, a prere-
quisite of every successful qualitative interview, was extremely difficult
on such a sensitive topic of semi-legality or complete illegality. On the
respondent’s side, this concerned potential interviewees who were in
an irregular situation or even residing illegally. In addition, they were
often closely associated with their employers and therefore feared put-
ting themselves and their job opportunities at risk by talking about the
difficulties they face with their jobs and their employers. This explains
why access to EU nationals turned out to be much easier than to third-
country nationals, which became most obvious when trying to access
persons through one of the established ways of accessing ‘hidden’ po-
pulations: ‘snowballing’ (narrators were asked to name other potential
participants, e.g. colleagues, friends).
Mistrust and apprehension did not only play a role with the mi-
grants interviewed, but also, and maybe even more so, with the other
actors involved. Getting at interviewees through the use of ‘gatekeepers’
– individuals who provide access to interviewees and reduce mistrust
when associated with the researcher – turned out to be extremely diffi-
cult. Possible biases that may arise from the gatekeepers’ side means
that the use of gatekeepers must be viewed critically. Often, gate-
keepers will only refer interviewers to those interviewees they think
would fit the profile best or those who are generally outspoken. In our
research, the challenge was to find gatekeepers who would be ready to
help in accessing possibly reluctant interviewees. Possible gatekeepers
from local NGOs and migrant organisations were uneasy about provid-
ing contacts, as they feared losing their clients’ trust. Therefore, only
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few contacts were established by means of local gatekeepers from
NGOs, migrant associations or labour market monitoring institutions.
Even more difficult was the fact that, in some cases, employers
themselves attempted to function as gatekeepers. Especially in sectors
where workers get accommodation from the employer and spend their
free time – if any is available – in the closest surroundings of the work-
place, employers hoped to act as gatekeepers and exercise control over
the selection of persons to be interviewed. In some cases, we even had
to get the employers’ permission to do interviews with some of their
personnel. This was especially the case for au pairs and other domestic
workers in private households, and in areas of seasonal work, most sig-
nificantly in agriculture. Here, workers live with their employer or in
compounds near the farm and have very little spare time. There is also
no secluded place that would ensure the privacy needed to talk freely
and openly about possible grievances. We therefore tried to minimise
this influence by directly approaching workers on their worksites. But
even there – and especially where employers work together with their
workers – we knew that the employers’ permission would be needed
and that interviews would have to be done directly at the workplace.
This did not only affect the sample selection, but strongly affected the
quality of the information retrieved in such situations. (In the case of
agriculture, some farmers even insisted on being present during the
interviews. As a result, narrations were significantly biased, as the most
crucial topics could simply not be discussed).
However, in many cases, the narrators’ accordance with their em-
ployers not so much derived from a direct fear of getting in trouble or
being severely punished by their employers, but rather represented a
certain type of loyalty towards them. As (especially in the case of EU
nationals) it is the employers who would be penalised if any informa-
tion on irregularities were to go public, workers would act in favour of
the employer as long as they still had an interest in upholding a possi-
ble work relationship for a longer period of time or over several sea-
sons.
On the other hand, employers were very cautious about making in-
terviewees available. This derived from their own fear of being con-
sciously or unconsciously denounced by their workers. Consequently, if
any delicate information were made public, they would lose their enti-
tlement for seasonal quotas, which in the end would not only cause dif-
ficulties on the employers’ side, but would affect their workers’ job se-
curity and future job arrangements. This strong fear on the side of the
employers became obvious by the fact that in some cases, even the lo-
cal chairman of the farmers’ association was consulted and had to ap-
prove the interview.
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Therefore, we decided that the third potential source of contact was
to be the research team itself. The researchers and/or bilingual or
multilingual interviewers engaged for this study used their personal
contacts for potential respondents, appealing to friends, relatives and
acquaintances who fell under the selection criteria or who could estab-
lish direct contacts with individuals in the target group. Although the
information collected in this manner turned out to be the most com-
prehensive, this also explains a certain bias of the sample composition
(for example, in favour of younger migrants, students or Polish
nationals).
3.2 Legal framework regarding access to employment of
non-nationals
The legal framework regulating access to employment and the infor-
mal strategies of migrants and employers to circumvent it are intercon-
nected and mutually influence each other. Regulations on immigration
and labour in Austria are defined through regulations and legislation
on a national, bilateral and EU level. National regulations on the em-
ployment of non-nationals in Austria are in general determined by two
laws: the Foreign Employment Law regulating access of non-nationals
to the labour market, and the Aliens’ Law that regulates entry to Aus-
tria and the right to stay. In addition to the Foreign Employment Law,
which concerns only dependent employment, regulations on self-em-
ployment define the access to certain trades. Next to this general fra-
mework on a national level, there are additional regulations for certain
groups of people, e.g. students or au pairs. The model of seasonal em-
ployment allows for specific access regulations in seasonal branches.
In addition to laws on the national level, EU regulations gain more
and more importance in the structuring of employment possibilities.
In this respect, the transitional regulations introduced in 2004, which
restrict the access to the domestic labour market for citizens of new
EU Member States, can be seen as an attempt to postpone the influ-
ence of EU legislation and retain the influence of national regulations.
Transitional regulations restrict access to dependent employment al-
most entirely, while self-employment is only partially restricted. To-
gether, national and EU-wide regulations shape the environment in
which regular and irregular employment of non-nationals takes place.
3.2.1 Regulations on self-employment and transitional regulations
Access to the labour market for the self-employed is regulated by trade
regulations, the so-called Austrian Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung),
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as well as by the EU Service Directive that includes the Posting of
Workers Directive. Both generally enable EU citizens to register a trade
and perform their services in Austria. For new EU citizens, however,
especially activities in the construction sector have been largely ex-
cluded from free access during the application of transitional regula-
tions since 2004. Getting a trade licence for most construction activ-
ities and performing specific construction services is thus restricted by
transitional regulations, and is also bound up with additional obliga-
tions for the foreign entrepreneur. In order to get access to such re-
stricted branches, EU-8 citizens are obliged to submit a certificate that
proves their skills were obtained by education and experience (Befa¨hi-
gungsnachweis).
Registering a trade in Austria as a self-employed person is one way
to get access to the Austrian labour market outside of Foreign Employ-
ment Law. In order to get a licence, one has to pay a monthly fee and
organise social insurance on one’s own. On the other hand, due to reg-
ulations of the EU Service Directive, owning a company in the country
of origin principally enables foreign entrepreneurs to accept temporary
jobs as self-employed persons in Austria. Foreign entrepreneurs are
also allowed to use their own workers to carry out a limited specific or-
der in Austria. Due to transition periods, foreign entrepreneurs have to
prove their qualifications for most construction activities and, accord-
ing to the Foreign Employment Law, their workers additionally need a
work permit for the duration of the job. As only national employers
can obtain one, the foreign entrepreneur has to cooperate with an Aus-
trian enterprise in order to get work permits for his or her own work-
ers. As an additional requirement, the need to employ a foreigner in-
stead of a domestic worker to carry out the respective job has to be de-
clared (preferential treatment of native workers).
While self-employment is possible in almost all branches of the
economy, it plays a significant role mainly within the construction sec-
tor, where a number of restrictions apply due to transitional regulations
after EU enlargement.
3.2.2 Regulations on seasonal employment
In addition to the regulations on highly qualified workers,2 seasonal
employment is another limited possibility for foreigners to get access
to the Austrian labour market. Two sectors, namely agriculture and ca-
tering and tourism, are considered seasonal and thus mainly affected
by this regulation. While key personnel are per definition highly quali-
fied and well-paid, seasonal labour covers the demand for cheap for-
eign labour in low-skilled sectors. The system of seasonal work is con-
strued as an additional access possibility to the labour market outside
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the framework of the Austrian Foreign Employment Law. In addition,
the limited duration of seasonal work permits guarantees that seasonal
employees do not achieve further access to the labour market. Conse-
quently, seasonal work permits do not lead to integration on the Aus-
trian labour market in the long run, but only allow access for the dura-
tion of the permit. Even migrants who have worked as seasonal em-
ployees for years do not acquire any labour market status and have to
start from scratch time and time again.
Seasonal work permits are temporary work permits. Every year, the
Ministry for Economy and Labour defines a quota for the number of
‘seasonal work permits’ to be issued for specific sectors, occupational
groups or regions, especially covering occupations in seasonal tourism
and agriculture. Seasonal work contracts are usually issued for the lim-
ited period of six month only but can, upon application, be prolonged
for another six months. If, in this case, a person is temporarily em-
ployed for one year, a reapplication under the same conditions is only
possible after suspending the work for two months. Seasonal work per-
mits include health and pension insurance, as well as unemployment
insurance. However, due to the temporary restricted character of seaso-
nal employment, seasonal workers do not have the possibility to claim
those accumulated rights on pension and unemployment benefits. In
agriculture, a work permit for so-called harvesters (work permit and
visa for only six weeks) was introduced to cover peaks at harvest times.
This work permit only includes social insurance. Minimum wages are
currently 4.80 euro per hour net income for seasonal workers; harvest-
ers earn even less.
EU citizens, including Romanians and Bulgarians since accession in
2007, are guaranteed preferential access to seasonal employment. As a
result, third-country nationals are not issued a seasonal work permit
anymore, unless they belong to the so-called ‘core workforce’ of em-
ployers, having worked at one and the same farm for some years. But
recently, even the number of this non-EU core workforce has been re-
duced by half.
In the agricultural sector, this poses a problem to those farmers who
have in the past mainly relied on workers coming from third countries.
They have to hire new workers who must be newly incorporated and
trained in the business. Another potential problem of the seasonal em-
ployment system is the non-compliance of seasons with the duration
of seasonal work permits. As the season is slightly longer than the per-
mit, there has to be a shift of the workforce within the season, the
main season lasting from March to October. The unpredictability con-
cerning the yearly-defined quotas of seasonal workers keeps farmers in
suspense as to whether they will be able to harvest as much as they did
the previous year.
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As the legal and administrative regime of seasonal employment does
not seem to be adequately tailored to the actual needs in these specific
branches, it may play a part in facilitating irregular employment, infor-
mally ‘adjusting’ work contracts to seasonal realities.
3.2.3 Regulations on the employment of students
Regulations on the employment of students also play a major role in
shaping irregular employment, as the employment of students under-
lies restrictions. Foreign students are able to access the Austrian labour
market as long as they are registered at an Austrian university. Since
January 2003, non-national students are obliged to prove sufficient fi-
nancial means every year (a capital of 7,000 euro).3 In addition, for
non-EEC students, the university fee is twice as much as for nationals
and EU citizens (around 720 euro). At the same time, these students
have only very limited, but not clearly defined access to the Austrian la-
bour market, leaving room for discretion. By law, non-EEC students’ in-
come ‘gained by work on the Austrian Labour market must not be the pri-
mary source of subsistence to cover the larger part of living costs’. Generally,
working hours are limited to approximately ten hours per week, and
the salary has to be below the threshold for the payment of social in-
surance premiums (Geringfu¨gigkeitsgrenze), which was 333.16 euro
per month in 2006). Besides this limitation, students holding a resi-
dence permit are allowed to work on the basis of service contracts and
can apply for a work permit to enter seasonal work.
However, as the legal provision is not specific on the definition of
what the ‘larger part of living costs’ entails, a number of students actually
work at the margins of the law in order to be able to finance their liv-
ing expenses, or they prefer to work irregularly so as to prevent the
eventual loss of their residence permit.
As students holding Austrian or any EEC citizenship usually have so-
cial insurance coverage by other means (e.g. parents, second petty em-
ployment, student health insurance), employers might to a certain ex-
tent feel exonerated from responsibilities, choosing not to register
them or registering them below the social security threshold (333 euro).
In addition, Austrian students who receive a scholarship are only al-
lowed to work a certain number of hours per year and therefore may
also have an interest in non-registration.
In the sectors we analysed, the employment of students primarily
plays a role in catering and tourism, as kitchen help, waiters, wait-
resses or ‘barmen’, as well as in domestic services such as au pairs.
Working in a restaurant, a bar or in childcare is a common practice for
students overall. For many students, such sectors provide conditions
more easily compatible with the need for studying and working at the
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same time: flexible working hours and salaries and/or tips that are paid
in cash after the respective shift.
3.2.4 Regulations on employment in the private sector: Childcare, care for
the elderly and care for people with a disability
As in many other European countries, Austrian households tend to
employ migrant workers as a means of dealing with the declining capa-
city and willingness of traditional networks to provide services such as
housekeeping, child and elderly care, on the one hand, and the steady
increase in demand for these services, on the other. In order to grasp
the widespread phenomenon of outsourcing formerly unpaid family
work to paid domestic workers, certain socioeconomic and demo-
graphic factors have to be taken into account. These include the in-
creased participation of women in the paid labour market, the emer-
gence of the dual-career family, the unchanged sharing of household
tasks between the members of a household and demographic develop-
ments such as aging populations and changing household and family
structures (e.g. increase of one-person households). Nonetheless, the
structure of the welfare state and the manner in which childcare and
the provision of long-term care are organised and social responsibilities
are divided among households, the public and the market sector can
influence the households’ decision to employ a migrant caregiver.
The liberalisation of the au pair law can be seen as a political recog-
nition of the rising demand for migrant domestic workers in Austria.
Although, the au pair programme was initially designed as a culture
and language exchange programme for foreign young women and
men, it has gradually developed into a migration policy, supplying Aus-
trian households in need of care with affordable labour. In April 2001,
the law regulating the residence and employment status of au pairs,
predominantly women aged eighteen to 28 and originating from Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, was changed to facilitate the em-
ployment of caregivers. Since then, households in need of childcare
can employ an au pair for one year without needing to apply for a work
permit under the quota system regulating the access of foreigners to
the national labour market (Ko¨nig & Stadler 2003: 236). The host fa-
mily’s sole obligation is to register the au pair at the AMS two weeks
prior to the commencement of the work relationship. Following a suc-
cessful registration, the au pair is entitled to a temporary residence per-
mit. The host family is obliged to provide room and board as well as
60 euro per week in pocket money. The contract between the host fa-
mily and the au pair defines basic working conditions, such as the
amount of working hours per week (which is limited to 25) and the du-
ties performed, including childcare and simple household chores.
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In the case of elderly domiciliary care, the Austrian government
launched a policy package regulating the informal sector for long-term
care. In the autumn of 2006, a broad public discourse on the irregular
employment of migrant caregivers resulted in a general amnesty that
offered employers and caregivers impunity until the completion of the
policy measures. In July 2007, the government implemented two spon-
sorship models as an incentive to employ live-in migrant caregivers on
a regular basis. People in need of long-term care who were receiving
care allowances were given the opportunity to either hire a self-em-
ployed migrant caregiver or employ a dependent foreign caregiver. De-
pending on the kind of care relationship established between the allow-
ance receiver and the migrant caregiver, the state funds part of the ad-
ditional expenses associated with regular employment. Estimates on
the overall monthly costs for compliant live-in domiciliary care range
from 1,500 euro to 2,000 euro in the case of self-employed caregivers,
and from 2,600 euro to 2,850 euro in the case of subordinate employ-
ees, of which the government’s financial support covers anywhere from
225 euro to a maximum of 800 euro. Because of considerably lower
costs in the self-employed model, experts assume that it will be more
widely accepted. In effect since July 2007, the two sponsorship models
have not been very effective in stimulating the regular employment of
migrant caregivers. Of the 40,000 migrant caregivers estimated to be
working irregularly, only a couple hundred had registered as of Febru-
ary 2008.
3.3 Actors involved in irregular employment networks
In order to meet the very different and often changing needs of mi-
grants in working and social life, networks of migrants have to be very
flexible and versatile. Every network provides different kinds of access
to various ‘services’ appropriate for a variety of purposes. Thus, mi-
grants navigate within various networks, create them, try to get access
to them, activate and reactivate them and sustain them. Having access
to different kinds of networks can both create or limit possibilities, in-
fluence decisions and define whether or not people can benefit from or
improve their current situation.
Recruitment and employment agencies, employers, the ethnic com-
munity, family, friends and colleagues are different actors in the net-
works within which migrants move. The ability to incorporate sector-
specific key individuals into one’s networks determines the sustainabil-
ity and effectiveness of the networks at hand. The following part de-
scribes those actors that are most crucial in networks of irregularly em-
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ployed migrants, including both organised and informal networks and
the different kinds of possibilities they can open up.
3.3.1 Family, friends and colleagues
Social networks comprising family, friends and colleagues, ethnic and
linguistic community organisations, etc. are almost invariably consid-
ered to be the most important actors. Family, friends and colleagues, in
Austria and in the country of origin, have an impact on the initial deci-
sion to migrate to Austria, often open doors to work and social life in
Austria, are key in emergency situations and are also crucial for return
perspectives to the country of origin. Networks of family, friends and
colleagues define the scope of possibilities and thus the working and
social position of migrants at the time of entry, and they are fundamen-
tal to further establishing social contacts. This was most comprehen-
sively expressed by a Serbian student: ‘You don’t go anywhere where you
would end up in the street, but somewhere where you have family and
friends who can help you’ Social networks are the core resource for
managing accommodation and employment in the region of immigra-
tion; they provide assistance in legal, financial and personal matters,
and stretch beyond national borders. Nevertheless, there are also lim-
itations to these social networks. It was also stated that, especially un-
der conditions of geographical vicinity and free movement, some peo-
ple ‘just take a sum of money and start a trip into the blue in order to find
work. But sometimes they would spend all the money in travel and don’t
have any money left to come back home’.
3.3.2 Ethnic and linguistic community
In addition to familial and friendship networks, the ethnic and linguis-
tic community with all its institutions and resources may provide addi-
tional help to organise social and working life abroad, either in a for-
malised or informal way. While the general importance of familial and
friendship networks results in the tendency that job mediation mainly
takes place within one’s own ethnic and linguistic community, there
are also more formalised actors that evolved differently in respect to
their migration history in Austria. As one that has grown and estab-
lished itself over a longer period of time, the Polish community played
a crucial role for our Polish interviewees.
The Polish church, in particular, was mentioned as an important
meeting and contact point for irregularly employed migrants of Polish
origin, providing information about housing, working and migration,
as well as a place for recruitment by employers of the same ethnic ori-
gin.4 In addition, a Polish-language magazine has been complement-
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ing this role for a few years now as an informal meeting point, in
which everybody can advertise apartments (for free) or services (five
euro) in Polish.
However, ethnic and linguistic networks and their resources are not
equally available in all regions of Austria, but concentrate in bigger ag-
glomerations as in Vienna. This again results in the tendency of ethnic
communities to reproduce themselves there, because migrants prefer
to come to a place where there are already some established networks
in place. Thus, to recruit people in Vienna for work in other areas of
Austria (e.g. Tyrol) is conceived as difficult. But even employment in
specific sectors seems to be structured along ethnic lines. As men-
tioned above, migration abroad and recruitment is mainly built upon
informal networks of family members, friends and colleagues. To cover
additional demand, employers as well as labourers fall back on the
available informal recruitment structures. These informal structures
are steadily multiplying, creating specific ‘territories’ for specific ethni-
cities.
Each nationality has its own territory. Formany years it has evolved
like this, and as everyone was satisfied, it continued along those
lines. Exactly such a chain is here: first, a cousin came, then an
aunt, etc. I think, when somebody has done his or her work well,
then people are again looking for similar nationalities. If this defi-
nite person isn’t available anymore, then one is looking for some-
body coming from the same country because one thinks that they
are similar regarding their character and capabilities: diligent, fast,
honest, accurate. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
Over the course of time, each ethnicity has acquired a certain reputa-
tion. These reputations again contribute to the maintenance of ethnic
structures in the irregular employment of non-nationals. Thus, Polish
workers rely on their reputation to be ‘hardworking, able and flexible’.
This reputation is seen as a decisive advantage in looking for work and
is said to differentiate Polish workers from, for example, Austrians,
who are generally considered to be ‘lazy’.
We [Polish] are taken very readily, because we’re working very
well. Everybody tells us this, also my friends tell me the same:
that their employers say that we’re really performing well. (Male
respondent, Poland, construction)
Ethnic companies and their recruitment networks are another factor in
upholding ethnic structures within the construction sector. Ethnic em-
ployers are the most important employers for co-ethnics. Without
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being highly skilled, contacts within the ethnic community are crucial
to succeeding abroad. However, it has to be kept in mind that people
are not constrained to those ethnic networks and that these limitations
can be overcome with time.
… either one is coming with someone who already knows the
place, or to a Polish enterprise. This is okay, but otherwise it
makes no sense. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
3.3.3 Employers
In our sample, the role of employers was perceived somewhat ambigu-
ously. In several cases, employers would promise to ‘take care of the reg-
ularisation and organise the relevant documents’ (Female respondent, Po-
land). It is exactly this powerful position and the trust they gain that
employers can exploit. At the mercy of their employers, respondents re-
ported they were intentionally misinformed about their current legal
possibilities or status, or they were cheated out of their salaries, as the
following story of a Serbian woman shows:
Then a Turkish guy in a pizzeria hired me as a waitress. The
guy cheated me. He said he’d help me stay in Austria, so I
signed this contract. I didn’t know what I was actually signing,
but after this I was self-employed! I would never do this again!
By signing it, I was the boss and he was employed by me. I had
to pay his social insurance fees and other things. (Female
respondent, Serbia)
The following quote also shows that several respondents clearly distin-
guish between ‘immigrant employers’ and ‘Austrian employers’ as per-
forming differently when employing irregularly.
Foreign employers like Yugoslavs or Turks will not register you
at all. At these pizzerias, bars, et cetera (at least all those I
worked for), you work for two or three months and then he
should pay, and instead he would tell you he doesn’t need you
anymore and you would miss out. Austrian employers don’t like
to employ fully unregistered people, they get nervous and are
scared of being punished. (Female respondent, Serbia)
While migrant workers consider contacts and information provided by
social networks, family, colleagues and the ethnic community as being
of key importance when trying to find a job on the informal labour
market, actually being employed by a co-ethnic is not viewed as the
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most desirable option. In many cases, however, the fact that both em-
ployer and employee are embedded in the context of informal foreign
labour markets works to the disadvantage of migrant workers. The em-
ployer exploits these employees and even goes so far as to use intimi-
dation and threats, as reported by the same Serbian woman:
I will never work with a Yugoslav employer, or with any foreign-
er. Now that I’m in Austria, I want to work with Austrian
employers. If an Austrian doesn’t pay me, fine, I can go to the
Chamber of Labour and lodge a complaint. Theoretically I can
also do this with a Yugoslav employer, but then I would most
probably have problems of a different kind: my car would be
scratched, problems for my family. My daughter is there, at
home. I don’t even want to think about what could happen.
(Female respondent, Serbia)
Despite stories of unfair treatment, underpayment or cheating employ-
ees out of their money, employers were seen much more strategically:
even in cases of unfair treatment, only short employment or fully unre-
gistered employment, it can be worthwhile to perform well and to stay
on good terms with the employer. In the future, one could always come
back and, already familiar with the employer, could get full and legal
employment or would at least be recommended to someone else in
need of irregular labour.
Aside from the perception as a potential source of legal employment,
‘Austrian’ employers were generally portrayed as an important source
of information on legal and administrative matters, if not as persons
who would themselves enable a regularisation.
Apart from informal networks, formal job agencies (recruitment and
national employment agencies) are viewed as important for accessing
jobs especially to those persons who have legal residence status and ac-
cess to the Austrian labour market, such as persons holding a work
permit, persons working under seasonal contracts, self-employed indi-
viduals and students.
3.4 Motives to migrate and work abroad
Motives to leave the country of origin and come to Austria to work are
very diverse and vary among people of different age, gender and family
status. It should be stressed that no one comes to Austria with the aim
to work irregularly, but with the intention to work, study or live here.
Subsequently, available job opportunities, labour market regulations
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and individual networks are responsible for the entry of migrants into
irregularity.
Generally, migrants leave their countries of origin due to a bad eco-
nomic situation, a high unemployment rate, little or no state support
and minimal prospects for the future. Especially for those with fa-
milies, a sense of responsibility and the wish to provide a better educa-
tion and prospects to one’s children are factors that lead to migration.
As one live-in caregiver states,
I came to Austria to earn some money, to be able to survive in
Poland, to pay the rent and the bills. […] And when I first came
here my daughter was still at the university, so we needed to
support her as well. (Female respondent, Poland)
In the case of women, it is often divorce or separation and the related
need to care for one or more children alone that result in the decision
to work abroad. Furthermore, it is also the wish to emancipate, to earn
one’s ‘own’ money, which causes people to migrate.
In comparison to migrants with children and/or families, younger
persons mentioned an even greater mix of reasons. They emphasised
curiosity of going abroad, learning German and starting or continuing
a university education as well as earning some money. This is espe-
cially true for young women engaged as au pairs or working in catering
and tourism: ‘I work more or less because I want to study’ (Female re-
spondent, 24, Czech Republic). While the au pairs consciously chose
care-giving as a strategy to work, learn and live abroad: ‘[being an] au
pair is the best and cheapest way to learn a language and go abroad’ (Fe-
male respondent, 22, Czech Republic), the live-in caregivers who were
aged at least 30 to 50 stressed that they had not consciously chosen this
type of work, but it was the only one available.
I didn’t choose this kind of work. Before I started working here,
I didn’t even think about doing care work – it was just the only
possibility I had. Back in my home country, I was unemployed
and here I could earn a lot more than in Slovakia. (Male
caregiver, Slovakia)
Coming to Austria for educational reasons was only mentioned by re-
spondents in sectors that allow for a combination of working and
studying, such as serving as an au pair or catering. Employment in
other sectors does not allow for parallel education. While employment
in the construction or agricultural sector allows students to earn some
extra money during occasional stays (e.g. visiting a relative living in
Austria) or their holidays, these time-intensive and physically demand-
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ing jobs make it impossible to follow educational aims parallel to em-
ployment. This is also true for live-in caregivers, who have hardly any
free time to pursue anything but monetary aims.
The reasons why Austria was chosen as a destination country were
often rather by chance. Some migrants originally planned to go to an-
other country using Austria as a transit country, yet ultimately ended
up staying. The major part of respondents chose Austria due to prior
established contacts and connections through family, friends and col-
leagues. But also German as a second language in school or learned
during prior stays in Germany or Switzerland played a significant role.
Working life in specific sectors of irregular work
3.5 The construction sector
3.5.1 Construction: Sample description
At the time of the interviews, twelve out of 50 migrants were employed
irregularly in construction or construction-related activities, including
work on construction sites, renovations in private households, but also
landscaping and garden renovations. All of the interviewed migrants
were male, the majority of them coming from Poland (see 3.1), but also
including interviewees from Hungary and former Yugoslavia.
The age of interviewees varied widely, the youngest being 23 and the
oldest 55. About half of the interviewees were over 40. While the
youngest ones were single without children, most of the migrants had
one to four children and lived in a partnership, whereas some had got-
ten divorced during the course of their employment abroad.
Regarding the legal status of migrants, all of them had the right to
stay in Austria as EU citizens, refugees or asylum seekers. In contrast
to this, most of them had no access to the labour market at the time of
interviews, three held a trade licence, and only one, a refugee, had a
regular work permit.
The majority of interviewees had a vocational training in construc-
tion or construction-related activities (engineer, plumber, carpenter), or
had previous work experience in the construction sector in their coun-
try of origin or abroad. Some qualifications, however, had nothing in
common with construction work, including completed trainings as
cook, mechanic or caster. Only one refugee had not been able to com-
plete his education before coming to Austria.
Prior to their work in Austria, five men had also worked construction
in Germany, Ireland or another Central or Eastern European country.
Only two came to Austria after EU enlargement in 2004. Most of the
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interviewees had over ten years of work experience in irregular work in
Austria.
3.5.2 Construction: Structural features and specific actors involved
Reasons for irregularity
Respondents identified the legal framework as the most decisive reason
for irregular employment in the construction sector. Especially the
transitional regulations and their restrictions on dependent employ-
ment were said to result in ‘pseudo-self-employment’:
Yes, you still can’t operate a ‘white’ firm [in compliance with the
regulations] because you can’t employ Polish workers, that’s just
impossible. They only can work as self-employed people, every-
one opens up a single business on his or her own. Because the
Poles are not allowed to work here legally. (Male respondent,
Poland)
Interviewees also mentioned that the possibility to work with trade li-
cences facilitates the irregular employment of non-nationals. The ‘or-
dinary’ registration of employees is unattractive because ‘employment’
by means of trade licences is much cheaper and means fewer responsi-
bilities for employers.
I think everybody knows this, also the Austrians: the non-wage
labour costs are so high. So many Austrians have told me, ‘I pay
you 100 Schillings [about seven euro], and then I have to pay
100 to the revenue office. That’s simply too much.’ (Male
respondent, Poland)
Generally, jobs in the irregular economy in Austria are restricted.
While interviewees agreed that there is a demand for irregular jobs in
the construction sector, working possibilities are restricted to those
tasks people with access to the labour market do not want to do. There-
fore, irregular migrant work is considered ‘the worst jobs that Austrians
don’t want to do’ (Male respondent, Poland): mainly badly paid, hard,
unattractive and low-skilled:
Regarding irregular employment, in general it means hard
work, transport, carrying things in old houses that don’t have an
elevator. Work in the garden, cleaning, and agriculture outside
of Vienna. For women it’s cleaning, because not all Austrian wo-
men want to do that. For Polish people, it’s construction sites.
Turks don’t like that, only if they have to, otherwise they are
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more engaged in small-scale catering and trade. Poles and Slo-
vaks are easier to find for hard work. (Male respondent, Poland)
In addition to this, irregular work is most often found where the
chances to detect irregularities by inspectors are limited. In the con-
struction sector, this is said to be in the countryside and at big con-
struction sites, as the following quote exemplifies: ‘Most of the jobs are
outside of Vienna. Often, I also worked on very big construction sites’ (Male
respondent, Poland).
Actors involved
The organisation of work and the involvement of various actors are
very complex in the construction sector. Generally, one can distinguish
between small-scale, informal jobs, often in private households or for
one private employer, and large-scale, official construction projects. For
the latter, projects are assigned in the course of official competitions –
the lowest bid gets the job. Competitors are mostly big construction
companies. Afterwards, projects are commissioned to a number of
smaller companies, so-called subcontractors. Those subcontractors re-
distribute work to other subcontractors, going down to so-called ‘sin-
gle-person enterprises’, consisting of only one self-employed person as
the name suggests. Consequently, projects are divided into smaller
units, in the end leaving one company or even one self-employed per-
son for one specific task on the construction site (e.g. plastering walls,
installing floors).
Whether or not the work is performed in compliance with the law is
no longer the responsibility of the principal. From a legal point of view,
he or she is not responsible for any irregularities that take place on the
level of hired subcontractors, although at the time of writing there were
discussions of changing the law in this respect. The delegating and re-
delegating of projects to a long chain of actors, who are again distribut-
ing and redistributing different tasks, makes it difficult to identify the
responsible employers involved in the case of fiscal or worksite inspec-
tions. In this environment, the door for circumventions of, and non-
compliance with, legal regulations is wide open.
Due to the allotment of projects along a chain from principal to or-
dinary employee, so-called ‘mediators’5 become key persons in the
mediation of work by serving as intermediaries between employers and
workers. Mediators are persons who organise work for themselves and
others for money. The scope of their activity ranges from mediating
work for colleagues and organising labourers for an employer to ser-
ving their own labour needs as employers and carrying out projects di-
rectly. The difference between mediators and reciprocal mediation of
work between colleagues and friends is that mediators demand a
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monetary compensation for their mediation. In contrast to transna-
tional mediation services such as care agencies, mediators in our inter-
views almost exclusively acted on the national, mostly even on the local
level of the labour market.
For the most part, mediators themselves are acting as a ‘single-per-
son-company’, directly taking the money for the projects from the prin-
cipal employer and then redistributing it to ‘their’ workers, keeping
about one-third of the money for themselves. Working for a mediator
offers a significant advantage because the mediator takes over the per-
manent need to look for work and thus disburdens the single worker.
In contrast to that, working for a mediator can also mean losing con-
trol over one’s autonomy. Thus, some workers prefer to organise their
own work, provided that they already have enough contacts to employ-
ers on their own, be it private persons or company owners.
3.5.3 Construction: Recruitment structures
As was shown above, not only informal players such as family mem-
bers and friends are essential in finding a job, but one also needs to
gain access to more formal players, such as employers or mediators.
The following persons can thus be key in successful job seeking: 1) fa-
mily members and colleagues who have already been working in Aus-
tria for some time in a given enterprise, with more information about
working possibilities; 2) employers; and 3) mediators who refer work
for others and for themselves. At the time of entry, migrants only have
access to limited networks. Those ‘starting points’ have a decisive im-
pact on how recruitment networks can be further developed and ex-
tended over time.
3.5.4 Initial recruitment strategies
Some migrants already have contacts to key persons before coming to
Austria, either because they were recruited by an employer directly in
their country of origin, one of their colleagues happens to be a media-
tor or, as is most often the case, a job was organised via family mem-
bers before arrival. On the other hand, job prospects, mostly made by
colleagues before migration, often turn out to be not as reliable as ex-
pected, so that migrants may face a situation without a job or accom-
modation upon arrival in Austria. In such a situation, knowing people
who know where to look for a job is also very crucial.
Colleagues and friends are an important resource to find a job in the
initial period of employment, in ‘hard times’, and also as help for one’s
occupational career. The mediation of jobs between colleagues is usual-
ly free and based on reciprocity: first you help your colleague, and the
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next time he will help you. Often, colleagues share bigger projects that
cannot be done alone with others, expecting they will then do the same
for you.
There are places and strategies to find work in the construction sec-
tor that are especially important for ‘newcomers’ on the labour market –
persons who have not yet established contact with key individuals. In
big cities, there are special places for recruitment along roadsides (the
so-called Arbeiterstrich) where employers pass by to recruit workers,
mostly for jobs in private homes. These places are found in front of
the branches of the Austrian labour market service, home improve-
ment stores or refugee camps (e.g. Traiskirchen). Many workers gather
in such places especially in the morning, waiting for potential employ-
ers to come. The chance of finding a job there according to intervie-
wees lies at an average of 50 per cent, and decreases as the day goes
by.
Those who are looking for work on the roadsides are either new in
Austria, low-skilled (in regard to previous experience in the construc-
tion sector) or have little knowledge of German. Mediators also use the
roadsides to recruit labourers, but stress that it is the wrong place for
hiring craftsmen, as mostly inexperienced migrants gather there. Con-
sequently, the hourly rate that is paid there is lower than for other jobs.
Jobs that are offered there are mostly very small, short tasks for infor-
mal employers in private households, ranging from work for a few
hours to some months. An irregular Polish construction worker re-
members his first time in Austria on the roadsides:
It was not that easy, completely without German of course, but
it worked. To pay the rent, the weekly metro ticket, food, I had
enough in the beginning. Employers pass by there and ask
whether one wants to do this work. I could say a few words. (…).
There are those people who only know very little German. But
to get a job, that’s enough. (Male respondent, Poland)
Due to the low efficiency of newcomers’ recruitment strategy, looking
for work on the roadside must be complemented by other plans of at-
tack. In addition to advertising services in newspapers (a strategy that
was reported to be totally unsuccessful for those without a work per-
mit), establishing contacts at ethnic meeting points like the Polish
church or mass dwellings, people make use of another search/recruit-
ment strategy that was labelled ‘Von Tu¨r zu Tu¨r gehen’ (‘going from
door to door’) in our Delphi survey. Migrants just walk or drive around
to construction sites (or private houses with construction material lying
in front), and they ask if there is any work to be done. Another Polish
worker tells about his experiences:
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Sometimes we were just driving around and when we saw con-
struction material lying in front of the door, we just asked for
work. No matter if it was a private house or a business, we just
asked. Once we asked for work at a villa and then we spent the
night in our car in front of the house, and the next day we
worked there. We got something to eat there and we built a ga-
rage. (Male respondent, Poland)
3.5.5 Modifying recruitment strategies
Since the jobs found through these recruitment strategies are of low
prestige (‘unskilled’, ‘inexperienced’) and are miserably paid, migrants
try to widen their social contacts with every project they get in order to
climb the occupational ladder. The possibilities to find work increase
with an increasing number of contacts. Telephone numbers of collea-
gues and employers are collected continuously. The most important
strategy in widening one’s working possibilities is getting recommen-
dations from colleagues or former employers. As one migrant con-
firms: ‘People have relatives, acquaintances and family. If you have done
well once, word-of-mouth recommendations are the best propaganda’ (Male
respondent, Poland).
Still, establishing as many contacts with employers as possible is
especially important for those workers who work ‘on their own’ – this
means that they are not working for a company or one specific employ-
er, but are continuously organising new private small-scale jobs. In this
case, one does not depend on an intermediary and has a lot of autono-
my, but the mostly short-term character of the jobs means that one has
to keep looking for new jobs. Hence, looking for work and adapting
one’s recruitment networks takes a considerable amount of the mi-
grants’ time and energy.
As also in other sectors, at the beginning of working life in Austria,
recruitment contacts are by and large made up of co-ethnics. Also em-
ployers are often looking for workers of the same origin, and are also
establishing recruitment networks with their country of origin. By
means of advertisements in Polish newspapers or the cooperation with
somebody who organises workers directly in Poland, they try to hire
craftsmen or other workers, often under the precondition or with the
prior knowledge that the employment will be irregular.
There are certain resources that strengthen the position of employ-
ees in the eyes of their employers. This can be language or other speci-
fic skills needed in the given sector. Although ‘one can always find some-
thing’ in order to facilitate job seeking and get access to better jobs (bet-
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ter working conditions, better payment, more security, etc.), one needs
some key resources.
In addition to language, sector-relevant qualifications facilitate job
seeking. Most of the construction jobs performed by irregularly work-
ing persons are low-skilled activities that can be learned quickly. Work
is mostly restricted to manual and physically demanding occupations.
Therefore, formal qualifications such as education and certifications
count less than capabilities in determining one’s career – experience,
flexibility and versatility are key qualifications. When looking for work,
people are not asked about their formal qualifications, but about their
capabilities. Knowing how to plaster a wall or install a floor determines
whether they get the job or not.
It’s difficult to find work here, especially if you only know how
to do one thing. Me, for example, I’m very versatile: I know
how to tile a floor, I’m an electrician, and I know so many other
things. That’s why I always find a job here, but if somebody
only knows how to do one thing, then he won’t make it here.
You have to be extremely versatile. It is very difficult. (Male
respondent, Poland)
Most of the workers told us that they had no idea of the tasks they had
to perform when they first came to Austria, but they all acquired speci-
fic skills in the course of their employment and thus became ‘experts
with time’. Migrant workers assess the acquisition of know-how very
positively. ‘Learning by doing’ does not only refer to the tasks per-
formed, but also to language, which is mostly learned when talking to
colleagues. Increased experience also improves the bargaining position
of workers towards their employers. Thus, a man who has been work-
ing in Austria since 1990 can gradually make demands and enforce
them as well:
He only wanted to pay me eight euro an hour. I said I don’t
work for less than ten euro because I already have a lot of ex-
perience, and he should stop the car and let me out. And then
he accepted the ten euro, but the others have to work for eight
euro. (Male respondent, Poland)
3.5.6 Construction: Forms of irregularity and working conditions
As a general feature for all sectors and at all levels of occupation, ran-
ging from ordinary workers to self-employed individuals, there are only
oral contracts, if not pseudo-contracts that do not give an account of all
activities actually carried out. Oral contracts cannot be checked by any-
134 MIGRATION AND IRREGULAR WORK IN AUSTRIA
body from outside and thus do not give any guarantee of compliance
with workers’ rights or working standards. This means that nothing
can be taken for granted. Irregular working conditions can thus imply
irregularity in all respects, ranging from lack of insurance and other
benefits to violation of workers’ rights to insecurities concerning pay-
ment, accidents, etc. Not having a written contract results in great pres-
sure on irregularly working migrants who have to put a lot of effort in
keeping their jobs.
Our illegal construction workers have to work much more accu-
rately, because we only have oral agreements over working con-
ditions. If the principal employer has any complaints, he can af-
ford not to pay. (Male respondent, Hungarian entrepreneur)
Aside from this general characteristic, irregular employment in the
construction sector takes on various specific forms. First, there are peo-
ple who are working without any permit (neither work permit nor resi-
dence permit). Migrants without any permit are mostly working ‘in-
doors’, either in private homes or on bigger construction sites as soon
as the doors are installed.
On open construction sites, only those people worked who
were already legal. When work was advanced so far that the
doors were already there, we could work there enclosed. (Male
respondent, Poland)
In the last few years (according to migrants’ assessments since about
2000), there has been a shift from being employed completely irregu-
larly to being employed pseudo-regularly or semi- regularly. As many
migrants claim, companies are employing workers without any permits
less and less because of an increase in worksite inspections. This devel-
opment could not stop irregular work of migrants, but has resulted in
an increase of circumventions of legal regulations. Those circumven-
tions are often hardly traceable legally speaking, as was described
above. ‘Pseudo-regular’ forms of employment aim at circumventing
regulations on taxes, non-wage labour costs and social insurance dues,
and try to keep employers’ responsibilities and duties as minimal as
possible. The main characteristic of pseudo-regular or semi-regular
forms of employment is that employees have some kind of access to
the labour market (as self-employed persons, part-time employees,
etc.), but their actual working conditions do not comply with the re-
spective legal regulations.
The first of these pseudo-forms is the insufficient registration of em-
ployees, meaning employment in a company and possession of a con-
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tract that falls short of indicating the extent to which one is actually
working (e.g. having a part-time contract but working full-time). Part
of the money is thus paid according to tax and social insurance regula-
tions; the other, much larger, part is paid in cash. This practice of in-
sufficient registration is not only restricted to the employment of non-
nationals, but seems to be a general feature of construction work.
I have never met somebody who was registered for 1,500 euro
and also got this amount. That simply does not exist. It is like
this in the entire construction sector. And I really have a lot of
experience, really! (Male respondent, Poland)
Another young migrant does not seem sufficiently informed about the
compliance of his working situation with the officially registered work-
ing hours. As long as there are no problems, he’s also not interested in
it: ‘Eh...nine hours I am allowed to work, but how many hours I am re-
gistered I really don’t know. But I am registered, I think, for 30 hours.
In any event, anything goes’ (Male respondent, Kosovo).
Circumventions of regulations on self-employment are the other
considerable part of irregular work in the construction sector. To cir-
cumvent regulations on self-employment under the transitional regula-
tions (see Section 1.9), employees and their employers often use trade
licences. Often, such trade licences are registered for another trade as
the one actually practised. Another very common way to circumvent
the Foreign Employment Law is to subcontract to ‘self-employed’ mi-
grants, although the character of their work as employees would still
fall under the regulations of the Foreign Employment Law. In the case
of inspections, employers and ‘employees’ are able to produce official
documents. Lately, media has reported intensely on such forms of em-
ployment in the construction sector, generally referred to as ‘pseudo-
self-employment’ (Scheinselbststa¨ndigkeit).
In addition, despite restrictions on the ‘posting of workers’ (see Sec-
tion 1.9), foreign entrepreneurs equip their employees with trade li-
cences in order to circumvent registration procedures dictated by the
Foreign Employment Law.
Thus, in whatever way, employers try to find the cheapest way to em-
ploy their workers quasi-regularly:
I have a trade licence for cutting wood, because when I want to
get a trade licence as a carpenter I would need an official mas-
ter’s examination certificate. The fees are also cheaper this way.
That’s why I have the trade licence for cutting wood. The boss
always finds the cheapest alternatives for minimal costs. (Male
respondent, carpenter from Poland)
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Another worker got a trade licence upon his boss’ suggestion, so that
he would be protected in case of worksite inspections: ‘We have it in
case we get inspected. One-third of the bills get billed on the trade li-
cence, it is only a matter of form. It was our boss who proposed this
possibility to us.’ (Male respondent, Poland).
While equipping employees with trade licences protects employers
in case of inspection, gives their companies the appearance of ‘legality’
and does not produce many responsibilities for them, this strategy is
far less advantageous for employees. A substantial disadvantage for mi-
grants is that the monthly administrative costs of about 170 euro for re-
gistering a trade license have to be covered exclusively by the workers
themselves, while their salary does not increase. Their legal status is
not improved, either. Workers with trade licences often do not know
that having a trade licence does not automatically regularise their work
when working for an employer, as this statement indicates:
Everything is legal, only the small worker in the lowest position
has to pay the 170 euro out of his own pocket. That’s a minus –
the only plus is that it is legal. (Male respondent, Poland)
3.5.7 Payment: Amount, form and time of payment
Irregularities concerning payment are another major problem irregu-
larly employed migrants have to face in the construction sector on a
daily basis. Irregular work does not offer any guarantee in terms of
amount and time of payment or even in terms of being paid at all.
Most of our interviewed workers did not get paid on time and were not
paid as much as had been agreed upon before. While the amount of
payment is generally agreed upon in advance, one has no guarantee
that this agreement will ultimately be adhered to.
Another problem is that people who work illegally to 95 per cent
don’t get their money as was agreed. Either much later, or only
part of what was agreed on. (Male respondent, Poland, ‘mediator’)
Payment is generally agreed upon before the job starts, often not leav-
ing the worker much room for negotiation. Not only the amount is de-
termined, but also whether the worker will be paid per hour or per unit
of production. Being paid per unit of production was considered prefer-
able by interviewees, as the work performed can be demonstrated to
the employer exactly, reducing his chances of defrauding the worker.
The unit of production rate varies according to the kind of occupation
(easy and fast or difficult and slow) and on the individual speed of the
worker himself:
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When I am working per unit of production, I get two euro per
square metre for plastering and nine euro per square metre for
installations. For this first job, I had to do the plastering of 120
square metres in two days, and for that I got over 200 euro.
That was a good job. (Male respondent, Poland)
Generally speaking, the amount of payment depends on a lot of fac-
tors. Experience and capabilities define which kind of work one can
get: for those looking for work on the Arbeiterstrich, payment per hour
only rarely exceeds five euro. In case of recruitment by an employer or
mediator, hourly wages are usually a bit higher, around eight to ten
euro. This is due to the fact that such people are mostly hired because
of their skills and thus have a better negotiating position. In addition
to learned trades, formal qualifications also influence the price of a
worker. Craftsmen get paid better than unskilled labourers, although
there is no guarantee for that in irregular construction activities. In
spite of capabilities and qualifications, the payment for newcomers is
generally lower in the beginning, even when they possess certain quali-
fications: ‘In Austria, as bricklayer you get seven or eight euro per hour, in
the beginning, six euro’ (Male respondent, Poland, construction and agri-
culture). Another worker states:
In the beginning, I got 50 Schillings [about 3.50 euro], today you
maybe get around four euro. But it hasn’t changed much; when
somebody starts working now, he won’t get more than five euro.
(Male respondent, Poland)
As a result, experience is not only decisive in regard to capabilities, but
also in regard to knowing how much one’s work is ‘worth’. The bar-
gaining position of workers towards their employers thus improves
over time. Nevertheless, an increase of payment over time is not as-
sured for irregularly employed migrants. Even when working for the
same employer for a long time, they almost always have to fight for
better payment. When they finally achieve their goal, they have to put
more effort into their work, as higher payment means higher expecta-
tions on the part of their employers:
Payment has increased very slowly. We therefore had to beg our
boss, force him, threaten him to leave the firm. If he then paid
a bit more, we at the same time had to work more efficiently or
to pay for our work clothes on our own. (Male respondent,
Poland)
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In general, employers can do what they like with the salaries of their
employees. Automatic deduction of pre-payments from future salaries
is a very common practice among mediators, for example, to cover food
or accommodation costs.
In the beginning, he just deducted 1,000 Schillings [about 700
euro] for the flat. You could not do anything about it, because he
threatened us with the other thousands of people who are stand-
ing in line for our job. (Male respondent, Poland)
Nevertheless, lower income is accepted when the employer provides ad-
ditional services like lunch, housing (needed when the job is out of
town) or sanitary facilities. Such services are an important indicator as
to whether the employer cares about his employees’ working condi-
tions, something that is very much appreciated, even if it occurs only
rarely.
3.5.8 From unpaid wages to ‘pseudo-companies’
Due to frequent job changes, especially for those who organise work
on their own, migrants cannot count on a fixed amount of money per
month. Unforeseen interruptions of working activities mean an inter-
ruption of income. While regular workers continue to receive their
wages even in cases of illness or accident, irregularly employed workers
simply cannot afford to get ill, go on holidays or visit their families for
too long. What’s more, withheld payment is another major problem for
construction workers. The calculations of one worker who does odd
jobs demonstrate the unpredictability and insecurity of payments in an
irregular working situation as such:
First week 70 hours, second week 70 hours, third week 44
hours, fourth week 44 hours for one and the same employer. In
sum, for seven euro per hour, this would make 1,750 euro for
one month of work. First I got paid 100 euro, then ten, twenty,
fifteen and again twenty euro, then 300 euro. In sum, only 700
euro. This was an Austrian, you should really make a black list
of those employers who treat you this way. (Male respondent,
Poland)
This account exemplifies another big problem in irregular construction
work: irregularities in payment are not only due to frequently changing
jobs, but also to inconsistencies and fraud on the part of employers.
Being cheated in one’s wages far exceeds late payments. Cheating in
wages ranges from occasional cheating on a small scale to criminal
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and planned fraud by companies, also known as ‘pseudo-companies’.
The extent of cheating can range from not paying part of the income
to entire monthly wages.
The timing of payment is agreed upon in advance between workers
and employers. Irregular workers are usually paid weekly, every two
weeks, monthly or when a given job is finished. Generally speaking,
migrants explain that the later they are paid, the more uncertain they
are to get paid at all. As a result, migrants mostly reject monthly pay-
ment plans:
Monthly payment is okay only when you’re employed regularly,
not when work is irregular, because if something happens to him
[the employer], I will never see my money. (Male respondent,
Poland)
Due to the very short duration of daily jobs on the Arbeiterstrich,
labourers and employers cannot develop a relationship of mutual trust.
As a result, one has to be paid daily: otherwise, ‘you will never see your
money’. However, the above-mentioned example suggests that payment
generally is divided into very small sums, leaving some claims partly
open. Consequently, most workers demand a partial payment after one
week of work to check the employer’s reliability. But this strategy can-
not prevent cases in which employers pay out only part of the money,
never the whole sum that was agreed upon, as in the example above.
Inexperienced, young workers are especially in danger of being
exploited by fraudulent employers.
He [the employer] takes young people, agrees on 1,500 euro but
only pays them 300 euro, promising to pay the rest in two
weeks. But then he says that he has no work for them anymore.
And they never receive their money, and he finds himself some
new idiots. (Male respondent, Poland)
The more intermediaries there are between the worker and the princi-
pal employer, the higher the risk is of being cheated. When doing in-
formal jobs for private persons, the risk of being cheated is relatively
low, while it is higher when working for a mediator or for an employer
who is involved in bigger public projects. While subcontractors are de-
pendent on regular payments by their principals, workers are the weak-
est link in the chain as they are dependent on the reliability of all other
parties before them. If the first principal does not pay because of bank-
ruptcy, etc., subcontractors and workers may lose great sums of money,
while in the case of cheating by subcontractors and sub-subcontractors,
only workers have to bear the costs. This cheating in wages can extend
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into organised criminal activities. So-called ‘pseudo-companies’ (Schei-
nunternehmen) accept projects from bigger companies, money for their
services is transferred to them, but they disappear, declare bankruptcy,
etc., before paying out the money to their employees:
...he is a cheater. He takes on projects from big companies, has
us do the work and then does not pay the workers. And we are
left out in the rain. (Male respondent, Poland)
Some migrants state that cheating in wages generally has increased in
the last few years, making irregular employment less and less profit-
able for them. While migrant workers generally consider the risk of
cheating in payments to be very high, they see the highest risk when
working for ethnic employers. This does not mean that Austrians are
not involved in fraud, but it seems that the number of ethnic subcon-
tractors in the construction business is at least as significant.
I would never work for a Pole again, also not for a Yugoslavian.
That was for free. Never again! They did not pay at all, or only
10 per cent. That happened a lot of times. (Male respondent,
Poland)
3.5.9 Working hours and worker-employer relations
Generally, construction activities do not imply fixed or regular working
hours and overtime seems to be standard. However, such irregularities
are not only restricted to irregular migrant work, but are rather com-
mon in construction work as a whole. Projects have to be finished un-
der time pressure and factors like weather influence possible working
hours. The difference from regular work lies in the fact that those
working irregularly always have to be at their employer’s disposal re-
gardless of whether it is weekend, evening, etc. The closer the relation-
ship between employer and worker is, the more enhanced this ‘being
available’ becomes. As links between employer and worker increase, so
does the worker’s dependence on his or her employer. When the em-
ployer is not only the provider of a job, but also the proprietor of the
worker’s accommodation, possibilities of affecting the migrant’s life in-
crease. Some employers in the construction sector are also active on
the real estate market, buying old buildings, renovating and reselling
them. To make additional profit, they house their workers in buildings
that are very much in need of renovation. Consequently, the depen-
dency of workers on their employers increases, as now employers are
needed for both work and housing. In such situations, the fine line be-
tween work duties and voluntary help grows increasingly blurry. The
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boss can come by at any given moment just to say that he needs some-
body to ‘drive a nail into the wall’. It is very difficult to reject such re-
quests. Some employers even make use of their powerful position and
deliberately hassle their workers:
Sometimes, the boss comes by exactly when we want to go
home. Then he comes and checks our work and we have to stay
for another half an hour. No questions asked, and unpaid. (Male
respondent, Poland)
Another difference from regular work is the range of instability and
unpredictability regarding working hours. While some days are filled
up with projects, others are totally free. This especially applies to those
who organise informal jobs on their own. However, sometimes such
flexibility regarding working hours is also assessed positively. In con-
trast to rigid regular working hours, irregular employment enables mi-
grants to allot their time more autonomously. Nevertheless, this appar-
ent autonomy must also be put into perspective:
When I want to go home, I go. I don’t have to be at work from 8
a.m. to 5 p.m. I work about ten hours a day. And when I don’t
want to work anymore, I say, ‘I’m going now.’ The employer can
say, ‘No, you have to keep working.’ Okay, then I have to stay.
But I haven’t had any problems for a few years now. (Male
respondent, Poland)
The dependency on employers as providers of work and money domi-
nates an irregular working situation. A conflict between employer and
worker can mean the loss of one’s job. This is true even for conflicts
about workers’ rights that are otherwise taken for granted, like the
right to holidays or protection against random dismissals, not to men-
tion paid leave. As most of the workers are ‘replaceable’, the employer
can treat them as he wishes.
With holidays it is problematic – we can only go on holidays
when the boss goes, too. You cannot make any plans. Apart
from this, he only rarely accepts requests for holidays. If some-
body demands a holiday, he can even fire him. Holidays are of
course unpaid. (Male respondent, Poland)
For workers who have no fixed employer and are free to manage their
own time, taking holidays or working less means an interruption of in-
come for the period of time that they are free. Holidays are a luxury
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and, in almost all cases, involve visits to the home country, to see the
family or deal with things that need to be done there.
3.6 Catering and tourism
3.6.1 Catering and tourism: Sample description
At the time of the interviews, twelve persons (nine women and three
men) out of 50 were working in a hotel, restaurant or a bar either full-
time or as a side occupation for some hours only. Respondents mainly
originated from Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, former Yugoslavia and the
Czech Republic.
Of these individuals, six had entered Austria prior to the EU enlarge-
ment of 2004 and the six others had followed sometime between
2004 and 2006, mostly with the idea to stay in Austria for a longer
period of time and/or to find work. Only four of the interviewees were
older than 30. The youngest person interviewed in this group was a 21-
year-old woman.
By the time of the interviews, only three interviewees had all rights
to access the Austrian labour market, while nine others either enjoyed
EU mobility rights, were holding tourist visas or were in the asylum
system and therefore did not have access to the Austrian labour mar-
ket.
The sample did not include persons currently working on the basis
of a seasonal contract. We therefore had to rely on respondents’ experi-
ences living and working in Vienna and in the federal state of Tyrol.
Tyrol is one of the more touristy areas of Austria, so seasonal work is
consequently of major importance.
Generally, the respondents’ educational level was above average (e.g.
higher education certificate, university degree, trained librarian), or
they had sophisticated skills as generally required for careers in the
branch, such as training in catering and confection, a diploma from a
private school for tourism and hostelry or training as a waiter. Only
one had dropped out of nursing school and another stayed in school
only as long as was required by law.
Accordingly, those who had finished their educational training had
already started to work in their countries of origin and/or other coun-
tries as an educational psychologist, translator, a secretary in a large
company, a tailor, a retail salesperson, a cook or a waiter in a big hotel.
From my region, not so many people go abroad, but a lot come
from Western Ukraine. I know a lot of people here in Vienna
from there. This is a bit sad because many high-skilled people
like engineers or doctors are coming here illegally. For the most
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part, they are working on construction sites or as cleaning la-
dies. This is a bit sad. (Female respondent, Ukraine)
3.6.2 Catering and tourism: Structural features and specific actors involved
Tourism, hostelry and catering possess certain characteristics that can
be identified as facilitating irregular employment. They involve activ-
ities of a temporary nature, require only a low qualification profile and
secondary knowledge of the German language and do not call for in-
tense initial training, so a high rate of labour turnover is easily possible
(Lederer & Nickel 1997). In addition, businesses exclusively run by cer-
tain ethnic groups (e.g. restaurants) are under strong suspicion for sys-
tematically violating working standards and the non-registration of
their workforce.
Besides the enormous number of potential employment locations,
the major characteristic of the branch is that apart from seasonal work
arrangements, working in restaurants or bars is more easily compatible
with other jobs, obligations or interests as demonstrated by our sample
(e.g. studying). Working hours are usually flexible and organised in
shifts with a tendency towards night work, which makes it easier for
employees to adjust other obligations and interests to their working
hours.
3.6.3 Catering and tourism: Recruitment structures
Particular social networks that migrants usually rely on include family
and friends, current or former colleagues or the ethnic community. In
one way or the other, all respondents used these networks to identify
possible employers. The complexity and roundabout ways of finding
work are well explained by the following examples:
I always found my jobs through colleagues and friends. And
there is my family. My uncle, my mother’s sister, my cousin –
they are all here. And they all work in the same place. So they
would ask around: do you need a waitress or dishwasher, et ce-
tera? Unregistered work, of course. This is how it goes, the con-
tact between people and employers. (Female respondent, Serbia)
It was very difficult for me to find something by myself. It was
always easy when I knew someone who knew the employers.
When I tried to get in touch with employers on my own, it was
very difficult. Only in one case did I find a job by myself, but
this was just luck. All other jobs came through friends. (Female
respondent, Slovakia)
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Respondents noticeably pointed to the importance of colleagues. Col-
leagues become friends. Colleagues not only know someone who
might be in need of a worker, but former colleagues would sometimes
open up their own business after some time and attract others to work
for them.
Some of the respondents, mostly those who already had contacts,
broader experience or better knowledge of the German language, high-
lighted that they themselves act as intermediaries and help others to
get a job. However, recommending someone to a familiar employer
also harbours certain risks. If the recommended person does not per-
form well, it would also reflect on the mediating person and could tar-
nish their relationship. For potential career opportunities, this is defi-
nitely not helpful.
First, my acquaintance didn’t want to give me the employer’s
number, as we didn’t know each other so well. She had already
recommended someone who ended up performing badly. And,
you know, this reflects on you. (Female respondent, Poland)
As already mentioned above, in irregular employment – even more
than in regular employment – building up a good reputation and stay-
ing on an employer’s good side are indeed of specific importance. Even
in cases of unfair treatment, short-term employment or fully unregis-
tered employment, it may be worthwhile to perform well and to keep
in touch with the employer. One day, when a migrant’s status is fully
legal, he or she can always come back. Already familiar with the em-
ployer, the migrant may then get full and legal employment or would
at least be recommended to someone else in need of irregular labour.
In all work arrangements, the employer should be satisfied with
my performance. And wherever I have worked unregistered,
now that I have documents I can go there and everybody wel-
comes me. For me, it’s really easy to find work. Unregistered, re-
gistered, I don’t have any problems. Also with the company I’m
currently working with, I had worked unregistered before for
some time. (Female respondent, Serbia)
Formal job agencies such as recruitment agencies and national and re-
gional employment agencies are of importance for accessing jobs espe-
cially to those persons who have a legal residence status and access to
the Austrian labour market, such as those holding a work permit, those
working under seasonal contracts, self-employed individuals, asylum
seekers and students.
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In our sample, recruitment agencies did not play a decisive role in
accessing irregular employment in catering and tourism, but this does
not mean that they are of no importance at all. Personnel are often for-
mally recruited for seasonal employment, especially in the important
tourist regions.
But also in cases in which the AMS may not be able to directly help
or assist due to the lack of a residence permit or work permit, potential
workers would at least use the infrastructure of its regional branches,
as the example of a Czech worker illustrates. Already some time ago,
when he had a job in the agricultural sector in Burgenland, he had es-
tablished contact with the regional branch of the national employment
agency. Now jobless and lacking a work permit, he would nevertheless
use this connection. As he stated, he had called regularly and asked
whether it would be possible for him to get a seasonal work permit:
‘They said, “Mister, you have to do this yourself. We cannot help you. Go
back to the Czech Republic. You have to work.”’ Knowing that friends
and family had worked in Tyrol, he decided to also try his chances
there, nevertheless using the infrastructure and the connection to this
regional agency:
At the regional AMS, I collected job offers for Tyrol. Going
through the offers, I finally decided to go there, just like this,
without discussing or reviewing much, to just go there and try
by myself. I used the computer advertisements in the regional
employment agency. Since the 1990s, they have established a
computer system that would display job offers everywhere in
Austria. I would then call every single employer from a tele-
phone booth myself, that’s the story. [...] After 40 or 50 calls in
hotels and restaurants, the fiftieth employer would say, ‘Come,
we need someone, let’s try.’ It was interesting. After two min-
utes of talking, they would decide. You don’t need to negotiate
much. (Male respondent, Czech Republic)
In this and other narratives, calling a potential employer was presented
as a very effective strategy, especially for seasonal work, regardless of
whether a potential employer was identified by means of the Internet,
newspaper ads, family, friends, colleagues or former employers. Espe-
cially in cases where the necessary preconditions for regular employ-
ment are missing, direct and personal communication was regarded as
the best way to sound out potential employment.
Without a work permit, however, it is very difficult to find an em-
ployer who takes the risk of employing someone totally without regis-
tration, as employers can also employ students or seasonal workers
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with a formal contract (but not necessarily according to the agreed
working conditions).
If you have a job interview, they ask you about your documents
and you have to tell the truth. And by the time you start explain-
ing why you don’t have documents and how they can help you
in organising a permit, the whole story is already finished be-
cause no employer wants to take the risk, even if they really
want you to work for them. Even if they start arranging it, it is
not clear if you’ll get it. The whole procedure simply takes too
long. (Female respondent, Poland)
The often only temporary nature of irregular employment and the need
to have several jobs at the same time demands a high level of flexibility.
Finally, in irregular employment, one cannot be too selective: ‘It always
worked out, but only temporarily. One should not be too picky’ (Male re-
spondent, Czech Republic). Some respondents explained that looking
for a job requires at least as much time as they actually spend working.
Therefore, working and looking for a job often have to be performed si-
multaneously.
Although I’m really experienced in finding jobs – I have so
many friends, the labour agency, the Internet, the newspapers,
et cetera. – you spend the same amount of time looking for a
job as you do actually working. In the morning I’d look for jobs,
and in the afternoon and evening I went to work. And it goes
on like this. (Male respondent, Czech Republic)
In this context, it was also highlighted that it is much easier for wo-
men to access irregular employment in tourist regions than for men.
According to a Serbian woman: ‘For women, it is always easier, for
men it is much harder. In a hotel they need several nannies: two, three,
six, seven. But they only need one dishwasher.’
Looking for work becomes easier over the course of time, as respon-
dents improve their knowledge of German. Without German, however,
they are more reliant on friends and family, as well as on ethnic em-
ployers. As mentioned above, however, working in ethnic businesses is
often only considered as a temporary alternative:
It took quite some time until I found a job, most probably be-
cause of my bad German. Then I found a Polish pub on the In-
ternet. I called and had the interview, presented myself, and it
went fine. (Female respondent, Poland)
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3.6.4 Catering and tourism: Working conditions
Forms of irregularity
As in other sectors, employers in catering and tourism may also draw
on certain sector-specific ‘traditions’ when employing irregularly. Docu-
mented cases confirm the violations of regulations for temporary work
(seasonal employment contracts), part-time employment and the sys-
tematic violation of general labour standards.
In catering and tourism, one of the most established practices to cir-
cumvent regulations and standards is the non-registration or the regis-
tration of workers below the social security (and tax) threshold.6 In this
scenario, the contracts of employed personnel state they receive the
minimum income only. In reality, however, much more is disbursed in
cash and therefore remains also untaxed. As the following example of
a Slovak woman shows: ‘Payment was okay. Once a month, I got my
money transferred to my account, and the non-registered hours I got in
cash.’
Besides tax evasion, systematic violations of regulations for seasonal
workers seem to be very common. Employment contracts are ‘adjusted’
to seasonal reality, which means that workers overstay the time of their
official registration, are employed between seasons without a contract
or have to work significantly more than agreed upon in tourist peak
times.
In our sample, for those respondents who were not registered at all,
working and payment conditions were agreed upon verbally. In the best
case, non-registered employees would get net salaries equal to those of
registered employees: ‘Just cash in hand logically. Employers don’t want
the cash flow tracked. Everything was in limbo. But I had a room, food,
work and a monthly income’ (Male respondent, Czech Republic).
As mentioned above, one established way to register someone below
the social security threshold is the registration of workers as students
(provided the concerned employees are registered at an Austrian uni-
versity) for a maximum of ten hours a week and a maximum income
of 333.16 euro a month (2006 level). In this arrangement, social secur-
ity payments are in the hands of the respective student him or herself.
A Polish female student who reflected on the registration practice in
her workplace provided a very good example:
The waiters aren’t registered either, or only as students – below
the social security threshold. Me, I’m not registered at all, just
like the other foreigners she employs. Of seven employees, only
are registered. They’re registered as students and they’re Aus-
trians. If she was inspected, she would just say she’s trying them
out and they started today, or something like that. That’s it. And
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we also think she has connections and knows when someone
would come to inspect, as normally she would not get away with
something like this, right? And she earns a fortune by not pay-
ing any tax or social security contributions for all these people.
(Female respondent, Poland)
3.6.5 Irregularities concerning working hours and payment
Although irregular working arrangements equally apply to the native
workforce, immigrants are much more affected by these practices. For-
eign employees either have to work harder than their Austrian collea-
gues for the same wages, or their wages are significantly lower. In addi-
tion, especially non-EEC nationals risk getting cheated or even physi-
cally attacked by their employers.
And then I had all these problems with payment! When you
work unregistered, you can’t do anything about it! I don’t want
to work in a kitchen anymore, maybe I just worked in the wrong
hotel, but he beat me with the ladle, here on my leg! (Female
respondent, Serbia)
Respondents reported that especially those employees who got their
salary on a monthly basis worked much more than agreed upon (more
hours or up to seven days a week) and without any kind of compensa-
tion. In a monthly payment arrangement, the lowest rate reported was
200 euro per month for a part-time job (which equals an hourly rate of
approximately 2.50 euro). Nevertheless, if compensation was provided
(either compensatory payment or compensatory time off), respondents
perceived their working arrangements as rather fair by stating that due
to their irregular situation, they are not entitled to health, social or pen-
sion insurance anyway.
In hourly payment arrangements, the rates ranged from five to ten
euro per hour, and waiters would have their tips as well. Nevertheless,
employees were cheated in the hours they had worked, which ulti-
mately reduced their hourly payment rate.
They just calculated less than the actual hours I had worked. On
their monthly salary confirmation sheet, they wouldn’t write the
hours to be paid. One day, I said that there must be something
wrong, because I had carefully written down my actual working
hours. Every month I got less and less. In the beginning when it
was around ten or twenty hours, I didn’t say anything. But then I
decided to quit. It was really getting to be too much. I had
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worked 70 to 80 hours without being paid! (Female respondent,
Serbia)
The same person also explained why employees might have good rea-
son to be against hourly payment: ‘Better I get a monthly salary. If you
get 40 euro every day, you spend it easily. So she wrote down the days
she didn’t pay me and I got all the money at the end of the month’
(Female respondent, Serbia).
3.6.6 Several jobs at one time
Irregular work demands a high level of flexibility on the part of work-
ers. Irregular employment is usually of a temporary nature. Especially
in certain seasonal work arrangements, it is mostly temporary and of-
ten only part-time. In order to make a living, workers therefore often
need to be engaged in several jobs at the same time. Besides being
highly seasonal, work in catering and tourism already provides a struc-
ture that may allow for several jobs. ‘Part-time employment’ gets a dif-
ferent meaning, as individuals may work at night and keep their days
free, either to ‘look for another job’ or to do some ‘small jobs’ on the
side. In our sample, all interviewees working in this field had at least
two jobs or were trying to find a second or third job.
In the morning, I work in the hotel, unregistered. In the after-
noon, I work in a private household, and on Sundays, in another
restaurant. I’m commuting a lot. Before, I used to work eight
hours in a hotel; that was easier. Now I do a minimum of twelve
hours every single day. (Female respondent, Serbia)
Managing and organising several jobs at the same time was perceived
as specifically difficult in cases where irregular employment is on a dai-
ly or even an hourly basis. Employers would call for work one day and
cancel the next, so establishing a daily routine is difficult. Nevertheless,
if such arrangements were ‘small side-jobs’, respondents did not see
much problem with it, especially students who may have other sources
of income or other priorities: ‘I only do this when I can take time off.
It’s not worth the effort to neglect my university classes for an extra 60
or 70 euro a month, as I also have another job’ (Female student,
Poland).
Especially women reported that they were made into ‘jacks of all
trades’ by the same employer: ‘My job was to clean the rooms, but also
to help in the restaurant and in the kitchen. And on Sundays, also in
the restaurant bussing tables.’ (Female respondent, Serbia).
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Furthermore, some employees would also take additional work on
weekends. For the bigger hotels, this meant working as a chamber-
maid, helping in the kitchen and sometimes also as a waiter.
Respondents involved in seasonal employment and with one employ-
er appreciated the usual practice of providing accommodation and
food. One Czech respondent consciously looked only for those jobs also
including a room, as he could save on the cost of living this way: ‘You
get a room, food and work!’ (Male respondent, Czech Republic).
3.7 Agriculture
3.7.1 Agriculture: Sample description
Out of the entire sample of 50 interviewees, only seven (six men and
one woman) were working in the agricultural sector at the time of the
interviews. In addition to those, other interviewees had previous work
experience in agriculture and could also provide valuable insights. In-
terviewees originated from Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria.
At the time of the interviews, half of the respondents had the right
to reside in Austria independent from their seasonal work permit,
while the others only had a visa bound to the seasonal work contract.
As agricultural work is mostly seasonal work, half of the migrants
worked in the construction sector between seasons, while the other half
returned home. While all workers were employed legally during the
season (seasonal contracts as seasonal workers or harvesters), they
mostly worked without contracts off-season.
Because of the difficult access to interviewees, who were almost all
accommodated in a dwelling close to the farmhouse (see also Section
3.1), we could only reach migrants who had a seasonal work permit.
Nevertheless, all interviewees were affected by irregularities in regard
to registration, workers’ rights and/or compliance to agreements in
their contract.
All of the interviewees were between 30 and 40 years of age and,
with the exception of one, all were either married or divorced as well as
had one or two children in the country of origin. Most of the intervie-
wees came to Austria after 2000, but still before the accession of the
EU-8 Member States in 2004. Most of the interviewed third-country
nationals already belonged to the core workforce of their employers
and were thus still able to get a seasonal work permit, a situation that
was aggravated after 2004 due to the preferential treatment for EU citi-
zens. Some of the men had previous work experience in the construc-
tion or industrial sector abroad, e.g. in Germany or Turkey.
All of the interviewees had vocational training, ranging from cook or
baker to mechanic, carpenter and teacher. One even attended an agri-
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cultural school. Due to seasonality, seasonal work is also attractive for
students who come to earn money during their holidays. In reference
to his colleagues, a Polish carpenter said: ‘Some people are in school,
some do agricultural work, some work on construction sites as electricians,
tile setters – specialists’ (Male respondent, Poland).
3.7.2 Agriculture: Structural features and specific actors involved
Even more than in other sectors, the family seems to be the most im-
portant ‘actor’ in agriculture. As recruitment structures evolved mainly
via mediation between relatives, those private networks continue to
play a crucial role in the mediation of jobs. The informal development
of mediation structures also leads to recruitment chains. If farmers
need more workers, they often charge their employees with the respon-
sibility to get new people from their village the next season.
Often it works like this: you start with two or three people, and
they mediate the work among their family. You just take the
brother, or the neighbours with you. That’s how it has devel-
oped. (Farmer, Tyrol)
Seasonal work is most attractive to those who cannot afford to be ab-
sent from home for too long. Mothers or students thus often work as
harvesters for some weeks, which enables them a small supplementary
income.
Due to the provision of accommodation and social insurance by the
employers, family networks are less needed for the organisation of so-
cial life in the region of immigration (e.g. housing, contacts to doctors
in case of an accident). This situation clearly differs from the scenario
of those in mediating jobs.
Because seasonal labourers do not change their employers as often
as workers in the construction sector, for instance, having as many con-
tacts to employers as possible is not considered important. Having con-
tacts to employers is only important if someone wants to change his
job.
There are indications in our interviews that also organised recruit-
ment is taking place in the country of origin. Nevertheless, who those
professional recruiters are and whether they require monetary compen-
sation for their services remained unanswered questions.
3.7.3 Agriculture: Recruitment structures
Job seeking in agriculture follows very similar structures as in the
other sectors. Family, friends and colleagues are crucial in getting infor-
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mation about and recommendations for jobs. The difference from
other sectors is that recruitment for seasonal labour mostly happens in
the country of origin, as visa and work permit are then issued in one.
However, this has changed with EU enlargement, as EU citizens can
stay in Austria as long as they wish, and thus can look for other jobs di-
rectly in Austria before or after their seasonal employment. Before en-
largement, migrants needed a tourist visa to look for work, just as
third-country nationals still do: ‘I just came and found something, at first
moonlighting’ (Male respondent, Bulgaria). One Polish worker and his
son also came to Austria at random. They had information from collea-
gues about regions with a high demand for agricultural workers, so
they drove from one Austrian farm to another and asked everybody for
work.
The first time I came together with my son. My son already
knew some German and we looked for work. [...] This first time
we only worked for two months, a little bit in the tree nursery, a
little bit harvesting apples, but we had the telephone numbers
for the next year. It was no problem to call and say that we
would come again. (Male respondent, Poland)
Due to the importance of family networks in recruiting workers, it is
often whole families working on one farm. A Romanian seasonal work-
er managed to organise a job for his wife as well. ‘My wife is here, too.
It’s her first year here’ (Male respondent, Romania).
Due to the unpredictability connected to harvests and weather condi-
tions, recruitment takes place on very short notice. This is true for initi-
al employment, but also for the core workforce, as employers can never
make a binding promise of when work will start and whether they will
get a work permit for their employees the next year. Thus, migrants of-
ten have to decide within days or a few weeks whether they will come
to Austria or not. For example, one interviewee got the number of a lo-
cal farmer from a colleague, called and came.
Another colleague says, ‘Good firm, good work, do you also
want to work here?’ I call the enterprise, they say they need a
chauffeur [to bring the vegetables to the supermarkets], and I
come. (Male respondent, Poland)
Often, reliable workers are responsible for bringing additional employ-
ees the next season. This mediation is mostly done without asking for
a return service, for it is more based on a system of mutual help. While
one case showed how the employer of a Romanian worker, a small
farmer, asked him whether he knew somebody else who would also
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like to be a seasonal worker and then take the employee with him, an-
other interviewee described organising harvesting jobs for almost his
entire village:
Those, who now come in the fall are twenty, 30 persons from
me, from my village. [...] They are coming through me. For the
lettuce and apple harvest. (Male respondent, Poland)
In addition to these informal recruitment structures, organised recruit-
ment of workers directly in the country of origin also takes place. In-
deed, a Romanian woman was told about a job at a Tyrolean farm by a
friend of hers. This friend then knew another man who always would
come to Romania to hire people for work abroad. Transport from Ro-
mania to Austria and back would be organised by bus. Another worker
from Bulgaria has also heard about such organised recruitment struc-
tures: ‘I know that there are such people who organise work, but me
myself, I don’t know anybody’ (Male respondent, Bulgaria). Overall, in-
formal recruitment structures seem to play a more decisive role in Aus-
trian agriculture than organised ones, as the interviews indicate.
Over the course of time, migrants also get to know other working
possibilities and other employers, and have the opportunity to change
their job or even change to another sector. However, for seasonal work-
ers who are in the country for only six months, have to work all day
and live at the farmhouse, it is not that easy to look for other jobs. This
is easier for those who remain in Austria after their seasonal employ-
ment, as the following example shows. Here, the important role of em-
ployers as a resource of jobs and the importance of making a good im-
pression are stressed:
The work as bricklayer emerged later. I started with trimming
trees and harvesting apples and then it got around that I could
also work as a bricklayer. Now I have many contacts and it’s
good. And when people are content, then everything is okay.
(Male respondent, Poland)
3.7.4 Agriculture: Forms of irregularity and working conditions
It seems that registration-related irregularities in agriculture have di-
minished in the last years, due to enlarged and professionalised com-
pany structures and also increased worksite inspections. In addition,
seasonal labour arrangements were created to meet the demand for
flexible, cheap labour anyway, which are considered to be one of the
most important motives for employing irregularly (see Part 2 on the
Delphi study in this report). Consequently, irregularities largely take
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place within the seasonal labour model and can be considered as an in-
herent part of it.
While interviewees indicated that they or their colleagues worked
without any registration some years ago and are now registered as sea-
sonal workers, there are indications that working without registration
also occurs now, even if on a smaller scale. However, working without
registration mostly seems to be limited to some days, while the em-
ployer is waiting for approval of the work permit by the labour market
service or when work is continued after the official end of the employ-
ment contract. While it is not very risky for farmers in the eastern part
of Austria to employ someone without a contract (and thus without so-
cial security) for several days, this seems to be too dangerous in the
western part, as geographical conditions there are much more likely to
lead to accidents.
Another difference in the handling of seasonal work resulting from
the geographical situation is that farmers in the east of the country can
make more use of the shortest-term contract for harvesters, as many of
their workers are commuters from Hungary. The close distance ren-
ders flexible and short-term arrangements more acceptable than for
workers who have to travel long distances every time they are hired.
There are also migrants who remain in Austria after the end of their
seasonal employment contract and continue to work for the same em-
ployer or change to another sector in between seasons. In this manner,
the legal or illegal status of employment is not fixed but is rendered in-
terchangeable. For EU citizens, overstaying does not exist anymore; for
third-country nationals, overstaying can have significant consequences,
as one interviewee states. (At the time of the interview, Romania was
not a member of the EU.)
If you stay longer than six months, you get problems at the bor-
der for not having a valid stamp. Some people also stay in Aus-
tria after those six months and work irregularly. I heard about a
woman who worked irregularly in a hotel, was caught and pro-
hibited from coming to Austria for the next five years. You don’t
have problems at the border except when you’re working irregu-
larly – then you have no chance. If you get caught, of course.
(Female respondent, Romania)
On the contrary, EU citizens can come and go as they please without
fearing severe consequences. One Polish citizen works six weeks a year
as a harvester, gets social insurance, etc., and then returns to his irre-
gular work in the construction sector.
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For six weeks legally [work and stay], then you have to return to
Poland for two or three days and then you can come back again
to work irregularly. (Male respondent, Poland)
Pseudo-self-employment as another means of circumventing registra-
tion was mentioned in reference to Germany. Self-employed ‘lettuce
pickers’ or ‘carrot packers’ are reported to occur there in order to get
around the limit of six-month employment, while such cases were not
reported for Austria so far.
For those who have a seasonal work contract, accidents do not pose a
problem as health and accident insurance are covered. For the time be-
tween seasons, however, all workers have to arrange for extra insur-
ance, regardless of whether they stay in Austria or return to their coun-
try of origin.
Q: What if you have an accident here?
A: If it happens while I’m working irregularly, I have to return
to Poland. When I’m here for the apple harvest, then I’m in-
sured, but only for the time of harvest. That’s short. This is my
Austrian insurance. Otherwise, my insurance is in Poland. In
Austria or Germany, the insurance also costs so much. (Male re-
spondent, Poland)
Most irregularities occur in regard to working conditions. While regu-
lar access to the labour market is provided and social insurance is cov-
ered, violations of workers’ rights and especially of working hours are
very common, even if registered according to the rules. Generally
speaking, the agricultural sector is characterised by flexibility in all re-
spects. Working hours and workload depend on the weather and the
time of the season, both of which cannot be predicted in advance.
Q: Did you agree on the maximum number of hours you were
supposed to work?
A: No, because you cannot say how much is necessary for that
kind of work on a farm. It varied. Sometimes you know: when it
was raining during the week, then you have to finish some
things on the weekend, also when it’s raining. (Male respondent,
Poland)
This indispensable flexibility results in the difficulty to check the com-
pliance with working hours. All interviewees stated that there are times
where they have a lot of work, while other days are nearly work-free. In
156 MIGRATION AND IRREGULAR WORK IN AUSTRIA
sum, however, most of the interviewees work more than they are ob-
liged to. While one interviewee is registered for 40 hours, he actually
works 60 hours on average per week. The following man collected a
lot of unpaid overtime while working for a winegrower in Burgenland:
I got 4.50 euro per hour. Ten hours per day, 60 hours per week.
We worked each day except for Sunday. On Sunday, we could
rest. (Male respondent, Poland)
Despite what this interviewee said about having Sundays off, most
farms will not interrupt production flow for all workers on Sundays.
Generally, seasonal workers have one day per week off, but they are
not guaranteed a free weekend.
For those workers who come from countries that are further away, it
is not possible to return on weekends or to see their family during the
six months of employment. Getting holidays, whether that is one or
two weeks off, depends on the good will of the farmer. While some
workers are granted one week of holidays, others remain at their place
of employment non-stop.
Agricultural work as such is assessed to be really hard work. Work
in the field is considered to be exhausting and dirty, particularly for wo-
men. While women at horticultural farms are mostly employed for
cleaning and preparing vegetables to be sold, in their initial phase of
employment, women often have to work the fields as well. Interviewees
very much appreciated the opportunity to shift to other in-house occu-
pations such as the processing of vegetables or cleaning the house, and
considered such moves a sign of occupational mobility. Thus, occupa-
tional mobility within the agricultural sector does not refer to an in-
crease in income or an improvement of the contract, but just to an im-
provement of activities performed. As one interviewee stated, ‘Work
here isn’t hard, except for work in the field’.
There also seems to be a decisive difference between working condi-
tions on large and small farms. The latter is defined as one family em-
ploying one to ten workers. On large farms, occupations are exclusively
piecework or paid per unit produced or action performed: ‘On large
farms, there is always only one kind of work to be done. I only picked
strawberries or radishes’, a Romanian seasonal worker recounted. On
large farms, employers also have much less regard for their workers
and their needs. Their only concern is to keep up the production flow.
The last few years, she was on Farm X. That was a bit, well...
For example, work started at 4 a.m. Or to pick strawberries, she
slept in the field for three hours. Everything was piecework. She
got about six euro for one day. And when she came home, at
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about 10 p.m., she cried and said, ‘No, tomorrow I won’t go
there anymore.’ (Female respondent, Poland, about her sister-in-
law working in Austria during her children’s holidays)
Conversely, small farms help migrants to acquire know-how in agricul-
tural production, as their skills improve every year.
In the beginning I only picked apples, no more. Then I learned
how to trim trees for winter, and this and that. Now I can almost
run a fruit farm – no problem, I can do everything. (Male
respondent, Poland)
Working conditions on small farms are considered to be much more
familial and fair. This is also due to the fact that employers and em-
ployees have to work together very closely. Even the employer works
the field and everyone lives together in one farmhouse, so they must
all get along with each other. Nevertheless, this also raises the degree
of dependency of the labourer on his or her employer.
Whether small or large, farmers provide accommodation for their
employees, as most migrants have no other accommodation in Austria
and could not afford it with the income of seasonal labour alone. Due
to the situation of farms on the border in the east of the country, they
are again an exception to this practice, as many employees return
home each day or have organised private accommodation in Hungary.
For all others, accommodation is organised directly on the farm. For
large farms, this involves mass dwellings with two to four persons
sharing one room and only one toilet or shower per floor, as one Ro-
manian woman reported – this all for a six-month period. Accommoda-
tion is not free: workers must pay between 50 euro and 100 euro per
month – no small price, considering their hourly income of around
four euro.
There you only have very small rooms [about 10-15 m], half as
big as this one. In a group of four, two double beds. And you
have to pay 110 euro per person. You have one bathroom with
three showers and one toilet. About 100 people live there. (Fe-
male respondent, Poland)
At small farms or family businesses, employees sometimes do not have
to pay for accommodation. The lack of a monetary return service blurs
boundaries between duties and help. One is always available and feels
obliged to lend a hand in return. One of our respondents preferred
paying rent to informal arrangements:
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I said like this: ‘I don’t want to live there for free, I want to do
something for it.’ I always did something additional, even when
I worked for him. I couldn’t help it. I feel better, when... Now I
pay my rent and I am left in peace. (Male respondent, Poland)
Seasonal work in agriculture also extends to work in the vegetable pro-
cessing industry. In those cases, most of the workers are settled in Aus-
tria, most are refugees, and they have to cover their cost of living on
their own. This leads to the very low level of payment in seasonal work.
Payment follows the collective bargaining wages for seasonal workers,
currently set at 4.80 euro net hourly income for seasonal labourers,
and a little more than three euro for harvesters. While employers are
always free to pay more than this minimum wage, only few actually do
so. Experience and specific know-how may qualify some workers for a
higher salary.
A Bulgarian seasonal worker recalls a time when he was not yet re-
gistered as a seasonal worker. Firstly, working hours were not at all
regulated, and secondly, only the work that was actually done was com-
pensated.
The same as here: 3.60 euro per hour. I worked from 8 a.m. to
4 p.m. And if there was more work to do, we worked more, up
to eleven hours. And if there was less work, we worked less. On
rainy days we couldn’t work in the field, so for those days we
didn’t earn any money. (Male respondent, Bulgaria)
Nevertheless, being cheated out of payment does not seem to be as fre-
quent as in the construction sector, as one Ukrainian interviewee with
experience in both sectors indicated. In his opinion, the close relation-
ship with the employer and the already very low rate hourly income
prevents employers from cheating in their employees’ wages.
3.8 Domestic services
3.8.1 Domestic services: Sample description
Of the 50 migrants we interviewed, nineteen (seventeen women and
two men) were currently working in private households. The respon-
dents mainly originated from Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic
and four came from Ukraine. Thirteen people had entered Austria
prior to the EU enlargement in 2004 and six persons since May 2004.
The bulk of our domestic workers were in their mid-twenties; seven re-
spondents were 30 or older, three of them in their fifties. The younger
women generally cared for children or worked as housekeepers; male
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and older caregivers generally cared for older people or people with a
disability.
Given the underlying age structure, the marital status of the younger
respondents was single with no children; only one young woman was
married. Three of the migrants aged around 50 had children and were
also married or in one case divorced. Two caregivers lived with their
spouses in Austria.
Concerning the educational level of the six women and men caring
for elderly or handicapped people, two had a high school diploma, an-
other had finished nursing school in Slovakia and had his diploma re-
cognised in Austria and the others had a lower education and no ex-
perience in health care before starting work in Austria. By contrast, all
the young domestic workers had completed high school at least, some
had already gotten a university degree in their home countries and
most were attending university in Austria at the time of the interviews.
As for their residence and work status in Austria, university studies
meant that the young women either, as students, had limited access to
the labour market and a residence permit, or they had entered the
country on an au pair contract. Concerning the domestic workers over
thirty, one had married an Austrian and therefore had also gained ac-
cess to the labour market, while another had a trade licence for a
‘cleaning company’. In some cases, the women and two men also en-
tered Austria on a tourist visa. Of the six caregivers primarily taking
care of elderly or handicapped people, two had full access to the Aus-
trian labour market, while the others worked without any working pa-
pers or registration.
The given age and educational structure in our sample is mainly a
consequence of access to student networks and dormitories; it is not
implicitly representative of the domestic sector. The high proportion of
young, female migrants in childcare also reflects the persisting legal au
pair framework that is directed towards this group of migrants. Wo-
men coming from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland,
who work in domestic services generally have an above-average educa-
tional background, as has been noted elsewhere (Fassmann et al.
2004).
3.8.2 Domestic services: Structural features and specific actors involved
Reasons for irregularity
One of the reasons for employing migrant domestic workers on an ir-
regular basis is low labour costs. Public and private domiciliary health
care services often extend the care recipients’ and their families’ ability
or willingness to pay for care. This is especially true for 24-hour care
provided in private homes. Employing a migrant caregiver on an irre-
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gular basis can resolve the tension between the need for care and the
unaffordability or unavailability of services.
When you think that we [live-in caregivers] earn 50 euro per day,
that’s not much. A regular service provider would take 300 to
500 euro per day for a 24-hour job. But the people, they can’t af-
ford this. (Male respondent, Slovakia)
Other factors include the limited possibilities to employ migrant do-
mestic workers regularly, due to restrictive foreign employment laws.
However, employers can benefit from this situation, as it enables them
to set the working conditions at their discretion.
Due to existing income differentials between Austria and its neigh-
bouring countries, many migrants are willing to work in the informal
sector for far below minimum wage, often having no other employ-
ment options in Austria. Providing care and domestic work in the pri-
vate domain can also ensure the migrant with a sense of security, as
private households are not accessible to the public.
Sector-specific characteristics
It seems to be rather difficult to distinguish between different tasks
performed in paid domestic labour. As Bridget Anderson (2000) sta-
ted, domestic workers do ‘everything’ and ‘classify their employment,
not by type of work done […], but by whether it is live-in or live-out’
(2000: 28). ‘Live-in’ is in general associated with caring for children,
older people or people with a disability. The caregivers work for one
employer and live in their employers’ home. By contrast, live-out do-
mestic workers do not share the same living space with their employ-
ers. ‘Live-out’ can mean working for a single family, but more often it
means working for several employers and is generally more task-orien-
tated.
In this study, it was not always easy to uphold the clear distinction
between live-in and live-out domestic work, because the respondents
were in many cases involved in both types of work. Also, some women
worked as live-out but at the same time lived in apartments their em-
ployers had organised for them or that were owned by them, generally
just five minutes away from their workplace. In these cases, their work-
ing situation was quite similar to that of live-in domestic workers.
Nevertheless, we kept the distinction line between live-in and live-out
domestic work in those cases where we detected obvious differences in
working or living conditions of the workers.
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Specific actors involved
In the domestic sector, recruitment strategies for live-out domestic
workers are exclusively based on informal actors. In the first place, they
include other migrants and Austrians – friends, colleges and family –
many of them already working in this sector. A decisive role is played
by Austrian employers as they recommend their domestic worker to
friends and relatives.
Although these structures play an important role in live-in recruit-
ment as well, formalised actors such as commercial placement agen-
cies play an important role in bringing together families in need of
long-term care and women and men looking for employment in this
sector. Generally, they provide live-in domestic workers such as au pairs
or caregivers for elderly and disabled people.
The au pair agency provides information about duties and rights of
the involved parties and establishes the contact between the family and
the au pair. For their services, the agency is paid a one-time fee by the
host family and, in some cases, also by the migrant caregiver. Although
most au pair agencies support their clients during their stay abroad,
one interviewee from Ukraine complained that she had not received
any help from the agency when she ran into conflicts with her host fa-
mily and wanted to be placed elsewhere.
In the case of domiciliary care, recruitment agencies and associa-
tions play a crucial role in structuring the informal market for care-re-
lated services. Since the beginning of the 1990s, these organisations
(many of them situated in neighbouring countries, others situated in
Austria) have been set up as ‘charitable associations’. They work on a
transnational basis and place live-in care workers from CEE countries
predominantly in Austria and other German-speaking countries. The
rising demand for home care services has not been efficiently satisfied
by public structures, the market, the non-profit sector or family care ar-
rangements. Therefore, these formalised actors, as well as informal
networks organised by the migrants themselves, have stepped in to get
the job done.
The agency or association situated in the neighbouring country re-
cruits locals searching for temporary employment and willing to live
and work in Austria for several weeks at a time, in general for a period
of two weeks. The association based in Austria recruits migrant care-
givers, mainly in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and finds them a
job in an Austrian household. In general, the caregivers are on call 24
hours a day and reside in the same house as their elderly employer.
After a fourteen-day ‘shift’, they can return home as they are replaced
by another caregiver (in many cases someone from the same country
of origin) during their two weeks ‘off’.
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Regional differences exist between the eastern part of Austria and
Tyrol. A longer travel distance between the country of origin and the
workplace in Austria, as in the case of Tyrol, has prolonged the work-
ing stay up to as much as three months in a row, as one migrant from
Slovakia reported.
This organisational pattern has several advantages: first, before EU
enlargement in May 2004, the system secured the migrant care worker
a legal residence status in Austria according to the visa regulations for
tourists; second, the care workers have the opportunity to relax after a
physically and emotionally draining work shift and take care of their
own family; third, to circumvent employment laws, the agencies de-
fined the migrant workers as ‘guests’ performing charitable activities
and not work, and therefore they only receive pocket money.
In contrast to the au pair agencies, these commercial actors always
charge both the care workers as well as their employers for their ser-
vices, either on a regular annual or monthly basis. Both clients pay a
substantial fee regardless of how long a given care relationship lasts.
In one of the most prominent agencies, the annual mediation fees for
the host families range from 1,100 euro in Austria to 1,300 euro in
Switzerland. The migrant care workers pay a smaller amount, approxi-
mately 667 euro per year (Leibetseder 2004).
In some agencies, a contract for long-term care is signed between
the agency and the family in need, defining further rights and duties
between the two parties, e.g. the right of the family to substitute a care-
giver in case of dissatisfaction. But the care workers themselves do not
enter into a contract with the host family or the agency, and they must
rely exclusively on oral arrangements. Some migrants reported that
language tests and work experience had been requested upon applica-
tion, although this is handled very differently by the various placement
agencies. Some also organise the transportation for the caregivers, but
even here no general statements can be made.
In the case of providing care to older people or people with a disabil-
ity, not only placement agencies play a decisive role, but certain gate-
keepers might also pave the way to potential employers. They can con-
sist of doctors, medical staff or nurses working in the health care sector
(hospitals or professional home care services). These professionals
working in the formal labour market come into contact with caregivers
working irregularly in a private household during their daily routine,
for example, when taking care of a patient at home. Under these cir-
cumstances, they do not only get to know the caregiver working irregu-
larly, but they get the chance to evaluate job performance and ask for
contact details. At the same time, the gatekeepers are connected to po-
tential people in need of long-term care. Sometimes they mediate a
care relationship between the caregiver and the care recipient. Such
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gatekeepers play an important role in distributing information and
connecting potential caregivers and care recipients (Gendera 2007;
Schmid & Prochazkova 2004: 18f).
Although none of the respondents in our sample organised jobs in
elderly care for other colleagues in return for money, but rather on the
basis of reciprocity and trust, mediators, as they are known in the con-
struction sector, also exist in domestic services. But here the monetary
return is paid once only on a lump-sum basis (e.g. 400 euro for a
long-term care-giving job that, depending on the health of the patient,
might last for several years). In contrast to the construction sector, the
recruitment of the care workers takes place on a transnational level.
The mediator does not simply offer a job to the care worker but also as-
sumes some responsibility, providing substantial information on how
the job should be done, negotiating the salary and other benefits, such
as a private bedroom for the caregiver or mediating in conflict situa-
tions (Gendera 2007).
3.8.3 Domestic services: Recruitment structures
Agencies play a major role in providing migrants with initial access to
live-in employment opportunities, especially when the migrant does
not have any references from family, friends or former employers.
Most of the interviewed women who entered the country as au pairs
had used an agency the first time they were looking for employment
abroad. The au pair agency is not only helpful in finding a host family,
but it offers migrants a certain amount of security: working and living
conditions are determined in advance, and the arrangement includes
legal working and residence status in the host country. Because of the
regular status it offers, au pair migration is especially interesting for fe-
male third-country nationals. In our study, several au pairs came from
Ukraine. Besides through obtaining a student visa, au pair migration is
one of the few possibilities for non-EU citizens to enter the country leg-
ally. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of registered au
pairs in Austria are Ukrainian women (Gendera & Haidinger 2007).
The job-seeking strategies our au pairs implemented after their au
pair contracts had ended differed considerably depending on future
plans and further job opportunities. For some, the next stage was to
contact the agency once again and migrate to another German-speak-
ing country.
Because I already spoke German, I thought it might not be so
bad to try Austria. So I went to the au pair agency again and I
paid them 4,500 Czech crowns (approximately 150 euro). Three
months later, the agency informed me that they had finally found
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me a family who would contact me as soon as possible. And so
they did. The agency already told me that as an au pair, I’m not
supposed to work more than 25 hours a week plus twice babysit-
ting in the evening, that all for 60 euro. (Female respondent,
24, Czech Republic)
Four interviewees, two of whom came from Ukraine, had been work-
ing as au pairs in Germany prior to coming to Austria. By entering
Austria on an au pair visa, they gained residence and working rights
for another year. The women who migrated directly to Austria had
either visited the country before on a tourist visa, they had family and/
or friends whom they could rely on or they had completed or started a
university degree in German language. Whether the women entered
the country as tourists and relied on informal contacts or whether they
arrived with the help of formalised actors (an agency), informal actors
played an increasingly important role in the second phase of their mi-
gratory project. As in other sectors, enlarging their social network helps
migrants gain access to information and improve their chances of find-
ing a better job. With the exception of one case, further work opportu-
nities in domestic services had all developed through personal contacts
the women had met in their language course, in a public parks or
through already established contacts via family and friends. Several of
the young women working as live-in help switched to live-out work as
soon as they had the opportunity to do so.
When the au pair contract ended, I found a new job by chance.
In the beginning, my host mother offered for me to stay with
them and I agreed. But I wasn’t satisfied with that solution be-
cause I wanted to study at university, and how was I supposed
to study with two crying babies? But then I got lucky, because a
Polish friend I’d met on the playground was pregnant and I
could take over her jobs. And this was a great opportunity for
me. She passed on three families to me and all I had to do was
baby-sit for seven or eight euro per hour. (Female respondent,
23, Ukraine)
Some women also tried to find work – whether this was live-in or live-
out work – through ads in newspapers, notice boards in supermarkets
or via the Internet. Either they posted ads themselves or they called po-
tential employers. Although this recruitment strategy works in some
cases, several women mentioned sexual harassment when they posted
their phone number. They said that they were very cautious when they
took a job in this manner because no one they knew had recom-
mended the employer to them. Nevertheless, one young Hungarian
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woman who found a job posted in the newspaper stated to have
worked with the ‘best employer’ ever.
In the case of elderly care – generally live-in work – we detected the
same recruitment pattern as in childcare: commercial agencies are only
important in the beginning of the migratory project when the care-
givers have no further references in the country of destination.
I was searching for work on the Internet and I found the phone
number of the agency organising 24-hour care services in pri-
vate households. There are a lot of these agencies – I know of
about five in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. They are orga-
nised a bit like Caritas, but I don’t know if it’s legal. [...] I think
it’s somewhere in between – neither black nor white work
[neither illegal nor legal work]. (Male respondent, 35, Slovakia)
In fact, only two of our six respondents who worked with elderly or dis-
abled people made use of an agency, while the others either contacted
friends and family in Austria or were recruited by them transnationally
for a specific job. In the second phase of the migratory project of the
live-in caregivers working with the elderly, informal and personal con-
tacts dominate the recruitment strategy as well.
You only need the agency in the beginning. They serve as a kind
of ‘promotion ladder’. Once you’ve got the contacts here, the
agency is useless. (Male respondent, 35, Slovakia)
Generally, caregivers prefer to work without any formalised actor
(agency), in the first place because the migrants can save the annual
mediation fee. At the same time, it implies that the migrants’ informal
contacts and networks are extensive, including as many potential Aus-
trian employers, fellow migrants working in the informal sector and
gatekeepers (such as medical staff) as possible. The agency is a good
way to enter the informal market (to get a ‘foot in the door’, as intervie-
wees put it), but it can only provide live-in work. For the migrants, this
means that problems with employment and housing are solved at the
same time. Live-out jobs seem to be more difficult to find especially in
the beginning, although those who want to stay in Austria longer pre-
fer those arrangements. A female respondent from Ukraine worked as
a live-in caregiver for two families in a small village in Lower Austria.
She felt socially isolated there and finally decided to quit her job and
find live-out work in a major city. But not everything turned out to be
as easy as she had imagined in the beginning.
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That small village, it was quite boring there and I had to work a
lot as well. So I thought, why not go to Vienna – you can live a
good life there, you earn a lot when you are paid by the hour,
you really have good income possibilities there. But at that time,
I didn’t know about all the problems you have to cope with: you
have to find a place to stay and you also have to find work…and
that is not always an easy thing to do even if your friends help
you. […] So after my first jobs, I wasn’t so optimistic anymore.
(Female respondent, Ukraine)
The difficulty concerning live-out domestic work is to find several em-
ployers. Those working on an hourly basis need many households to
make a living. It seems that the longer the women work in the live-out
domestic sector, the easier it becomes for them to find new employers
due to their already developed informal networks.
Austrian employers play a central role in recruitment, whether
searching for live-in or live-out domestic work. These informal actors
are most likely in contact with other Austrian families searching for a
caregiver or domestic worker. Often they recommend the migrant
worker to friends or family, or ask their domestic worker to find some-
one ‘trustworthy’ for those dear to them. This mechanism is also con-
nected to the characteristic of domestic work, which takes place in the
private sphere. At first it takes some time to gain the trust of the em-
ployers, but as soon as they trust the worker and are satisfied with the
work performed, they act as informal ‘job agents’.
I also found work for my father. A friend of my current employ-
er – also a disabled man – was looking for a caregiver. And then
my employer asked me if I knew anyone who could do the job
and I recommended my father. (Male respondent, Slovakia)
This kind of ‘direct hire’ works very efficiently. Potential employers pre-
fer to hire caregivers formerly employed by their friends or relatives or
recommended by them instead of contacting an agency and paying a
high mediation fee for this service.
3.8.4 Domestic services: Forms of irregularity and working conditions
Forms of irregularity
Although the au pairs in many cases had a contract in their first year
that limits them to a maximum of 25 hours per week, and one woman
providing elderly care had a part-time contract as well, live-in caregivers
generally work much more than officially laid down in their arrange-
ment.
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Besides working more hours in spite of a limited live-in contract, a
major irregularity in the private sector is the complete lack of registra-
tion. After the au pair contract had expired, none of the interviewed
women had working papers, although most of them had a work permit
as students.
A comparable situation can be observed in the case of caring for the
elderly and the sick. With the exception of one Polish woman, none of
the respondents had an official work permit or were registered at an
Austrian social insurance agency. A Polish female caregiver with a
work permit had a part-time contract. Her employers registered her in
the social security system for only 25 hours per week, although she
was on duty 24 hours a day. A further irregularity concerned her un-
employment insurance. She had assumed that her working contract in-
cluded social insurance (pension and health) as well as unemployment
insurance. But after caring for an elderly woman for a period of ten
years, she discovered that her employers had not paid the unemploy-
ment insurance for her. When the elderly woman died, the caregiver
became unemployed and decided to leave for Poland. After several
years, once she had used up all her savings, she returned and searched
for work in domestic services again. Although her work permit was
still valid, she did not search for work in the official labour market ser-
vice due to her poor language skills.
In another case, that of a male nurse from Slovakia who had his di-
ploma approved in Austria and started a career in home care, the care-
giver continued to take care of his elderly landlady on an irregular ba-
sis, while also working for an official home care service. This man was
the second respondent caring for an elderly or disabled person who
had full access to the formal labour market and still worked part-time
on an irregular basis.
Of those women working in the live-out domestic sector, none of
them were registered at their workplace as a domestic worker or a
childcaregiver. Only one Polish woman had found a way to ‘semi-lega-
lise’ her working status by registering a trade licence for a ‘cleaning
company’ shortly after the 2004 EU enlargement. Although her work-
ing situation did not change substantially, her self-employment allowed
her and her husband access to social security. Because the woman had
a trade licence, she could also accept cleaning jobs from offices or com-
panies who needed an invoice. Although her duties did not change at
all, she acted as an official company at least towards some of her cli-
ents.
The completely or semi-irregular working situation of most inter-
viewed women and some men working in domestic services included
all kinds of insecurities: no protection in case of unemployment, sick-
ness, violation of workers’ rights, problems with payment, no paid holi-
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day leave and, most notably, no fixed working hours, breaks or defined
duties.
3.8.5 Live-in domestic work: Working hours and employer-employee
relationship
Different kinds of live-in domestic work – whether caring for children
or for older people and people with a disability– are subject to similar
mechanisms. Because the women and men work where they live, their
working hours and duties are not clearly defined and tasks in a house-
hold can be endless. The tasks the domestic workers performed ranged
from preparing the meals, doing the shopping, personal hygiene, chan-
ging nappies, playing with the children or entertaining the elderly,
cleaning the house, doing the laundry, bringing the kids to school or
taking the sick to the doctor – just to mention some of the most impor-
tant. But the list of duties also included medical care and rehabilitation
in the case of elderly care-giving (irrespective of the professional quali-
fications of the caregivers), gardening or accompanying the family on
holidays (especially for au pairs). Live-in domestic work in many cases
means being on call even at night. When the care recipient suffered a
major illness or the children cried, the caregivers had to look after
them regularly at night and calm them or dispense medication. One
interviewee working with an Alzheimer’s patient could hardly sleep for
several months because her employer screamed at night. In such cases,
she got up in the middle of the night and tried to calm the elderly wo-
man.
The main problem live-in domestic workers are confronted with is
the disregard for basic workers’ rights. Although some have a contract
limiting working hours to 25 per week, all live-in caregivers com-
plained about having to work much longer than what they had ar-
ranged for in the beginning. Sharing their living space with the care re-
cipients and in many cases also the employers (family members)
makes it virtually impossible to maintain a clear time framework, as
one woman highlights in the following statement:
So the parents know very well that they can ask me for help any-
time, since I am at home anyway. That means that even when I
have fixed working hours, I think I always work a bit more.
(Female respondent, 24, Czech Republic)
Furthermore, it is even more difficult to explain to children why one is
‘available’ (at work) in the afternoon but not in the evenings or on
weekends:
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Also, what sometimes disturbs me is that when I am ‘off’ but
want to stay in the house, the boys sometimes come to my room
and want something from me, and of course I can’t just tell them
to get out. They don’t understand it really that I am there to
‘work’ with them, if you know what I mean. (Female respondent,
22, Czech Republic)
The lack of control over working hours and leisure time has further
consequences. In some cases, the domestic workers felt restricted to
the employer’s household because they didn’t know when they were
supposed to ‘work’ and when they were ‘free’ to leave the house – and
in a household, there is always work to be done. Being available at both
the beginning and the end of the day can lead to exploitation and a lack
of self-determination. For these reasons, it was difficult for the follow-
ing respondent to organise her time or even find an extra job in the
live-out sector:
I wouldn’t mind finding an extra job, maybe in cleaning or baby-
sitting for another family. But as I said, I can’t because I don’t have
fixed working hours. (Female respondent, 24 Czech Republic)
Usually the live-ins had some free time in the afternoon,when the fa-
mily members took care of the elderly person, or even a full day off on
the weekends, as in the case of most au pairs. But the live-in situation
also means that this arrangement can be changed anytime, for exam-
ple, when the employer has some additional work to do. In situations
where the elderly person is mentally ill and cannot be left alone for
even an hour, the caregiver has to stay at work all day long. In the case
of one Ukraine au pair, after some time, her employer complained
about her going out on weekends and wanted her to stay at home even
on her days ‘off’.
Several months before my contract was supposed to end, we ar-
gued about my going out on weekends. But the weekend is
meant for going out, meeting friends or travelling, isn’t it?
When you do this type of work, you need a private life as well.
But she told me, ‘No, it’s not okay for you to go out on week-
ends. I like the way you perform your tasks and take care of the
children. I want you to stay with us, but I don’t want you to go
out every weekend.’ But staying at home on the weekends for
me means work, nothing but work. (Female respondent, 25,
Ukraine)
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Conflicts between employers and employees were rarely carried out as
openly as in this case. Disputes arose about different attitudes of per-
forming housework tasks or disciplining the children. In general, the
domestic workers did not complain about substantial problems like
their working conditions or low payment. This situation can be de-
scribed as the ‘part-of-the-family’ dilemma. In domestic services –
whether this is live-in or live-out work – the employer-employee rela-
tionship is characterised by a strong personal relationship that is
shaped by power and friendship at the same time. The relationship be-
tween employer and domestic worker is never exclusively governed by
the intimate setting and friendship or by civic relations – it is always a
mix of both. As Bridget Anderson stated, the division of society in two
separate spheres, a private and a public, is the ground where
the employer consolidates much of her power: the worker may
be treated as ‘part of the family’ (governed by customary rela-
tions) when it is a matter of hours and flexibility, and as a work-
er (governed by civic relations) if she becomes too sick to work.
(2000: 4f)
The dependency of the worker on the employer’s goodwill – especially
in those cases where the migrants have an undocumented or insecure
residence status – and the complex relationship between the employer
and the domestic worker can help to explain why another young wo-
man never addressed her dissatisfaction about her poor income. When
she was asked in the interview why she had never spoken about her
problems to her employers, she explained with the following:
No, I never dared to talk about money and such. I don’t know
why...I feared that talking about money always changes the rela-
tionship between people, and I didn’t want our relationship to
change. We really had a very good relationship. I didn’t want
anything to change just because of a couple of euros. But if I
were to work as an au pair in the future, I would set up clear
rules. And if the family didn’t live by them, then I would say,
‘Sorry, but not this isn’t okay.’ (Female respondent, 23, Ukraine)
Although this woman had a very good relationship with her employer,
she feared addressing sensitive issues such as payment and working
conditions. A general characteristic of domestic work is that the em-
ployer-employee relationship is not recognised as such but is defined
in terms of personal friendship. Therefore, it is obvious why this au
pair had to ‘protect’ her ‘good relationship’ with her employer: a change
in the attitude towards the domestic worker might lead to a deteriora-
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tion of her working conditions and, in the worst case, even the loss of
her job. Another feature of domestic work is that many caregivers
speak of their work as being ‘part of the family’. But feeling like part of
the family can obscure the asymmetrical work situation that is gov-
erned by the migrants’ dependence on the employers’ goodwill and
their lack of rights.
I always worked a bit more. […] But I didn’t mind it so much, be-
cause they were always very kind to me and I really like their
children. (Female respondent, 24, Czech Republic)
This tension between the affective relations of the private and the nor-
mative relations of employment is a structural aspect of domestic work
in general, although it seems to be more prominent in live-in working
arrangements. Although the ‘being part of the family’ rhetoric obscures
the unequal power relations between employers and migrant workers,
it also has an impact on the migrants’ overall work satisfaction.
Building up a complex and emotional relationship or even feeling
‘love’ for the care recipients is a reality for this type of work. A 48-year-
old woman from Poland who had spent more than ten years caring for
an older and disabled woman expressed her deep attachment to her
employer. She wanted to stay with her ‘until the end’, although in the
meantime she had received working papers and could have searched
for a less demanding and better paid job elsewhere. The same reason –
feeling emotionally bound up – was mentioned by another caregiver. A
central feature of caring work is bringing feelings and subjectivity into
the caring relationship. In this sense, it is understandable why this
caregiver preferred to stay with ‘her’ care recipient instead of searching
for a live-out job or employment in the formal labour market.
A further aspect of live-in domestic work is social isolation. Working
in the house in the case of elderly care, often ‘around the clock’, makes
it difficult to socialise with people outside the household. At the same
time, the lack of privacy and not being able to invite friends over or
working in isolated, rural areas means restricted social contacts.
I don’t have many friends here, either. The family lives in a big
house in a village near Vienna, and I didn’t have the opportunity
to meet anyone. (Female respondent, 24, Czech Republic)
Although several aspects of live-in and live-out domestic work are simi-
lar, there are also important differences, as will be shown in the next
section.
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3.8.6 Live-out domestic work: Switching between sectors
As has been mentioned before, live-in domestic work is generally fol-
lowed by live-out domestic work (Anderson 2000). In our sample, after
their first live-in experience, several (five) live-ins found a live-out ar-
rangement. They were either working full-time (up to 45 hours per
week) for a single employing family or for several employers at the
same time. The domestic workers prefer this work situation in the first
place because they have their own living space. In this way, they get
not only more privacy, but more control over their working hours and
generally have a higher monthly income. In the case of the following
respondent however, although she had been working in a live-out ar-
rangement for four years, she had to be available in the evenings as
well.
Now that I have finished my education, I also work there in the
mornings. This family found me an apartment close to where
they live. I only pay 170 euro per month for the rent and a bit
more for heating. But she can call me anytime in the evenings,
if she wants to go meet some friends in town, then I take care
of the kids.’ (Female respondent, 28, Poland)
Therefore, having one’s own apartment does not always mean clear
working hours. Instead, it seems that live-out domestic workers who
reside close to their employers or in an apartment their employers own
are confronted with the same problems facing live-ins – such as no
clear working hours and no defined tasks.
In contrast to the situation described above, working as a live-out
generally means working for several employers on an hourly basis and
is more task-oriented. Sometimes, the migrant workers are hired exclu-
sively to clean the windows or to do the laundry, but in most cases they
clean the whole house in a limited timeframe. Working for several em-
ployers implies not only great flexibility, but requires organisational
and coordinative management capabilities.
I work every day from Mondays to Fridays in the mornings three
to four hours and in the afternoon three or four hours as well.
Sometimes, I also clean on the weekends, or I do some babysit-
ting when they call me. In total I work for five families, and in
each family I’m there once a week. Then there’s also this elderly
woman I go to only once a month. Sometimes I get extra work
when my employers give a party and they need someone to help
them out. […] Generally I only clean, and sometimes I baby-sit
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as well. But most of the time I only do cleaning work. (Female
respondent, Belarus)
Although at first glance live-out work would appear to give the domes-
tic workers more freedom, some women also described physical stress
and pain arising from their working conditions.
Every week I worked for the same families. So every day I was
in a different household. I had to travel back and forth. [...] This
situation was really quite stressful for me. [...] And from all this
cleaning – washing the floors, you always have to bend down
and your hands are always wet – I got problems with my joints.
I went to the doctor in Poland and he told me not to work with
lots of water anymore, but how was I supposed to avoid this as a
cleaning lady? (Female respondent, 45, Poland)
A characteristic feature of live-out domestic work is the high flexibility
of the employees switching between different kinds of employers on
the one side and between the private and the public spheres on the
other. None of the women worked exclusively in private households,
but they all cleaned in restaurants, offices, bars, medical centres, phar-
macies or hotels – wherever they found additional work. In the case of
one Ukrainian woman, cleaning in the public sector did influence her
working conditions for the worse. Although she had two families for
whom she managed the household a couple of hours per week, she
searched for additional income sources. During the summer, she found
a hotel that was in search for additional staff.
Sometimes a hotel would only hire you for a trial period. They
would tell you to come and work for two days and in the end
they told you, ‘Oh sorry, we don’t need you, we can’t hire you,
you don’t work fast enough,’ or something like that. And once I
even signed a piece of paper, without knowing what it meant,
stating that I would work for a trial period of two days without
payment. […] I think there are lots of hotels or bars that play
tricks like that, only to exploit you. (Female respondent, 28,
Ukraine)
In this case, providing cleaning services in the public sphere was differ-
ent from working in private households. It seems that the strongly per-
sonal and intimate employer-employee relationship that dominates the
domestic sector does not only influence the working conditions – ex-
tension of working hours, no fixed duties – but in some cases prevents
the employers from cheating the workers. In the private sphere, exploi-
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tation remains a more subtle phenomenon, although severe mistreat-
ment and even sexual abuse can also be an element of domestic work
(Anderson 2000).
The respondents working in the live-out domestic sector did not only
work in cleaning or as caregivers, but they were all engaged in other
types of activities and in totally different sectors as well. Domestic work
was only one part of their professional career in the informal sector.
The other jobs they performed ranged from leather manufacturing,
shop assistance, tutoring, harvesting and in many cases jobs in cater-
ing and tourism.
3.8.7 Gender-specific problems
Especially interesting in this context is to compare the gender relevance
of the different sectors such as catering and tourism and domestic ser-
vices. Although one might assume that working in the private, invisible
sphere makes young, female domestic workers more vulnerable to sex-
ual harassment, the experiences of a young Ukrainian woman paint a
totally different picture. She had worked in many different restaurants
and bars as a waitress and expressed great discomfort about the work-
ing conditions for several reasons.
I also worked in a Turkish bar. [...] But this job didn’t work for
me at all, I had no experience. When you want to work in a bar,
you have to be the kind of person who likes to joke around with
the customers and talk to them, and most of them are men,
And every day you have to do the accounting, which is quite
complicated as well. [...] I worked there only one week and my
boss told me that customers had complained about me, that I
wasn’t nice to them. When the customers are men, there is al-
ways some kind of sexual harassment – they don’t respect you as
a woman. With the boss, it was the same thing. I also had pro-
blems with payment, because he didn’t want to pay me in the
end. (Female respondent, 28, Ukraine)
After her unpleasant experiences in the catering and tourism sector,
this woman was very pleased to find work in domestic services.
So I left this bar. I was already fed up with this type of work in
bars and restaurants, and then finally I found a family on the in-
ternet looking for a child caregiver. They paid six euro per hour
and I was very happy with them. (Female respondent, 28,
Ukraine)
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But problems with sexual harassment can arise even in domestic ser-
vices. A 30-year-old Polish woman developed a strategy so as not to
attract the attention of her male employer. To avoid giving any false sig-
nals, she dressed in old clothes and refrained from putting on any
makeup.
3.8.8 Payment and qualification
In comparison to the construction sector, where cheating in payment
is a major problem, this issue plays only a minor role in domestic ser-
vices. The close and often familiar atmosphere among employers and
the migrant domestic worker would seem to exert a positive influence.
As long as the employers are satisfied with the work performed, the ar-
ranged payment is not a problem. (That said, in two cases women re-
ported that they had to constantly remind their employers to pay them
their weekly pocket money, a situation they perceived as very unplea-
sant.) In another case the worker was asked to help out on the week-
ends and was promised extra pay for working during her time ‘off’.
But this extra money was never paid, and she never dared to address
this sensitive issue. Bargaining for a higher salary is also seen as rather
problematic. Only one of the interviewees mentioned that her employ-
ers had proposed a higher salary to her. The others had to start the bar-
gaining process by themselves or they did not address the issue at all,
in fear of ruining the ‘good relations’ with the employer.
In general, the au pairs earned 360 euro per month and worked 30
to 45 hours per week (which amounts to approximately two euro or
three euro per hour). This extremely low income was complemented
by additional services and bonuses: room and board, birthday presents
and other small gifts. Some au pairs were offered a private apartment
by their employers, and in two cases this was part of the payment; in
one case, the woman paid 170 euro for her flat that was just around
the corner from her employer’s home. In this way, her landlady could
easily call her in the evenings when she needed her to take care of the
children. The highest income was received by a Hungarian woman:
she received 700 euro plus a private apartment that the family owned,
and her employers also financed her studies in Austria (377 euro tui-
tion fee per term).
The live-in domestic workers taking care of elderly and sick people
had an income between 30-50 euro per day, although one male nurse
mentioned that when he started out, his daily income was only fifteen
euro. These live-in caregivers also had free room and board (generally
a separate room). In the cases where the migrants travelled back and
forth between their country of origin and Austria every two or three
weeks, the employers also paid the travel expenses:
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When I go back home, I take a ‘taxi’. There are always several
women working in the same region or town, and there is a com-
pany that organises this shuttle service for us. The 160 euro
travel costs are paid by the family. (Female respondent, 50,
Slovakia)
The moment the domestic workers switched to live-out arrangements
and worked on an hourly basis for several employers, they earned a
higher salary – on average seven to nine euro per hour. And it was only
in live-out jobs where the duties were clearly defined and restricted to
specific tasks, such as only taking care of the children. Specific tasks
are also valued differently, usually eight to nine euro for cleaning and
five to six euro for babysitting. In rare cases, the women also had their
public transportation paid for.
Although our sample included two men who were employed to take
care of elderly and disabled people, it is women who do most of the do-
mestic and caring work. The major qualification needed for this type of
work is connected to gender – being a woman is considered a suffi-
cient criterion to do the housework, care for children, the elderly and
the sick, even in those cases where intensive medical care is needed.
Only one of the six respondents in elderly care had a medical educa-
tion, while none of the others had experience in care-giving before
their first job in Austria. Another decisive criterion seems to be age.
Whereas young women prefer to take care of children, caregivers, aged
between 30 and 60, care for elderly and disabled people. This fact was
confirmed by an employer who complained about younger caregivers.
Before this [50-year-old] woman, we had other caregivers working
for us but I was not pleased with them. Especially the young
women. For those women, care-giving is ‘just a job’ and in the eve-
ning, the only thing they think of is going out. But she really is dif-
ferent – she takes care of my mother 100 percent, and she always
stays in the house. (Austrian employer of female respondent)
3.9 Sector-specific conclusions
3.9.1 Construction
Construction is a very labour intensive sector that is characterised by
international competition and a growing participation of international
players. Projects are granted to those who can do the work for the ‘best
price’, not only on the level of the principal company, but also on the
subsequent levels of subcontractors and sub-subcontractors hired to
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carry out portions of the work. This non-transparent structure of carry-
ing out work as well as the ‘need’ for cheap labour results in a consid-
erable number of construction workers who are employed irregularly.
Still, there are also many private persons who employ migrants irregu-
larly to perform construction activities in their houses, restaurants, gar-
dens, etc.
Those two different spheres have resulted in the appearance of dif-
ferent actors and types of irregular employment. The system of public
projects involves a long chain of employers, ranging from the initial
principal to the labourer who does the job. Irregularly employed mi-
grants can be found on all of those levels, either as ‘ordinary’ employ-
ees working for a company, as ‘mediators’ who look for workers on be-
half of their own employers or by directly contacting clients and acting
as employers themselves. They are either not registered at all, regis-
tered insufficiently or are in possession of a fake trade licence.
Equipping employees with a trade licence seems to be a common
practice, especially for those who are involved in public projects, in or-
der to produce the appearance of legality. As reported for other sectors,
but especially for catering and tourism and in domestic services, also
the construction sector involves ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ activities irre-
spective of whether carried out in public or informal projects. ‘As soon
as there is a door installed’, we also find that fully unregistered workers
are employed, as the risk of worksite inspections is lower in such
‘closed locations’. The same can generally be stated for work on behalf
of private employers. Conversely, the need to employ migrants at least
semi-legally is higher on open construction sites and when working for
bigger companies. Hence, in these areas there has been a shift from
non-registration to pseudo-forms of self-employment.
Migrants doing informal jobs for private employers are not involved
in a chain from principal to worker, but have to get into contact with
their employers directly. They also have to organise their jobs for them-
selves again and again. For them, registering a trade licence often
seems to be unprofitable, as their own labour costs would increase as a
result.
Common to migrants hired irregularly for both public and private
projects is that they only have a ‘word of mouth’ contract with their em-
ployers. This does not give them any guarantee of keeping their job,
nor does it enforce compliance with agreed upon working conditions.
While people working ‘on their own’ are more autonomous with re-
spect to working hours and less dependent on an employer in regard
to payment, they constantly have to invest in their social networks to
sustain a profitable amount of work.
On the other hand, those who work irregularly for an employer or
mediator face different risks, the most important of which is not being
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paid. Often, there is no direct or close link between the employer who
pays and the employee who receives the money.
To get a job in the irregular construction sector, migrants generally
do not need to have a good knowledge of the German language or cer-
tificates of professional skills. ‘You can always find something’, as one
Polish worker indicated. To make a career within the construction sec-
tor, however, versatility improves the negotiation position of employees,
while working arrangements for the most part remain unregistered.
Language skills become a key to getting better positions as well as to
changing to regular employment – in other words, getting a formal
contract. In order to achieve this, contacts to employers, especially Aus-
trian ones, are an essential resource for the migrant’s career.
In sum, the construction sector offers possibilities for an occupa-
tional career within irregularity (becoming a specialist and thus being
better paid, becoming a translator and thus not having to do much
manual labour, becoming a mediator and retaining fees for mediation,
etc.) and, even if very restricted, outside of irregularity as well (working
as a ‘real’ self-employed person, offering services as a foreign entrepre-
neur). Nevertheless, even the latter only very rarely implies working
with formal contracts.
In contrast to other sectors, employment in the construction sector
does not allow for parallel activities alongside work (such as education
or training) or supplemental work in other sectors. On the other hand,
construction work is often used as a supplementary source of income
when the migrants’ main activities are in another sector, as it was re-
ported by agricultural seasonal workers. Besides, changes from one
sector to another are only taken into consideration when somebody
wants to get a regular job.
While all of the respondents intended to work irregularly only for a
limited period of time (see Section 10.3 on irregular employment as a
‘temporary project’), the biographies of migrants also show that one
can easily get stuck in irregular employment. The national legal frame-
work restricting access to the labour market for most non-nationals is
primarily responsible for the lacking career perspectives. Limited ac-
cess to the labour market in the course of transitional regulations facili-
tates and enforces irregular employment, as EU-8 citizens currently
have the right to settle and to look for work in Austria but at the same
time have no free access to the labour market. The increase in pseudo-
forms of self-employment is also a result of making use of EU regula-
tions to circumvent national regulations. As these emerging forms of
pseudo-regularity are very profitable for employers, they are likely to re-
inforce irregular employment structures even after the end of transi-
tional regulations and will influence the irregular status of migrants in
the long run.
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3.9.2 Catering and tourism
As in other sectors, employers in catering and tourism can draw on
certain ‘traditions’ when employing irregularly. Especially with regard
to the immigrant workforce, insufficient registration or registration of
workers below the social security threshold can occur in all employ-
ment arrangements permitted under Foreign Employment Law: em-
ployment according to the general working regulations, seasonal work
arrangements and student employment based on the specific work reg-
ulations for students from non-EU countries.
Besides the enormous number of potential small- and medium-sized
workplaces, the major characteristic of the sector (with the exception of
seasonal work arrangements) is that working in restaurants or bars is
easily compatible with other jobs or other obligations and interests, as
was demonstrated in our sample (e.g. studying). Working hours are
usually flexible and organised in shifts with a tendency towards night
work, which makes it easier for employees to adjust other obligations
and interests to their working schedule. Salaries or at least tips are of-
ten paid in cash after the respective shifts.
This explains why some employees can cope easily with arrange-
ments of non-registration or registration below the social security
threshold, as they may be registered with another employer, either
within catering or in another sector. Therefore, working in a restaurant
or bar for many people is a typical side job. This is specifically true for
national as well as non-national students who, according to the specific
work legislation, should devote themselves to studying rather than
working in the margins of the law in order to earn a living. Many pre-
fer to work unregistered so as to prevent the potential loss of their resi-
dence permit.
While some people – especially those who are young and single – ap-
preciate this situation, others characterise the branch as a burden. This
latter group includes people who cannot rely on a primary job or those
with no other obligations. In order to make a living in catering and
tourism, workers need to manage several jobs at the same time. Espe-
cially those with familial responsibilities face problems, whether their
families are in their country of origin or in Austria. Coping with the re-
quirements of high flexibility was especially difficult for those who
wanted to lead a family life. In our sample, this was specifically high-
lighted by mothers with younger children.
Another characteristic of catering and tourism is the division into
‘invisible’ jobs such as kitchen staff and chambermaids and ‘visible’
jobs such as waiters and waitresses, receptionists, etc. The more visible
jobs were described as jobs where persons are at least registered as stu-
dents or otherwise as workers under the social security threshold,
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where a certain appearance and German language skills are required,
and which are therefore usually reserved for Austrian citizens. For the
invisible jobs, all of this was secondary.
Another aspect highlighted by respondents was the fact that this
structure also has consequences for worksite controls, especially con-
cerning the more ‘visible’ jobs. Employees can always be presented as
being employed on a trial basis and therefore not fully registered yet,
or as being part-time workers yet in reality working full-time.
Moving up in the branch may be the promotion from an ‘invisible’
job to a ‘visible’ job, provided that any kind of registration is legally
possible or envisaged by the employer. After all, good conduct and a
close relationship with the employer also help in keeping the job, or
ensuring that one day, if the status is regularised, one could also come
back. Otherwise, working in catering and tourism was assessed as a
good opportunity to acquire skills that could be useful in possible fu-
ture work arrangements in Austria or in another country.
In cases where workers were employed in one hotel or restaurant
only (as in seasonal work arrangements, for example), the high flexibil-
ity was mirrored by the fact that staff should take over several occupa-
tions within the business and act as ‘jacks of all trades’. As accommo-
dation is usually provided on the worksite in such arrangements, work-
ers are always onsite and therefore run the risk of working much more
than actually agreed.
Finally, the temporary nature of the sector, the high flexibility de-
manded and the different type of payment arrangements (on a daily or
an hourly basis) provide fertile ground for defrauding employees on
their agreed compensation.
3.9.3 Agriculture
In Austria, it is mainly small-scale producers who shape the domestic
agricultural sector and who try to compete with others across the EU.
In order to stay competitive, the seasonal employment model was in-
troduced by Austrian politicians to provide flexible and cheap labour to
a sector characterised by unsteady working hours, hard working condi-
tions and the need for intensive labour input.
The statements of our expert and migrant respondents indicate that
the complete non-registration of workers in this sector has diminished
in recent years. Irregular employment is now mainly associated with
the system of seasonal employment that facilitates irregularities con-
cerning working hours, working between seasons and other violations
of workers’ rights.
Temporarily restricted work permits are the most striking feature of
seasonal employment.,They make seasonal work attractive to commu-
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ters, students, mothers, fathers, etc., who want or need to work abroad
and at the same time hope to keep close connections to the home
country. The seasonal employment model per se contains this ‘return
perspective’, as the restriction of work permits to six months and the
low wage level indicate. Nonetheless, as soon as this intention to return
is given up and migrants want to settle in Austria, seasonal wages are
no longer sufficient to sustain a living.
Another feature of agricultural work is the close relationship be-
tween employers and employees that arises from the provision of ac-
commodation by the farmers. Often, farmers and their workers live to-
gether in the same farmhouse. This close relationship with mostly one
employer and the need to be available at all times reduce opportunities
to change the job or sector, as migrants hardly have any chance to es-
tablish contacts with other potential employers. This is especially true
for seasonal workers, as their work permits are bound to one employer.
In contrast to other sectors, workplaces in this sector cannot be
found everywhere, as is the case for construction sites, households or
restaurants. Farms are mostly situated in rural and remote areas that
do not allow for the pursuit of other interests in the migrants’ spare
time, the use of resources of established ethnic communities or the es-
tablishment of contacts to employers other than farmers.
This all affects the career perspectives of agricultural workers, but
the possibility of making a career in the agricultural sector is virtually
nonexistent as well. While migrants in our sample reported that they
got progressively more responsible positions or shifted from hard field-
work to in-house activities over time, improved working conditions are
only rarely bound to an increase in salaries. Thus, migrants who want
to get ahead in their occupational career have to change their job as
well as the sector. Especially for those who have settled in Austria, it is
indispensable to have other jobs alongside their agricultural activities,
to supplement their income and to bridge seasonal work breaks.
The end of the transitional regulations on the Austrian labour mar-
ket and further EU enlargement thus will show whether seasonal em-
ployment stays attractive for those who have the right to settle and
work in Austria, or if it is only appealing for those migrants that have
no right to reside or work in the country.
3.9.4 Domestic services
The rapidly growing informal domestic care sector can partly be ex-
plained as a result of the re-privatisation of care work, on the one hand,
and the possibility to employ a migrant caregiver, on the other. The
specific work situation in the private household is the main reason for
many problems domestic workers and care workers have to cope with.
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First, the fact that the job takes place in a household, the private do-
main of the employer, gives the employer the power to structure the
work situation as he or she sees fit; second, the permanent presence
and availability of the worker in a live-in arrangement – both day and
night – clearly clashes with defined working hours; thirdly, because of
its closeness to unpaid reproductive activities, paid domestic work lacks
the recognition of ‘productive work’. The ambiguities the private sector
faces can be illustrated in the expression ‘part of the family’, which is
used by the employers as well as the domestic workers themselves to
describe their employer/employee relationship.
The general trend in paid domestic work can be summarised as a
transition from live-in to live-out employment (Anderson 2000). Only
two of our interviewed au pairs were still working as live-in domestic
workers when we completed the study, whereas all the others had
changed their live-in employment to a live-out arrangement. Four re-
spondents taking care of older and disabled people also worked as live-
ins, but in two of these cases they were women in their fifties whose
centre of interest was in their country of origin. Therefore, a change to
a live-out employment situation did not make any sense for them. The
change from a live-in to a live-out job affects fundamental working con-
ditions: first, the workers enjoy greater personal freedom and privacy
when they rent their own living space. Second, they have control over
working hours. Third, the income level in live-out employment is gen-
erally higher. Fourth, the work tasks and duties are more clearly de-
fined.
Central to the improvement of the working situation in the private
sector, especially of live-in care work, is the recognition of the impor-
tance of this traditionally unpaid women’s work:
If immigration policies recognised the need for immigrant la-
bour in these types of work, providing work visas for such work-
ers, workers would be more effectively protected by labour laws,
including minimum wage laws, protection on hours worked,
and right to privacy (Misra, Woodring & Merz 2004: 8).
Employing a caregiver on a 24-hour basis for a handicapped or elderly
family member is still not compatible with labour standards and for-
eign employment laws in Austria, although the government has at-
tempted to introduce a legal basis for affordable care work and has
twice prolonged a temporary amnesty programme for irregular care
workers until the summer of 2008. While only a few irregular care
workers have taken the offer so far, politicians are recognising the need
for such types of feminised work, and the heightened awareness of ir-
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regular working conditions in this sector has led to an intense, if politi-
cally difficult, search for solutions.
3.10 Career planning in irregular versus regular work
3.10.1 Decision-making processes in an irregular work situation
Given all the uncertainties that have to be taken into account in an irre-
gular work situation, making decisions is no easy matter. How mi-
grants navigate through irregular employment depends on their initial
intentions to work abroad, their individual resources such as language,
professional skills and networks as well as the legal framework that
surrounds them. While every person has to make decisions on his or
her occupational career and future perspectives every now and then,
the difference for irregularly employed persons is that they cannot plan
on a long-term basis. Nothing is set in stone, and unpredictable events
can suddenly change all plans that were made beforehand. This inse-
curity is a direct result of irregularity. As was shown in the description
of working conditions, irregularly working migrants have no secured
rights, no guarantees of being financially secured in the immediate fu-
ture, etc.
Thus, migrant workers are not able to make plans in the long term.
Plans are made for the moment and can be changed as soon as new
perspectives arise. For this reason, answers to questions about future
perspectives are usually elusive.
In sum, I’ve tried not to plan too much, only to put as much
money aside as I can. But any big plans, such as saying this year
I have to achieve this and that, I’ve never made plans like that. I
know that when you plan too much, you won’t succeed. (Male
respondent, Poland, construction)
Another comment very impressively illustrates how pragmatic and
quickly decisions are made. After complaining about deceitful employ-
ers and bad working conditions for quite some time, saying he would
definitely return to Poland in the near future, a Polish construction
worker comes to the following conclusion:
If there would at least be the money, this would be something,
but now, when I can’t even send home money, then it makes no
sense anymore to stay here. […] In case something special comes
up in the next two months, then I will probably stay. (Male
respondent, Poland, construction)
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On this uncertain basis, migrants have to navigate through irregular
employment, taking into consideration factors in both the country they
work in and their home country. Decisions to continue with or quit ir-
regular employment or to change within irregular employment to an-
other employer or even another sector largely depend on the initial ob-
jectives that were connected with working abroad. As shown above,
these motives differ between people of different ages and family status.
In addition, sector-specific working conditions and working possibili-
ties also influence those decisions.
3.10.2 ‘Profiting’ from irregular employment
The migrants in our sample are very conscious about the advantages
and disadvantages of regular and irregular work; some deliberately
decided to work irregularly, while others entered irregular employment
because of a lack of alternatives. Being able to get any ‘profit’ out of
the current working situation is a decisive factor in keeping or quitting
one’s job, returning home or looking for another job abroad. ‘Profit’
can be associated with the fulfilment of financial aims as well as educa-
tional aims, acquiring new skills or family-related aspects.
I could save something and give it to my family as a present,
but I’m not talking about big sums, it was always tight. (Male
respondent, Slovakia)
Irregular employment is often assessed as a good starting point in the
beginning of the migratory project, as long as the overall working and
living conditions are acceptable and the work situation is compatible
with future plans.
For most respondents, earning or saving as much money as possible,
making investments in the country of origin and caring for family
members at home were important motives for working in Austria, and
were thus also decisive in their evaluation of the current work situa-
tion.
My only aim is to earn more money; the means don’t interest
me. I have achieved my goals: I can care for my family very well,
my children get everything they want, and with better education,
they have better chances in their future lives. (Male respondent,
Hungary, construction)
Yes, I’m very satisfied, I’ve already bought a car, in Poland I
would have to work eight years for that. (…) At the moment, I’m
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content with my work because there’s money, that’s the only
thing that counts. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
For others, the principal goal was to overcome insufficient educational
opportunities and inadequate job opportunities in the country of origin
by internationalising, professionalising and acquiring additional knowl-
edge in Austria. This attitude was especially pronounced by students
responding to the current European promotion of student mobility. As
a good example, the summary conclusion of a Slovak student can be
presented. Talking about her future plans and career opportunities, she
stated that moving up in her position ‘is only possible in Slovakia because
that’s where I can utilise my acquired German language skills, which do not
help me any further in Austria’. Several persons currently in training in
Austria mentioned acquiring certain skills, which subsequently should
improve their long-time earning potential in their countries of origin.
Nevertheless, many circumstances can upset migrants’ plans and
goals and render getting profit from irregular employment very hard,
as we have seen with the irregularities on payment. Still, especially for
those who work on their own, working irregularly is sometimes pre-
ferred to registering a trade as a self-employed person. First, getting a
trade licence is very cost-intensive. Second, people have to keep their la-
bour costs low in order to remain competitive. According to one con-
struction worker: ‘When you charge legitimate prices, nobody will hire
you’. Paying taxes is thus considered a disadvantage, because it would
result in an increase of labour costs.
In contrast to those persons, working as a self-employed individual
with a trade licence seems to be very profitable for ‘mediators’ who em-
ploy other migrant workers irregularly. A precondition to become an
‘employer’ is to have as many contacts with potential clients as possi-
ble:
I collected my connections while working for an Austrian-
Hungarian company from 1998 to 2001. I then realised I could
earn more working for myself. (Male respondent, Hungary,
construction)
As we mentioned earlier, the other example is students. Because the le-
gal provision is not specific on their possible engagement in the formal
labour market, students may actually prefer to work unregistered in or-
der to prevent the eventual loss of their residence permit.
Those respondents who had planned to settle in Austria faced addi-
tional difficulties in irregular job arrangements, as their aim to inte-
grate into Austrian society and establish a life in Austria requires high-
er costs, such as expenses for living costs, consumer products, etc. This
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became most obvious in seasonal work, as the legal framework for sea-
sonal work is designed for temporary work arrangements and has spe-
cific regulations for low wages. For people who agreed to settle in Aus-
tria for a full year, for two seasons or more, it is impossible to cover
their costs of living exclusively with seasonal labour. The employment
break in between two seasons makes seasonal work incompatible with
an actual regular life in Austria, especially for those who also have to
care for a family.
As a consequence, migrants have to engage in other irregular activ-
ities as a supplement to their seasonal wages or must try to change to
another sector completely. A Polish respondent worked as a harvester
during the seasons and as a construction worker in between seasons.
Because of family reasons, he finally decided to settle in Austria perma-
nently. This made it necessary to quit his job as a farm worker:
Q: What do you think about the hourly wage of 3.80 euro?
A: Well, let’s say it like this: with the money I earned at the
farm, I could live happily in Poland. But as it is now, I want
to live in Austria […] With this money, this is not possible, I
cannot make a living. You have to earn more, that’s it. (Male
respondent, Poland, agriculture and construction)
Due to the fact that employment in domestic services is regarded as a
temporary project, satisfaction with the overall work situation is largely
related to whether the domestic worker is able to pursue other interests
(e.g. attend university) alongside their employment. This is especially
true for young, highly qualified, single females. Furthermore, live-in
working conditions solve problems of employment and accommoda-
tion simultaneously. For undocumented migrants, the ‘invisible’ work-
place – the private household – protects employees from inspections
and consequently from expulsions. In a live-in arrangement, the mi-
grants save as much money as possible and minimise their expenses.
Therefore, several young and especially single respondents saw em-
ployment in domestic services as a good way to combine living, study-
ing and financing their studies, as well as improving their knowledge
of German. After some time, they generally change to a live-out occu-
pation rather than another sector.
The main goal of my trip was to improve my German, and I’m
sure that I succeeded. I’m also sure I learned a lot about Austria.
I didn’t expect any financial successes, so in this sense noth-
ing really surprised me. […] I can study while working, and I
always have contact to German-speaking people. I also like to
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work with children, so my working situation isn’t too bad.
(Female respondent, 22, Czech Republic, domestic worker)
If a job was not compatible with one’s aims anymore, migrants consid-
ered changing their job. Reasons included monetary issues (low or un-
paid salaries, etc.), but at the same time also difficulties in the relation-
ship with their employers and questions of respect. Respondents who
felt disrespected by employers, who cheated them out of their wages or
exploited a position of power by insulting their integrity in any other
way, were often motives for leaving the job.
I left because the employer was an idiot, or because he had too
high expectations, or because he did not pay well, or did not pay
more for working at night, or because the work was boring.
(Male respondent, Poland, construction)
Nevertheless, a good relationship with the employer can also compel a
migrant to keep the job, even of it is irregular and they do not like the
work very much. This is true especially in the domestic sector, where a
trusted relationship between employer and employee is of significant
importance. Employers sometimes undertake efforts to keep their au
pair, cleaning lady or caregiver and try to improve the working and liv-
ing conditions.
Keeping the au pair even after the contract has run out can be of ma-
jor interest to the host family, because all family members and espe-
cially the children – the main care recipients – are already familiar with
this caregiver and the daily routines in the household are already well
developed. After three months, the employers of a Hungarian woman
decided that they wanted her to stay so they increased her monthly in-
come from 600 euro to 700 euro. After the au pair contract had run
out, they supported and financed her university education.
After the first year, I thought I’d finish with the job, because I
don’t really want to work as a babysitter. […] But I get along
really well with the family, so I decided to stay, even though the
only reason I’m still in Austria is my university education. To
start with a university degree was their idea. My employers sug-
gested that I study in Austria, because they knew that otherwise
I would leave. (Female respondent, 26, Hungary, au pair)
Several of the domestic workers who were employed for some time
with a single employer had the opportunity to live-out in a private
apartment, often rented or even owned by their employers, while work-
ing full or part-time for this family. In general, the women preferred
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living-out because of greater freedom, privacy and control over working
hours. One 23-year-old respondent from Ukraine, who had worked as a
live-in caregiver for two years and recently switched to live-out employ-
ment for several employers, commented on her situation:
Yes, I am satisfied with my current working situation, because I
work and I also have enough time to study, go out and meet
friends. Now that I don’t work as an au pair anymore, I have
much more time to myself, although I earn the same money as
before. (Female respondent, 23, Ukraine)
But even in cases where the migrant workers are not satisfied with
their working conditions and their boss is unfair, they do not always
have the opportunity to improve their working conditions or change
their job. For example, a Polish man who came to Austria in 1997 does
not want to give up the level of stability he has reached with his work.
As he has never changed his job since his arrival in Austria, he is very
dependent on his current employment. For him, a bad job is better
than no job:
Sometimes I thought about changing my job, but I never had an
offer that would have motivated me to leave behind all I have
now. Nobody would guarantee me that I’d have worked non-stop
there. Everything else [other offers] was like it is here, but I have
this job. It’s a steady job. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
3.10.3 Irregular employment as a temporary project
Irregular employment was seen as a temporary project by respondents
irrespective of age, high or low skill levels, working in the public or pri-
vate spheres, on a contract basis or fully unregistered. Most often, peo-
ple agree to work irregularly only until they have accomplished their
aims, for example, building a house back home, finishing university or
earning a supplement to their pension. Nonetheless, as was shown
above, decision-making processes are related to the moment and deci-
sions can be changed according to circumstances. Hence, irregular em-
ployment often becomes a permanent ‘temporary’ project, as the bio-
graphies of those whose aims are strongly connected to projects in
their country of origin demonstrate.
For example, most of the respondents in the construction sector aim
at getting a regular job after the end of the transitional regulations.
Young women working in domestic services – on an hourly basis for
several households, for a single employer as live-out domestic workers
or as live-in caregivers – all defined their current work situation as a
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‘temporary project’. As one respondent observed, the overall aim is to
find a ‘normal job’ afterwards, ‘because I don’t want to do this kind of
work – cleaning and childcare – all my life!’ (Female respondent, 23, Uk-
raine). The young and highly-qualified domestic workers want to keep
on working in the private sector until they finish their university educa-
tion or find access to a ‘better job that is legal and related to my education’
(Female respondent, 23, Ukraine).
Similar to the young women primarily taking care of children, irre-
gular employment also had a temporary character for the two male
caregivers from Slovakia (30 and 35). They had both already taken ac-
tions to leave the private sphere. One had his foreign diploma in health
care recognised and worked in a domiciliary care service, while the
other planned to migrate to London and find work in another sector.
In contrast to the perspectives of the young domestic workers for
whom work in a private household has no future, the elderly care-
givers, aged between 40 and 60, wanted to continue their care-giving
activities until their retirement. For elderly women, especially those
with low qualifications, employment in domestic services means a rea-
sonable income and a possibility to finance their life back in their
home countries.
In Slovakia, women over 45 can’t find any work, they are already
too old. So old women like us have to search for work abroad.
(Female respondent, Slovakia, 50)
As a consequence, this Slovak woman plans to work as a caregiver for
another decade, although she would also prefer regular employment:
I have to work some ten or twelve years more. Then I can finally
retire. As long as Sonja [the care recipient] is healthy, I’ll stay
here and take care of her. When she dies, I’ll have to find work
somewhere else. But I can’t stay at home because I can’t retire
yet, I still have to work and I hope that I can stay in Austria. […]
But I’d appreciate it if we could register this work I’m doing, so
I could pay some money into the social insurance system.
(Female respondent, Slovakia, 50)
3.10.4 Advantages and disadvantages of an irregular employment situation
The advantages that are connected to regular employment (meaning
having a ‘normal’ employment contract) in contrast to irregular em-
ployment (not having any employment contract) are well appreciated.
But only when the disadvantages in an irregular employment situation
start to outweigh the advantages do people consider quitting irregular
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employment. However, this is often easier said than done, as will be
discussed in Section 3.10.5, Attempts to get a formal contract.
By weighing the costs against the benefits of irregular employment,
most respondents would opt for any type of formal, contract-based em-
ployment. Respondents specifically highlighted the rights associated
with formal, contract-based employment as among the most important
potential improvements, as well as the fact that regular employees have
the right to complain in the event of an exploitative situation.
If you work unregistered, you cannot go and complain any-
where, you just have to accept it, live with it or look for some-
thing else. But if you have a contract, you can go and officially
report it. (Female respondent, Serbia)
Another major advantage of contract-based employment was seen in
social security. First, formally employed workers are covered in case of
an accident in the workplace. For those working irregularly, having an
accident means an interruption of income as well as problems in get-
ting medical treatment. Without social insurance, medical treatment is
de facto not affordable, so many people return to their home country to
see a doctor. Since EU enlargement, possibilities of private insurance
have improved and an increasing number of unregistered migrant
workers choose this option. But generally speaking, an accident means
a serious problem.
As soon as somebody offers me a formal job, I’ll accept immedi-
ately. Like with the accident I had: if I had worked legally, I
would have got compensation, and would have been insured.
Then you can live quietly without fear of what the next day may
bring, how to survive. And you don’t have to go to work on
crutches to earn some money because your resources are all
used up. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
This interviewee also addressed the feeling of security that is connected
to having a contract. Permanently being stressed and uncertain about
one’s immediate future and only being able to plan from one day to
the other are considered to be very negative aspects of irregular em-
ployment. This uncertainty also affects the core family, partners and
children. Irregular employment can meet the expectations to care for
the family, but only with difficulties. In the absence of a contract, there
is no guarantee of regularly transferring money to the family. Further-
more, by not having social insurance oneself, it is impossible to pro-
vide it to spouses and children. Therefore, social insurance is often or-
ganised in the country of origin: migrants are co-insured through their
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parents or have taken out a basic insurance policy with minimal contri-
butions in their country of origin. Nonetheless, those arrangements re-
quire investments and are not affordable for everybody:
I don’t have money, so I don’t have insurance, either. For some
time I had it in Poland. My children are insured through my
wife because she worked in the past. (Male respondent, Poland,
construction)
Being separated from the family is another substantial disadvantage
for those who are married or in a long-term partnership. While it
would be less of a problem for the entire family to migrate to Austria
with a regular contract, irregular work in many cases does not even en-
able visits by family members because living conditions are not appro-
priate, for example, when migrants share an apartment with several
others. Consequently, most people with a family plan to return home
sometime in the future, but this contrasts with the need or wish to
earn more money.
I’m satisfied with my work, but I’m not satisfied that I live with-
out my family. […] We talk every evening, but that’s not what I
want. There are two possibilities: either I return home, or I stay
here. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
The lack of social security is also a concern in the long-term future of
migrants. The right to a pension is bound to a regular job. This also in-
cludes pension claims in the country of origin that can be accumulated
with regular working hours abroad (within EU countries, for example).
Therefore, irregular work over a longer period of time means getting
only the minimum pension upon retirement.
Additional social aspects were laid down especially by third-country
nationals who sense difficulties on two sides: legal residence and ac-
cess to the labour market. As a Serbian woman explained:
Contract-based employment is much better! Everything is better.
You earn less but you have certain benefits to safeguard the fu-
ture. I could see my child, as he could come to Austria regularly.
But now I don’t have this possibility. Now my aunt or my cousin
living in Austria has to invite my child to make it possible for us
to see each other. My child also needs a formal invitation to get
a tourist visa. In order to file for a formal invitation, you have to
have a pay slip and a tenancy agreement of three or four
months. I cannot provide these things. (Female respondent,
Serbia, cleaning, catering and tourism)
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The well-being and general feeling of security of migrants is also di-
minished by the permanent, if suppressed, fear of worksite inspections
and their related consequences. On the other hand, this fear has di-
minished with EU enlargement and the associated freedom of resi-
dence for all new EU citizens, as will be shown in the next chapter.
3.10.5 Attempts to get a formal contract
Making a career within irregular employment is fraught with con-
straints and is seen as desirable only when the current working and liv-
ing conditions do not clash with other aims migrants have (e.g. living
together with one’s family).So under specific circumstances, irregularly
working migrants undertake efforts to get a regular job during the
course of their employment. In sum, almost all of the workers would
prefer to have regular work, although some fear not to profit from their
work anymore. At the same time, irregularity generally is considered to
be a ‘temporary’ project.
Nevertheless, there is often an intention to continue to work irregu-
larly at least ‘in the near future’ – which could mean up to ‘the next few
years’ – but still not in the long run. Especially those who plan to settle
in Austria would prefer to regularise their status, while those who plan
to return ‘soon’ or are commuting anyway do not see the need to get a
regular job: here, the principle goal is to ‘come to work in Austria’.
On the other hand, most respondents in our sample wished to enter
the formal Austrian labour market for the reasons that were already
mentioned above: having social insurance, being secured for a longer
period of time, being able to care for the family in the country of ori-
gin, etc.
However, most of the labourers got stuck in irregularity and worked
much longer in an irregular setting than expected. Still, the state of ir-
regularity is not necessarily a permanent one, but people may shift in
and out of irregularity or may be in both situations at the same time,
similar to what is generally known as moonlighting and is equally ap-
plicable to the non-immigrant workforce. But for some immigrant em-
ployees, this is not voluntary in the least. Take immigrant students, for
example: due to the specific restrictions in accessing the formal labour
market, they are not allowed to have two jobs above the social security
threshold, as the following example of a Polish student illustrates:
Now I have a part-time contract and I earn approximately 280
euro a month. Based on this contract, I also have accident insur-
ance covering accidents on the job. It was not easy to get this,
but my employer, the lady in the hotel, helped me a lot. Gener-
ally everything is fine now. The only thing that makes me angry
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is that for a second small employment, I was told that as a for-
eign student I’m not allowed to have a second employment.
(Female respondent, Poland)
When presenting oneself to a possible employer, insufficient language
skills severely obstruct negotiations with employers from the very be-
ginning.
It took quite some time until I found a job, most probably be-
cause of my bad German. Then I found a Polish pub on the In-
ternet. I called and had the interview, presented myself and it
went fine. (Female respondent, Poland, catering and tourism)
...I also speak German quite well. Now it’s no problem anymore
to look for work. Thank God it now works with the language,
without language it’s difficult to find work. You have to speak
well. No language always means problems. (Male respondent,
Poland, agriculture and construction)
With the exception of employment in ethnic businesses, where the in-
sufficiencies of the language skills would not be as significant, this was
often the case when trying to enter employment based on a legal con-
tract or with an Austrian employer.
Nevertheless, language skills may facilitate getting a regular contract
but are by far no guarantee. Interviewed migrants stated that regular
and ‘skilled’ positions are still restricted to Austrians or long-term im-
migrants such as already established Turks or Yugoslavians.
Still, sound knowledge of the German language was considered a
key competence to get out of short-lasting, low-skilled, badly paid posi-
tions. In catering and tourism, this took the form of changing from an
invisible position (e.g. as an assistant in the kitchen) to a waiter or
waitress dealing directly with customers.
In the construction sector, German language skills were considered
helpful in developing from a manual labourer to an employee assum-
ing certain responsibilities. This could be translating between collea-
gues with little knowledge of German and employers, or getting in con-
tact with clients and thus developing one’s own recruitment networks.
In short, German language skills allow for advanced responsibilities
and coordinative and administrative tasks.
After a few hours, I noticed that the other Hungarian workers
who were employed illegally there could not speak German that
well. So I had to help with translation everywhere, and I didn’t
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have to do so much manual labour. (Male respondent, Hungary,
construction entrepreneur)
Moreover, in the construction sector, German language skills were also
presented as a precondition to become a mediator or ‘employer’ oneself
and thus profit by organising and distributing work. To be able to deal
with architects, real estate owners, etc., one has to have sound knowl-
edge of the German language.
Although in domestic services women can find work with no or very
low language proficiency, finding work in the formal health and nur-
sing sector also requires good language skills, even in those cases
where caretaking activities predominate.
Employers are important players in regard to regularisation efforts
under current foreign employment laws. Some migrants reported very
positive experiences with their Austrian employers. In other cases,
especially in seasonal work, employees explained that the employers’
hands were tied to the seasonal workers regulations, awarding only a
limited number of seasonal workers to every employer. If the quota
was already exploited, there was nothing to be done.
Yet others stated that although their employers often have the possi-
bility to register them in a regular way, they are not willing to do so.
If you’re an ordinary Polish citizen and would like to find a reg-
ular job, this is very hard, because nobody really wants to apply
for your registration. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
The very weak legal position of irregularly working migrants makes
them vulnerable to exploitation by their employers, who take advantage
of their employees’ marginal position.
I think the boss could employ us legally if he wanted to. You
hear about that. But he doesn’t want to, because why should he
pay more taxes? Besides, he’s afraid that we’d run away and get
a new job as soon as he’d registered us. (Male respondent,
Poland, construction)
To avoid this, employers often feed the employees they hire irregularly
with hope, saying that they would register them officially if they had a
work permit: ‘Many employers tell me that they would immediately
register me if I had a work permit’ (Male respondent, Poland, construc-
tion). Unfortunately, in most cases this is a false promise. For the most
part, employers try to shift their responsibility for regular working con-
ditions to someone else.
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Another paradoxical situation that emerged from the migrants’ at-
tempts to regularise their working status was that employers asked for
working experience in Austria as a precondition for registering them.
But even when a migrant has worked in Austria for years, he or she
cannot prove this experience because irregular employment is not re-
gistered.
The absence of working papers also poses difficulties to women
working in domestic services, as it binds them to a specific employer
and makes it even more difficult to find regular employment.
I don’t want to work illegally forever, as this is a great insecurity
for me. If my family would register me, even for a couple of
hours, I would already have proof that I cared for a handicapped
person, and that would prove my work experience when I’d be-
gin my studies. With papers, it’d be easier to find a regular job.
But they won’t even bother, although I talked to them about it
several times. (Female respondent, 24, Poland)
Although a regular contract is generally a hot commodity, specific cir-
cumstances can cause migrants to reject the offer for a regular job. In
one case, a Polish construction worker got a regular job offer in the
1990s, but he rejected it because he intended to return to Poland very
soon. When he ended up getting divorced, his plans changed and he
regretted this missed chance.
I was asked twice whether I wanted to have a regular job, to be
registered. I always thought, why do I need that? I’ll stay here
for another half a year and then go back, because I had my fa-
mily in Poland and a small child. I really regretted having de-
clined this offer, as it has become increasingly difficult to get a
work permit over the course of time. (Male respondent, Poland,
construction)
3.10.6 The case of the domestic service sector
Due to the restrictive labour migration policies in Austria, work in the
domestic service sector rarely allows for a regular career. It is interest-
ing to note that all female childcare-giving respondents in their mid-
twenties except for one had pursued a university degree or higher edu-
cation in Austria. Due to their status as students, they met the condi-
tions to get a limited work permit. Taking into account that the inter-
viewed caregivers had the right to work legally at least for several hours
a week, none of the women was offered regular employment in the do-
mestic sector. At the same time, except for one case mentioned below,
196 MIGRATION AND IRREGULAR WORK IN AUSTRIA
none of the other women claimed to be employed regularly in the do-
mestic sector. This fact has to be analysed in connection with the low
status of domestic work. Domestic work is rarely part of the women’s
self-definition, but rather they see it as a temporary work project and
not a desirable occupation (see also Caixeta et al. 2004). When domes-
tic workers tried to find regular employment, it was mostly in other
sectors ‘outside’ the private sphere.
The only exception in our sample concerns a Polish woman who
worked as a live-out for several employers and registered a trade licence
for a ‘cleaning company’ after May 2004, semi-legalising her working
status in the process. As we have seen above, this practice is generally
more widespread in the construction sector.
3.10.7 The case of students and seasonal workers
Irregular employment of students and seasonal workers, but also of
part-time employees, differs from other forms of irregular employment
as those persons in principle have formal, if limited, access to the la-
bour market.
Although there are many cases in which employees gained legal ac-
cess by registering at an Austrian university, their working situations
did not change all that much. Still, this regularisation was for the bene-
fit of both sides. First, third-country nationals could legalise their resi-
dence status by means of a student residence permit. Second, health
insurance was covered at relatively low costs. In the care sector, some
of the employers would even pay the insurance fee. Third, the future
perspective of acquiring a higher education that would pave the way
for a better-paid, high-status job, either in Austria or elsewhere, in-
creased the workers satisfaction with their current situation. And yet,
and most importantly for the care sector, the employers could be more
or less sure that their caregiver would stay in Austria as long as the
university education would last, and would most likely continue work-
ing in their household.
For seasonal work, too, the central ‘plus’ is the basis of regular regis-
tration. Although seasonal work is considered poorly paid, in the end
most seasonal employees are registered and insured and do not have to
fear inspections. Despite the low wage level, migrants keep their seaso-
nal contracts in order to have access to the formal labour market (albeit
limited access), a regular residence status and social insurance. One
seasonal worker who is also employed irregularly in the construction
sector as a supplement to seasonal work stresses the importance of
being registered:
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I don’t want to work unregistered permanently. It’s just tempor-
ary, until the season starts again. [...] I’m also afraid that my fa-
mily and I would be deported to Ukraine again in the case of an
inspection. You risk too much, even if you can earn more this
way. (Male respondent, Ukraine, agriculture and construction)
For people without access to the formal labour market, seasonal labour
is often the only way to get a regular contract. Thus, it seems paradoxi-
cal that this regular job does not suffice to sustain a life in Austria. ‘It
is hard sometimes; one has to work longer; there is much work to do.
Nonetheless, you are not able to make any savings’ (Male respondent,
Ukraine).
Even for those who are exclusively engaged in seasonal work and re-
turn to their country of origin afterwards, seasonality does not only im-
ply advantages. Especially those who have a family appreciate the sea-
sonal break in order to see their families and take care of matters in
their countries of origin. Nonetheless, no one can get a definite com-
mitment to be able to return the following season. Recruitment for the
next season sometimes happens on very short notice, so migrants have
to leave their families behind and return to Austria with almost no
warning.
[...] my boss needed somebody to clean the house for the person-
nel. She called and asked, ‘Can you come? We need somebody
for the cleaning.’ So I had to come again in February, while I’d
only returned home in December. (Female respondent, Romania,
agriculture)
Regular access to the labour market is a precondition for occupational
mobility and the changing of jobs. As a construction worker states,
‘Everything has to be able to advance.’ People working as students in ca-
tering and tourism or in other sectors can make use of this regular ba-
sis, but the seasonal employment model excludes such an advance.
Seasonal employment does not result in further access to the formal la-
bour market as it is excluded from the ordinary regulations on the em-
ployment of foreigners. Thus, the expectations of a Bulgarian seasonal
worker of getting a better job upon losing seasonal work will not be ful-
filled:
I’d try to find something else in Austria. I think I have a visa
and I’m registered at the employment agency. That’s why I can
find another job easily. (Male respondent, Bulgaria, agriculture)
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3.11 EU enlargement and its impact on irregular employment of
migrants
Ahead of enlargement of the EU in 2004, politicians and the media
predicted dramatic impacts of this development on the Austrian labour
market. Prognoses like the ‘flooding of the labour market’ dominated
the reporting on the new states joining the EU. Therefore, transitional
regulations for protecting the Austrian labour market were put in
place, restricting the rights of new EU members to enter the labour
market. As EU enlargement has not brought access to the labour mar-
ket for all our interviewees so far, this report now asks what EU enlar-
gement has really changed for irregular workers from new EU Member
States as well as for third-country nationals who are irregularly em-
ployed in Austria.
3.11.1 Irregular employment before EU enlargement
Many of the interviewed migrants came to Austria in the 1990s, long
before becoming EU citizens, and before being granted privileged ac-
cess in relation to other foreigners when applying for a work permit.
Migrants from neighbouring countries were all third-country nationals
and thus were not only obliged to have a work permit for employment
in Austria, but also a residence permit to be able to reside in Austria
and move freely in and out of the country.
Regulations on residence differ for each country of origin. While
most non-EU citizens need a visa to come to Austria, some countries
are excluded from this requirement; at the same time, their period of
stay is limited to three months. This variety of regulations makes it
very difficult for migrants to comply with regulations and also for po-
lice to inspect the compliance.
In the 1990s, regularly entering Austria on the basis of a tourist or
seasonal employment visa was a common practice for irregularly work-
ing migrants from the neighbouring countries. Although it was re-
ported to us that the likelihood of getting checked at the borders was
rather small, persons who did not risk overstaying their visa would re-
turn before their visa had expired (or before the three-month period
was over), in order to get the exit stamp and apply for another visa.
Nonetheless, as this became more and more common practice, a solu-
tion to the entering and exiting issue arose in the form of a market for
falsified stamps, sold informally inside the country for about 200
Schillings (about fourteen euro in today’s currency).
It wasn’t easy. In the beginning, I also returned every three
months. Later on, as the relationship with my wife deteriorated,
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I stopped going back. I got a false stamp twice, for 200 or 300
Shillings. In the case of inspections, I could’ve proven that I’d
just arrived. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
To explain how common this practice actually was, respondents re-
ferred to the fact that even foreign enterprises sending their workers to
Austria would make use of such practices for all workers without a per-
mit.
In Hungary, we had a contract with a Hungarian enterprise. But
we had to hide it when crossing the border and immigrate as
tourists. (Male respondent, Hungary, construction)
As tourist visas may be issued rather quickly and in succession, mi-
grants often became ‘permanent tourists’. Today, the following recom-
mendation can be found on the homepage of the Federal Ministry of
Internal Affairs: ‘The Ministry strongly advises against the frequently
used practice of leaving the country at the end of three months and re-
entering the country a few days later’.7
If there were any border controls at all, border they were described
as rather lax harassments, as one Polish worker remembered entering
the country in a bus full of male Polish ‘tourists’:
Upon leaving the country, they often checked the stamps in our
passports that showed how long we’d been in Austria. And when
we came back, they asked, ‘Where are you going?’ Such silly in-
quiries, because it was pretty logical that 50 men wouldn’t come
to Austria to visit someone, but to work. (Male respondent,
Poland, construction)
Especially for younger persons, another way of extending the right to
residence was by applying for a student visa. If the visa was granted,
however, this meant additional obligations, namely the successful com-
pletion of a minimum number of courses.
The first time I had a visa for six months, the second time again
for six months, and then I applied for my student visa. At first
this was only for six months, but then I extended it up to one
year. (Female respondent, Ukraine, catering and tourism)
Another regulation makes it difficult to uphold the legality of one’s re-
sidence status, or at least the resemblance of it. Everybody who stays in
Austria is obliged to appear at the local registration office after three
days of their stay. Thus, not being registered could result in expulsion
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for most migrant workers. Today, this still applies to third-country na-
tionals in some cases. As registration documents were primarily
checked in the public sphere (e.g. at street inspections), migrants high-
lighted that having a registration document was of specific importance
and in some cases even more important than a visa. Thus, many mi-
grants were looking for ways to register themselves, even if they did
not have a long-term residence permit. For example, an easy way to get
registered was to list one’s accommodations as one of the mass dwell-
ings, even when one did not actually live there.
‘It is not that expensive [to live in a mass dwelling], and you can
also register here. For those who work legally, this is very impor-
tant, because you need it [a registration certificate] to get a bank
account. (Male respondent, Poland)
Thus, even today, the registration of one’s place of residence is impor-
tant for migrants from EU countries. First, it is a precondition for get-
ting a regular job or to register a trade licence. Second, it is necessary
for administrative issues, such as opening a bank account or register-
ing a mobile telephone.
In live-in care in the domestic sector, migrants and agencies found a
specific way to handle the restrictions in residence legislation: transna-
tional care circuits. Workers would enter Austria as tourists and only
then contact the Austrian family in need of long-term care. Two per-
sons sharing a workplace could solve the problem of periodic absences
after the visa had expired. While one caregiver would stay in Austria
with the patient, his or her exchange partner returned to the country of
origin and took his or her time ‘off’. After several weeks, or a maxi-
mum of three months, and well before the expiry of the tourist visa,
the exchange person would regularly enter and resume work. This or-
ganisational pattern was encouraged by placement agencies as well as
by informal networks. The advantages of this arrangement are quite
obvious: the workers had a temporary but secure residence status as
tourists; while working in the private sphere, they barely had to fear in-
spections; returning home regularly allowed the caregivers to uphold
contact with family and friends and relax after an intense and exhaust-
ing working cycle. (For further details, see Section 3.8.2 on specific ac-
tors in domestic services).
3.11.2 Impact of EU enlargement on the situation of irregularly employed
migrants
Although regulations on access to the labour market substantially
stayed the same for new EU citizens, EU enlargement and the asso-
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ciated freedom of residence significantly changed the circumstances of
an irregular employment situation. First, it presented the possibility to
freely move (coming, returning, visiting, receiving visits) whenever one
wished; second, the consequences of worksite inspections changed sub-
stantially for EU citizens, as they cannot lose their residence permit
anymore.
While most of the migrants managed to find their way through regu-
lations on residence and employment in some way or other, the story
of a Polish worker is characterised by the results of non-compliance
with residence regulations and their consequences. While he came
from Poland as a refugee in 1989 and even got a regular job in the be-
ginning of his stay, he lost all his residence and work permits through
adverse circumstances. He was deported sixteen times since then, al-
ways returning to Austria immediately thereafter. For him, EU enlarge-
ment is a valuable relief.
I was deported sixteen times. I always slept in parks. No money,
no documents, nothing to eat. Every three months, you had to get
a new stamp [to renew the tourist visa]. Police often came to
check on it. And I didn’t have one. I was deported on 7 April
1995, and I haven’t forgotten it. I was forbidden to enter Austria
for the next five years. I then came back over the ‘green border’.
Four times, five times. In one year, I was deported three times.
The police just laughed, they already knew me. (Male respondent,
Poland, construction)
EU-8 citizens can now travel within the EU as they like and can only
be deported for criminal activities. As a result, they do not have to fear
police inspections on the streets anymore, and border controls are no
longer a threat, either. Therefore, although hopes of getting a regular
job were not fulfilled, EU-8 citizens state that EU enlargement has
made their lives easier.
On the day of accession, I thought that everything would be
better, that there would be some chances of getting a legal job.
In the end, there are no prospects for legal working possibili-
ties. But at least we feel better here. (Male respondent, Poland,
construction)
Almost all interviewees mentioned this ‘feeling better’ as a result of their
legal residence status as the most crucial change in the course of EU
enlargement.
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Maybe there is less fear, although I’m still working illegally.
(Male respondent, Poland, construction)
What has changed certainly is the situation at the borders. Also
here in Vienna, because you used to have to worry about street
controls. This doesn’t happen anymore. (Male respondent,
Poland, construction)
There used to be lots of problems at the border – they always
checked and searched the car. But thank God this has changed.
There are no controls anymore. Now everything is easier. (Male
respondent, Poland, agriculture and construction)
While EU citizens are still not treated equally, mobility rights may help
in feeling safe and at home also in Austria.
It was rather comfortable, because I could feel like I was at
home. Before accession, there was a strict border, which was
feared. […] We then felt like second- or third-class citizens. And
now, of course we’re not like Austrians, but it’s much better.
(Male respondent, Slovakia, caregiver)
Before EU enlargement, travelling between Austria and the country of
origin was not easily undertaken. It was a rather risky endeavour, as
border crossings could always mean the loss of one’s residence rights
or being detected as working irregularly. People had to plan their visits
according to visa regulations, not leaving the country too late though
still just in time not to exhaust the maximum period of stay.
In emergency situations, such as a family member falling ill or hav-
ing an accident, one could not just return to the home country without
putting one’s right to return at risk. The need to return after a three-
month stay could also come into conflict with ongoing work contracts,
which could quickly be lost during one’s absence.
Now it’s different. You can travel as you like. A lot has changed
since EU enlargement. I’m not afraid anymore. I often go
around in my work clothes and I’m not afraid. I’m not a crim-
inal because I work. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
Thus, irregularly employed migrants of the new EU Member States do
not have to fear inspections anymore: border controls and street inspec-
tions are no longer a threat to EU citizens. Since EU enlargement, peo-
ple can feel more secure, also in their daily life on the streets. In the
case of a police check, they just show their registration certificate or
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say they have just arrived to visit somebody, and no further troubles
arise. Also, perspectives of shifting one’s centre of vital interests to Aus-
tria open up.
When I cross the border, it’s easier for me now. He asks what I
am going to do here, and I say that I live here, it’s that simple. I
used to pretend I was only crossing through Austria. I’ve already
been stopped by the police, and I just said, ‘I live here in G.,’
showed them the registration certificate, and they didn’t ask any
further questions. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
However, the transitional regulations and the ongoing restrictions on
the Austrian labour market are assessed very negatively. As one mi-
grant commented: ‘I think EU enlargement has not brought about any ad-
vantages for us’ (Male respondent, Poland). At the same time, there are
concerns that it has become more difficult to find regular employment
since EU enlargement. While some connect registration difficulties di-
rectly to EU enlargement, others see this trend as embedded in a long-
er process of EU-wide integration and migration policies.
The situation has surely changed in Ireland, Great Britain,
France, Spain, et cetera. where it is allowed for the ‘new mem-
bers of the EU’ to work without a work permit. But otherwise
I’d say that in Austria and Germany, the situation has gotten
even worse than it was before. I think it’s nearly impossible to
get a work permit nowadays. (Female respondent, 22, Czech
Republic, au pair)
The forthcoming accession helped people to hang on and wait for bet-
ter times. In the words of a Slovak woman:
I didn’t like my situation at all. But I knew I just had to hang on
for some time until I’d get free access to the Austrian labour
market, as I was already registered for one year. Then I would
have the right to choose a job and say, ‘Now this I don’t like.’
(Female respondent, Slovakia, catering and tourism)
3.11.3 Shifting working opportunities through EU enlargement
Several migrants reported that especially in seasonal work, fully unre-
gistered employment was not as easily found anymore as before EU
enlargement. Nevertheless, those changes were referred to not only in
the context of EU enlargement, but as developments of the last years
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in general. In his reflections about changes after the EU accession of
his country, a Czech migrant who had already regularly worked in Aus-
tria long before EU accession most clearly summarised:
Before, non-registration was almost not an issue at all. It was
just the common practice. (…) It has become much more diffi-
cult to arrange, to organise and to find fully unregistered work. I
always found it, but now you really have to try, in the remote
areas somewhere up in the mountains. Employers probably feel
safer there now. (Male respondent, Czech Republic, catering and
tourism)
Moreover, some respondents, but especially third-country nationals
from the ‘traditional’ sending countries (former Yugoslavia, Turkey)
who already had established working relations in Austria or who were
even holding temporary work permits before EU enlargement, also
sensed an enhanced level of competition.
Now they all ask for a seasonal permit. But I don’t have this
document, this seasonal permit and all that. Many employers
now say, ‘No, there are too many unemployed Austrians,’ so
many natives. First they have the chance to work, then the EU
nationals, then me! (Female respondent, Serbia)
So now, Austrians come first, then people from Poland, the
Czech Republic, et cetera. All of a sudden, so many people have
EU rights and get the chance to work before I do – just because
I’m Serbian, just because of that! I tried to get a temporary work
permit three times, but I was rejected every time. (Female
respondent, Serbia, catering and tourism)
Although some employers apply for the registration of their employees,
this is now often rejected by the labour market service due to the pre-
ferential treatment of domestic and EU workers.
The company would’ve liked to register me, but the regional la-
bour market agency didn’t issue the authorisation. My boss
would’ve liked to register me as an ‘intern’ because I did tourism
school before. But they knew that I’d most probably work much
more than twenty hours, and they didn’t want to allow it. The re-
gional labour agency informed me of this ‘no continuation deci-
sion’ saying that there’s no good reason why I should work in
Austria, as there are enough unemployed Austrians who could
do this job. (Female respondent, Poland, catering and tourism)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM MIGRANT INTERVIEWS 205
Conversely, some respondents from the new EU Member States finally
achieved what had always been hoped for: a formal employment con-
tract. In the words of an emotional Slovak woman who had worked
only unregistered in private households before:
I was cleaning in their home. One day they told me, ‘We’re look-
ing for someone for our catering company, someone from an
EU Member State.’ They told me I should go to the lady who
knows everything about the law and how it works. Then I
started to work. This was the first time I worked legally, and I
had a contract! (Female respondent, Slovakia)
The implications of a formal employment contract were highlighted by
another Slovak woman, who had been registered in a bar and was reg-
ularly cheated out of her salary in the past.
After one year of permanent registration before accession, I
would get a work permit. And I got it last week. For me, this
means that I have much better chances now: I can pay for my
studies and my rent without being scared I’ll end up in a miser-
able situation, like when I had to ask friends to help out with
cleaning, et cetera. The things you do when you can’t get regis-
tered. Now I really feel safe, also in regard to the border control
– it’s just enjoyable now. (Female respondent, Slovakia).
The 2004 EU enlargement also changed some perspectives with regard
to the labour market in the UK and Ireland: ‘If I can’t make it here, I
can always try it in Ireland or Great Britain’ is a common statement mi-
grants make. Even workers in the domestic sphere can now use the
possibility to register for a trade licence – as in the construction sector
– in order to work in private households as a self-employed person.
This is the case of a 30-year-old Polish woman. For her, the trade li-
cence is a possibility to partly legalise her status, and at least, as she
put it: ‘I can now pay my own social security and health insurance’.
In contrast to some expert and media predictions of a ‘flooding of
the labour market’, most of our respondents stated that there would
not be any major changes in regard to who comes to Austria and how
many people would come: ‘The people who want to work here are al-
ready here’ is another frequent statement heard. In addition, the cur-
rent transitional regulations are thought to render countries like Ger-
many and Austria unattractive for new, young immigrants, who would
prefer to work in an EU country with regular working possibilities.
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Regular employment possibilities in other EU countries also open
up perspectives for those who see no perspective on regularising their
job in Austria.
I’m already older now and have to start to work regularly. Before
that didn’t interest me much, but now it does. I also thought
about going to Great Britain, because you can already work leg-
ally there. (Male respondent, Poland)
Furthermore, some students in our sample started to exploit their mo-
bility rights after EU accession and found new ways of escaping the re-
strictive regulations concerning the labour market access for non-na-
tional students in Austria. During their semester breaks, they would go
and work abroad in a third country (preferably an English-speaking
country such as the UK or the United States, in order to improve their
English language skills), using extended networks to find a job. In
doing so, they could save money to finance their studies in Austria.
During my semester break in the summer, I could go to the
United States and Great Britain, where I also worked as a cham-
bermaid. That way, I didn’t have to work in Austria until Janu-
ary. Then my parents helped me out a bit and I started to distri-
bute flyers again, et cetera. (Female Polish student)
During my semester break in the summer, I went to work in
England for all three months. As Poland was already a member
of the European Union, I didn’t need a visa or even a work per-
mit for Great Britain. I could work in a factory and as a cleaning
lady in an office. (…) Because I’d earned enough in England to
survive in Vienna until the next semester break, I didn’t have to
go back to that bar, which actually made me very happy! (Female
respondent, Poland)
In sum, restrictions on access to the labour market connected with the
freedom of residence are often directly related to irregular employment
as such. Irregular employment is thus seen to be facilitated by state
regulations.
It’d be better if the labour market were already open. Then
they’d have all the people together under one umbrella and
they’d know what they’re doing here and who they are. Nobody
would be able to circumvent that anymore. (Male respondent,
Slovakia)
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3.11.4 Impact of EU enlargement on the inspection situation
Since EU enlargement, the inspection situation for EU citizens has
changed completely, reducing the general risk associated with irregular
work in Austria for many. This not only refers to street inspections or
border controls, but also to worksite inspections that are now directed
at the employer and no longer result in the expulsion of irregularly
working migrants. On the other hand, such inspections can still result
in the loss of one’s job, as employers find themselves in trouble with
the law. Hence, inspections can still mean the loss of one’s livelihood.
In whatever case, what migrant workers had to say about inspections
on construction sites before EU enlargement reveals a great deal about
how risky and frightening the atmosphere in irregular construction
work must have been back then:
I was working illegally around 1995 and I got caught. We were
working in Floridsdorf. They had dogs, so we couldn’t run away.
First they put us in jail, then we were brought back to Poland by
bus, in the beginning they even did this by plane [laughs]. (Male
respondent, Poland, construction)
There were cases before where we had to flee on the roofs or we
always had to have a hiding place somewhere. (Male respondent,
Poland, construction)
The secure legal residence status of EU citizens now facilitates the en-
forcement of workers’ rights, which theoretically also exist for employ-
ees hiring irregularly. One Polish man tells about a situation in which,
during the course of a worksite inspection, he charged his employer
with cheating him in wages.
Two years ago, there was an inspection by the tax office. That
was when I worked for the guy who owed me 1,400 euro. When
he saw the inspectors, he disappeared immediately. So I be-
trayed him, I told them everything: that I should get nine euro
per hour and had worked for three months. I also said that he
owed me money and I gave them his address, everything. If
he’d treated me all right, I wouldn’t have done this. But so, then
he had to declare bankruptcy. That was exactly around the time
of accession. And I had no difficulties at all. (Male respondent,
Poland, construction)
Employers and workers are increasingly mutually dependent on each
other, although most employers try to undermine this recently
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strengthened position of workers by prompting them to get a trade li-
cence. Some interviewees stated that activities of inspection bodies
have increased, making it more dangerous for employers to employ
people without any papers. One works for an employer, but is formally
‘self-employed’:
During inspections, there’s always the question about who gave
the assignment and who the employer is. Our boss has ex-
plained to us several times what to do in the event of an inspec-
tion, where we could hide. That when they catch us, it is over for
both of us, us and him. (Male respondent, Poland, construction)
In catering and tourism and, more generally, in seasonal work, respon-
dents explained that since EU enlargement, employers regularly ask
for seasonal documents as a precondition to being employed. Regard-
ing the worksite inspections, some things have still remained the
same. This was also reported for the construction sector in respect to
trade licences. Those working ‘visibly’ would be registered at least part-
time (under the social security threshold), while those working comple-
tely ‘unregistered’ would be carefully hidden and work in less visible
places. Nonetheless, other respondents explained that they were dis-
missed after a worksite control, as employers got increasingly scared of
being punished. They added that unregistered employment is easier to
find in remote rural areas where worksite controls are not to be ex-
pected.
In contrast, people working in private households still feel rather se-
cure (in respect to being inspected) and thus do not consider it neces-
sary to get regular access to the labour market, as one Polish worker
suggests: ‘If you are working privately, how will they find out? Only if
someone denounces you’ (Male respondent, Poland). Private persons
who hire workers for informal jobs in their homes and gardens do not
care about inspections and their consequences, either. According to the
same migrant, he was never even asked by his employers whether he
had a work permit or not.
Notes
1 A rough overview of the most notorious branches and sectors has been obtained
through the preceding Delphi survey. Note: illicit or criminal activities (e.g. prostitu-
tion, drug trafficking and illegal trading activities) were not targeted by the inter-
viewers for reasons of their own personal safety and the special difficulties of access.
2 See Section 1.9 in Part 1 of this report on the regulation of migration and foreign em-
ployment in Austria. In order to qualify as ‘key personnel’ under the annual immi-
gration quota, the prospective immigrant has to demonstrate to the Employment
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Service earnings of at least 60 per cent of the upper threshold for social security con-
tributions, which in 2007 amounted to a 2,304 euro gross monthly salary, fourteen
times a year (Beratungszentrum 2007).
3 Means of proof can include a sufficient balance on a personal account at an Austrian
bank, traveller’s cheques, or indication that a scholarship has been granted.
4 See also Fassmann et al. (2004).
5 We chose to call people who mediate jobs for a return payment ‘mediators’, seeing as
the term ‘client’ is often associated with criminal activities, and other expressions
such as ‘organiser’ are not used in the literature.
6 The social security threshold is the amount below which no social security contribu-
tions have to be paid, except accident insurance, about 333 euro per month. At this
income level, no income taxes are due, either.
7 Source: www.bmi.gv.at/einreise (last accessed on 19 March 2007).
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4 Conclusions
4.1 Integrating research approaches and results
As stated in the introduction, our research project has aimed to contri-
bute to improving the knowledge base in two disciplines: migration as
well as labour market research. More specifically, the main objectives
of the project have been as follows: to fill a major gap in Austrian mi-
gration research; to identify the main underlying factors driving and
sustaining irregular migrant work; to discover fundamental patterns
and structural characteristics of irregular migrant work; to identify
shifts and changes in these patterns and characteristics resulting from
major socioeconomic trends; to determine the impact of successive
rounds of EU enlargement on irregular migrant work in Austria; and
to compare and contrast our findings with the regulatory intentions of
state policies and control mechanisms.
To guide our theoretical interest and the development of our re-
search project, we started off by putting forward a number of hypoth-
eses that constitute something like a guiding principle throughout this
report and the various research methods we employed. We will now try
to assess each of these hypotheses against the theoretical and empirical
insights generated by our research.
1. Due to high income differentials, there is a large potential supply of
regular and irregularly working migrants in Austria from lower-income
countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
In its simplest form, this widely held, almost common-sense view on
migration argues that migration flows are generally from low-income
to high-income countries, and that the income differentials between
Austria and its neighbouring countries are thus a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for regular and irregular labour migration to the coun-
try. This basic argument has been refined in several strands of migra-
tion theories, such as push-pull theories (Lee 1966) and microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic theories of migration (Lewis 1954; Harris &
Todaro 1970; Sjastaad 1962; Borjas 1989). It was later complemented
by more sophisticated approaches (Stark 1991) and the migration-sus-
taining network theories of migration (Massey 1989).
Against this general theoretical framework, there is much empirical
evidence that confirms the importance of income differentials as well
as short geographical distances for migration flows, and for irregular
labour migration flows in particular. For example, while the larger part
of migrants in Germany still stem from traditional ‘guest worker’ re-
cruitment countries such as Turkey and former Yugoslavia (indicating
the importance of state policies and ensuing network effects), migrants
from the neighbouring Central and Eastern European countries ac-
count for the largest share of irregularly working migrants in Germany
today (cf. Alt 2003; Cyrus 2004; Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2004; and others).
The same has been argued for Austria, where around two-thirds of all
migrants originate from the erstwhile labour recruitment countries,
the successor states of former Yugoslavia and Turkey (Fassmann & Sta-
cher 2003; Biffl 2005). And while migrants from the new EU Member
States still make up only a minor part of the foreign population, it has
been suggested that their share is likely to be much higher in irregular
migrant work (Biffl 2001; Jandl & Hofmann 2004).
These views were also shared by the majority of our experts in the
Delphi survey. There was widespread agreement on the following: that
irregular migrant work in Austria has assumed a considerable magni-
tude; that it has significantly grown over the past fifteen years and in
particular since 2004; that it has the potential to further grow due to
EU enlargement and the lifting of transitional regulations on the la-
bour market; and that the majority of irregularly working migrants in
Austria originate from the new EU Member States.
How do these theories, empirical studies and expert assessments
compare to our empirical findings through interviews with irregularly
working migrants? We can say that our results largely confirm the
rough outlines of the theories and evidence sketched above. However,
when it comes to the details, we often found contradictory and some-
times surprising evidence. Our sample selection was deliberately fo-
cused on irregularly working migrants from the new (2004 and 2007)
EU Member States and former Yugoslavia, so the sample composition
does not in itself provide evidence on the geographical origins of the
wider population. Nonetheless, the accounts of our interviewees on
who they work with and which irregular branches are dominated by
which nationalities do provide this evidence – again, largely in concur-
rence with the theory and expert assessments above.
Moreover, the description and analysis of the functioning of migrant
networks provides a central message on the question of the ‘potential
supply’ of irregularly working migrants. This supply (at least from the
new EU-8 countries) is highly ‘elastic’, meaning that new, yet unfilled
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potential job opportunities are quickly communicated along established
migrant networks and are consequently quickly filled by either already
present or newly arriving migrants. To put it differently, there would
be no supply independent of a demand for irregular migrant work.
This brings us to the next hypothesis put forward at the beginning.
2. In certain sectors and branches of the Austrian economy, there is a
considerable demand for irregular foreign labour.
Returning again to the theoretical underpinnings of migration re-
search, there are several influential authors who have argued that irre-
gular labour migration is fundamentally determined by a permanent
demand for cheap labour in industrialised countries. On a general le-
vel, the dual labour market theory (Piore 1979) in its classical (Portes
1997) and modern (Arango 2004) interpretations, as well as the global
city hypothesis (Sassen 1991) and its extension by ethnic economies
(Light 2004) all argue that because the demand for low-skilled, low-
paying and precarious jobs cannot be satisfied by native workers, it is
increasingly satisfied by irregularly working migrants. These migration
theories are complemented by a number of theoretical discussions on
informal labour markets that attribute the demand for irregular foreign
work to certain structural characteristics of labour markets, such as
over-regulation (Williams & Windebank 1998), de-regulation (Talbot
2004), flexibilisation (Overbeek 2002) or globalisation, increasing cost
pressures and other factors (cf. Samers 2005).
These theoretical arguments are too abstract to lend themselves to
operationalisation and evidence-based testing. Empirical studies on ir-
regular foreign employment in other European countries, however,
have produced valuable evidence and have identified a number of sec-
tors and working conditions as conducive to the irregular employment
of migrant workers. For Germany, the sectors and branches most often
mentioned are construction, agriculture, tourism and domestic services
(AKI 2003; Cyrus 2004; Lederer & Nickel 1997; Sinn et al. 2005; and
others). Specific conditions and characteristics conducive to irregular
migrant work are often seen in labour-intensive, physically demanding
and low-qualified work, with a low risk of detection, high seasonal
variability, and tasks that are generally impossible to mechanise or out-
source (Alscher et al. 2001; Alt 2003; and others).
In our Delphi survey, we collected a number of expert assessments
on the most notorious sectors and branches and provided a tentative
quantification of the extent of irregular migrant work for Austria. In
these assessments, construction, catering and tourism and agriculture
surfaced as the most affected branches in the public sphere, while do-
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mestic services (cleaning and home care) were seen as being domi-
nated by irregularly working migrants.
Building our interview sample on these assessments, we were able
to learn a great deal on work opportunities and the demand for mi-
grant workers in these sectors. As our in-depth narrative interviews
went deep into the reasons and motives of workers and their employers
to engage in irregular migrant work, we were able to trace patterns,
structures, forms, characteristics and other previously unavailable in-
sights. One general conclusion from this research is that there is in-
deed a considerable and permanent (if seasonally fluctuating) demand
for irregularly working migrants in a number of sectors and branches
of the Austrian economy. Moreover,the single most important reason
for this demand is the high level of taxes and social security contribu-
tions associated with regular employment (the so-called ‘tax-wedge’)
and, thus, the cost savings associated with irregular migrant work.
As this permanent demand for cheaper irregular labour is the main
driving force behind irregular migrant work in Austria, other factors
and developments assume only secondary importance. Thus, while our
research traces the influence of EU enlargement in 2004 on irregular
migrant work and demonstrates the influence of it on forms, patterns
and employment arrangements, we found little evidence that the over-
all extent of irregular migrant work has fundamentally changed. We as-
cribe this to the observation that – while opportunities have expanded
for many irregularly working migrants and the forms of irregular mi-
grant work have become more complex over the past decade as de-
scribed in this report – the demand side changes only gradually and is
driven by other socioeconomic factors.
To sum up this discussion on the supply and demand of irregular
foreign employment and to assuage fears of a sudden flooding of the
Austrian labour market by irregularly working migrants (whether after
EU enlargement, the lifting of transitional regulations, the lifting of
border controls and so on), we wish to reformulate the two hypotheses
above. We propose to do so with the following statement: rather than
by the supply of irregularly working migrants alone, the structure and
dynamics of irregular migrant work in Austria are equally shaped by a
considerable and permanent demand for irregular migrant work in cer-
tain sectors and branches of the Austrian economy.
3. Irregular migrant work is in most cases accompanied by a de-
qualification of the migrant workers accepting low-skilled work.
There is a wide spectrum of opinions concerning the de-qualification
of migrant workers and especially those involved in irregular work. In
the theoretical literature, one can generally distinguish two positions in
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this respect. While many authors draw attention to the low-skilled mi-
grants working in the informal economy (Bundesregierung 2005),
others (Lederer & Nickel 1997; Stobbe 2004) see them as being above-
average skilled and resourceful and, by necessity, having to accept un-
skilled, low-paid irregular jobs that sacrifice their skills. This process is
seen by Cyrus (2004) and other authors as ‘brain waste’, ‘brain loss’,
‘skill waste’, declassification, depreciation of skills or downward mobi-
lity. Veiga (1999) speaks about ‘domestification’ of migrant skills on
the irregular Spanish labour market. Many of the irregular migrants
mostly concentrated in domestic, agricultural, construction and trade
work lose their previous qualifications and skills and become general-
ists.
A similar opinion was shared by the experts involved in our Delphi
survey and many of the migrant workers we interviewed. Before taking
this assessment/phenomenon for granted, however, it is interesting to
look at it carefully from different perspectives. In many cases, due to
the restricted foreign employment and migration regulations, migrants
do not have any other choice but to accept work below their qualifica-
tions. This is also a distinctive feature of irregular migrant work. And
yet, the skills they brought from abroad have to be seen in the new so-
cial context. As our migrant interviews showed, some qualifications
had nothing in common with the job performed and, in some cases,
the qualifications were not even practiced in the country of origin,
making it difficult to speak about de-qualification through irregular mi-
grant work.
Nevertheless, irregular migrant work is in most cases accompanied
by a de-qualification, as in most cases it is simply a characteristic fea-
ture of irregular work in general, no matter if performed by migrants
or natives. In a modern interpretation of the dual labour market theory,
economic globalisation does not only create opportunities for highly
qualified labour, but it also generates opportunities for poorly qualified
and unskilled workers. In post-Fordist economies, employers find it
beneficial to use cheaper, irregular labour, and the demand for it is
high. On the other hand, due to the restrictive nature of immigration
and labour market policies, this affects migrants the most of all. They
are a particularly vulnerable group, also because they have insufficient
language skills, lack specific knowledge of alternative opportunities,
cannot get their foreign education recognised, etc. Furthermore, this
trend is stronger in respect to migrants with an irregular resident sta-
tus or asylum seekers, where the level of uncertainty and risk are much
higher. Especially regulations regarding the admission of low-skilled
migrants have become more restrictive – hence the demand for irregu-
lar migrants. Local workers may accept such low-paid jobs for a short
time, whereas the differentiating characteristic of migrants is that they
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accept these conditions for a longer period of time (Quassoli 1999),
even if they intended only a temporary migration project at the begin-
ning. This is also an opportunity for low-skilled or unskilled migrant
workers.
Furthermore, there are certain characteristics that make specific
branches and economic activities particularly susceptible to irregular
migrant work – such as a standardised qualification profile in many
low-skilled labour intensive jobs or a seasonal or generally high fluctua-
tion of workers.
In addition, different branches are entered by different groups of mi-
grants for different reasons and with certain distinctive characteristics.
The concentration of migrant workers in particular sectors increases
pressure on both wages and vacancies, especially when unscrupulous
employers exploit the vulnerabilities of migrant workers to drive down
wages and offer worse working conditions. This not only exacerbates a
process of ‘regressive flexibilisation’ within the local labour market, but
it also seems to discourage some employers from investing in work-
force employment. The majority of experts shared the view that the
qualification profile of migrant workers is higher than the nature of
their work in all sectors except private home care, where qualified per-
sonnel perform skilled work even if the employment relationship is
mostly irregular. The strongest contrast between the unskilled nature
of work and the migrants’ qualification was seen in agriculture, house-
hold and cleaning and catering and tourism – thus suggesting a strong
de-qualification effect. Interestingly, the career opportunities are very
much influenced by the sector one is in. Young migrants in domestic
work or catering and tourism have more possibilities for upward mobi-
lity through wider networks and contacts with nationals, as well as
greater opportunities to acquire new skills (sometimes improving ca-
reer potential in the country of origin) than those in the construction
or agriculture sectors.
Another important point worth stressing is the temporary character
of irregular employment, which is often seen as an entry strategy. Reg-
ular jobs are preferred in general, but this is not always the case. Thus,
one could say that the generally observed de-qualification takes place in
a time-limited way, and it is only a part of a migration plan or career
development that fits well with the migrants’ goals. Thus the observed
‘skill waste’ is often temporary,1 though in some cases it can also be-
come of a more permanent nature. This opinion was often shared by
our migrant respondents and is particularly true for young persons
who are still studying when they come to Austria or take up studies
during their stay in Austria. A similar situation is in the agriculture
sector, where the character of work is temporary in itself, even if re-
peated each season over a number of years. In addition, some experts
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pointed out that even when migrants had formally low-skilled jobs,
they sometimes still used their qualifications in their daily work.
In many cases, there is thus not a ‘brain waste’, but rather a ‘brain
change’. Migrants counted the irregularity and official de-qualification
in, while having another motive such as ‘improving German language
skills’ or ‘gaining work experience’. The de-qualification was thus ex-
pected to last only for a short or limited period of time, with the even-
tual goal of improving qualifications and developing professionally. In
many migrant biographies, the advancing in hierarchical structures
was remarkable. The problem with the de-qualification started, how-
ever, in cases when the ‘temporary’ project took on a permanent char-
acter. And migrants almost always believe that return is just a matter
of time. Young migrants, especially, also thus believe it will only be a
matter of time until they gain a better socioeconomic position. They
believe they will achieve this by improving their language skills and
getting additional education, occupational skills and experience.
One more important aspect concerning migrant skills in general is
often missed in the theoretical discussions. In a migratory context, the
recognition of qualifications and credentials is more complex due to
the internationality that is at the heart of cross-border mobility (Csedo
2007). In general, migrants’ qualifications and skills are different in
their national context and the new context of the host country. Zulauf
(2001) acknowledges the employment mismatch originating from par-
tial or non-recognition of foreign credentials on the host labour market.
Others such as Salt (1992) are of the opinion that migrants’ overall hu-
man capital is the object of transfer during the process of migration,
hence employers are concerned with the recognition of the migrants
‘brains’ rather than their qualifications. Significantly, as Csedo (2007)
notices in the case of the UK and what can also be observed in the case
of Austria, employers are skill-based recruiters and job-relevant specific
skills have a higher labour market value than generic educational skills.
Thus, skills in the migratory context are not individual givens, fully
transferable across borders, but they are rather outcomes of negotia-
tions between employer and migrant (Csedo 2007). Therefore, skills
have different values in different places and times, and ‘de-qualifica-
tion’ is a normal phenomenon for many cases in the migration process.
4. Irregularly working migrants in Austria strongly depend on the existence
and functioning of social and family networks and increasingly on
professional networks of illegal job providers as well.
As in most labour migrations, networks play a crucial role in facilitat-
ing the irregular labour migration at many different stages. Networks
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are powerful intermediaries, not only offering migrants-to-be informa-
tion on the opportunities of migration destinations, labour market
needs and housing offers, but also on views, ideas, values and beha-
viours in destination countries. In all these functions, networks can
help to reduce the social, economic and emotional costs of migration,
as argued by the proponents of migration network theory (Faist 1997;
Light & Bhachu 1993; Massey 1989). Sociologists use the term ‘ex-
change theory’ to describe how people engage in social relationships in
order to benefit from them. Based on kinship and trust, networks of fa-
mily and friends constitute the core of migrant networks, in general,
though especially for those in an irregular situation. They are charac-
terised by strong ties of interpersonal relationships, while ethnic net-
works are based on weak ties of common heritage. This opinion is
shared by our experts as well as our interviewed migrants, and is also
prevalent in the theoretical debate. Irregularly working migrants in
Austria depend on the existence of these networks with varying inten-
sity over the course of their migration experience. Thus, networks play
a particularly strong role at the beginning of the migration project: for
recruitment and finding housing, for acquiring both general and speci-
fic information and for help in emergency situations. They provide in-
spiration, create ‘fashions’ of behaviour on the labour market and also
shape return perspectives. In general, although most interviewees did
rely on various networks, the most important ones consisted of indivi-
duals they had known from their country of origin prior to departure
and, less importantly, of individuals from the same country of origin
(via kinship and friendship networks) they got to know later on. These
findings are in line with other research. For example, Parre˜nas (2001)
speaks about the ‘dislocation of emotional relations’ as the result of mi-
gration and globalisation. Family and friends often serve as role models
who can have both positive and negative influences on the situation of
irregularly working persons in Austria, supporting but also hindering
their professional development. When it comes to professional develop-
ment, however, it is more often ethnic and linguistic networks – who
enable access to particular job opportunities – that manage to ‘trap’ ir-
regular migrants within their own ethnic and linguistic communities.
In whatever form, the irregularity magnifies the strong dependence
on migrant networks. Where the access to irregular work cannot be
communicated officially, the importance of networks is growing. Thus,
the communication and information strategies take place in an infor-
mal way and depend on them to a very high degree. The insecurity
and the ‘illusionist’ temporariness of the situation require a high mobi-
lity and flexibility, for which network support is of particular impor-
tance. After all, access to irregular work information about job opportu-
nities is usually communicated within established networks, rather
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than advertised freely in front of law enforcement agencies (cf. Doo-
mernik et al. 1997). Besides informal networks of family, friends and
ethnic compatriots, professional networks of labour brokers and people
smugglers also act on the intermediary ‘meso-’ level of migration ac-
tors (Faist 1995, 1997; Heckmann 2004; Jandl 2007; Kyle & Koslowski
2001; Mavris 2002; Salt & Stein 1997).
Commercial networks are generally based on weak ties of common
interest, as well as criminal networks that involve the exploitation of ir-
regular migrants. Alt (2003a) observed that for certain forms of irregu-
lar migration (e.g. irregular circular migration), the significance of pro-
fessional networks has declined as migrants have accumulated their
own migration-specific knowledge and personal contacts. This observa-
tion was also supported by our migrant interviews. Professional net-
works of illegal job providers or job mediators often overlapped with
ethnic networks and were more commonly used for finding irregular
employment in seasonal branches such as agriculture or tourism, as
well as in the care and construction sectors. Several experts in our Del-
phi survey shared this view. Significantly, ethnic and linguistic commu-
nity networks are not equally available in all regions, but are concen-
trated especially in the bigger agglomerations (Vienna, Innsbruck).
This also creates an initially favourable situation for more professional
networks of irregularly acting job providers. Nevertheless, as soon as
migrants have established their own networks, also with or through
their employers, the importance of professional agencies providing ac-
cess to irregular jobs declines. Thus, we can say that professional net-
works of illegal job providers often play an important role for irregu-
larly working migrants at the beginning of their stay in Austria. They
are often used as an entry strategy by new migrants or by those with
very limited opportunities to build up their own social networks. At the
same time, professional agencies providing access to irregular jobs are
also very flexible and can change over time in reaction to the fluctuat-
ing demand for irregular work in particular sectors.
5. Access to irregular labour markets varies considerably according to the
impact of specifically targeted policies (migration policy, labour market
policy, enforcement measures, etc.) and the amount of administrative
and ‘social’ control.
Generally it can be stated that most policies structuring access to irre-
gular employment are not specifically targeted towards irregular em-
ployment or the irregular employment of migrants. It is rather a wider
framework of national and EU-wide regulations that structures access
to irregular employment. Moreover, as also experts stressed in the Del-
phi survey, irregular employment of migrants (non-nationals) is only a
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small part of irregular employment in general. For Austria, this frame-
work structuring the access of migrants to regular and irregular labour
markets consists of regulations defining access of foreigners to employ-
ment and residence in general (Foreign Employment Law and Resi-
dence Law), as well as more specific regulations for certain trades or
groups of people, such as regulations on self-employment, student em-
ployment, au pair or seasonal employment. Those regulations define
what is considered to be legal or illegal employment. (Regulations im-
pacting the situation of irregular employment of EU citizens will be
treated in the next section). Therefore, our experts underlined that in
order to reduce irregular employment, more comprehensive political
measures must be found that go beyond a pure ‘cure for the symp-
toms’. Nonetheless, most of the strategies pursued to reduce irregular
employment of nationals and non-nationals hardly cross this line.
Thus, for example, both our experts and migrants indicated that the
Austrian regulation on seasonal employment, on the one hand, did re-
duce completely unregistered employment in agriculture. On the other
hand, however, it has facilitated irregular employment by providing mi-
grant workers only with a minimum of labour rights and an extremely
low income, making it impossible to sustain a living for those who
want to settle in Austria.
In contrast, employment in the domestic sphere was completely un-
regulated until recently, leaving childcare, care for the elderly and dis-
abled as well as cleaning services almost entirely to irregular employ-
ment. Irregular employment in domestic services, generally not consid-
ered as ‘labour’, only attracted the interest of politicians as migrant
workers were seen as competitors to domestic workers. Political inter-
est in the provision of irregular care services by migrant workers only
increased when the issue ‘exploded’ in the mass media during the
2006 national election campaign, bringing some embarrassing revela-
tions on the use of irregular migrant care workers by prominent politi-
cians along with it. In an intense political debate, neither criminalising
nor permanently legalising irregular care work were seen as political
options, so the government decided to buy time for reflection by estab-
lishing a commission that would come up with sustainable solutions.
For the meantime, a general amnesty until June 2007 for irregular
care workers and their employers (the patients and/or their relatives)
was announced by the Minister for the Economy and Labour, which at
the time of writing – still lacking any comprehensive political and fi-
nancially sustainable solutions – has been extended twice for six
months, first until the end of 2007 and then until June 2008. Despite
this sudden outburst of attention and the various draft laws debated, in
reality not much has changed in the situation of irregularly working
caregivers in Austria so far.
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Besides setting the legal and policy framework, stepping up control
efforts and increasing the level of penalties for irregularly hiring em-
ployers (i.e. employer sanctions) are another strategy to contain and re-
duce irregular employment. While experts and migrants both con-
firmed that increased inspection measures (worksite inspections) in-
crease the risk of irregular employment for employers and employees,
the available evidence indicates that this does not automatically mean a
reduction of irregular employment. Rather, ways of circumventing legal
regulations via semi-legal arrangements are sought out and implemen-
ted. As the many examples of ‘pseudo-self-employment’ in our research
show, despite new legal enactments to clearly distinguish between reg-
ular and pseudo-regular forms of employment, the latter are in reality
very hard to control.
Thus, while the above-mentioned examples show that specific reac-
tive policies and control measures influence the way irregular work is
structured and organised, they do not seem to have a decisive impact
on the extent of irregular migrant work as such. One reason for this is
the simple observation that repressive control measures are quickly cir-
cumvented by employers hiring irregularly and their employees, as
long as the gains of doing so exceed the expected losses. Another rea-
son seems to be the widespread conviction among policymakers that ir-
regular migrant work in many cases solves more problems than it cre-
ates (e.g. in the care sector) and thus deserves a certain tolerance. If
this is so, it might be better to state it clearly rather than spending time
and money on symbolic policies and ineffective control efforts.
6. The 2004 enlargement of the EU had a profound impact on the
structure and dynamics of irregular migrant work in Austria.
The 2004 enlargement of the EU is only one point in a longer process
of economic internationalisation, as well as in the development of the
legal and economic framework within the EU. As explained, the latest
EU enlargement in 2004 introduced various levels of access to the
Austrian labour market, but basically kept the dichotomy between EU
and non-EU citizens. In addition, transition periods with their multi-
tude of inscrutable regulations and exemption clauses for ‘new’ EU-8
citizens render a simple legality-illegality dichotomy insufficient for de-
scribing irregular work (see also Anderson & Ruhs 2006).
Already in an early stage of our research project, several experts par-
ticipating in our Delphi study suggested that over the past few years,
the irregular employment of migrants has occurred in greater hetero-
geneity and that this is related to the enlargement processes. It was sta-
ted that de-regulation processes, outsourcing to sub-companies and the
ongoing liberalisation of the labour market promote irregular migrant
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employment, while at the same time the boundaries between ‘irregu-
lar’ and ‘regular’ work become more and more blurred. Employers and
‘employees’ try to make use of the broad range of legal regulations or
search for ways to circumvent them. Our experts stated that especially
‘grey’ forms of employment such as pseudo-self-employment and the
violation of trade regulations have increased since 2004, mostly so in
the construction sector, which is characterised by internationally com-
peting companies and sub-companies.
This development was also clearly confirmed by statements of irre-
gularly employed construction workers themselves, stating that owning
a trade licence has almost become a precondition to being ‘employed’
irregularly at a company. In seasonal sectors, it was also stated that
completely illegal forms of employment have been replaced by ‘grey’
forms of irregularity, such as by issuing ‘pseudo-contracts’.
The facilitated access of EU citizens to self-employment and their
preferential treatment has clearly contributed to this development. The
increase of pseudo-forms of regularity or irregularity also corresponds
to another assessment of experts, judging that the main motive of em-
ployers to employ irregularly is to save on non-wage labour costs. Pseu-
do- self-employment and insufficient registration of employees passes
those costs along to migrants and relieves employers of their legally de-
fined duties.
In addition, several of our experts stated that the increased availabil-
ity of migrant labour, due to the right for EU citizens to freely reside
and travel within the EU, coupled with the restricted access to the la-
bour market for EU-8 citizens, has led both to a higher supply and a
higher demand (due to decreased risks) of irregular migrant labour in
certain sectors. Generally speaking, our experts assessed that the
amount of irregular migrant work, especially in self-employment, has
increased since enlargement in 2004, except for in the agriculture and
industrial sector. While these claims are not directly verifiable through
our migrant interviews, many migrants reported that they did not no-
tice any significant changes in the amount of irregular work among
their own networks and certainly no big increases or decreases around
the time of EU enlargement in 2004. The general conclusion on the
above hypothesis is thus that the 2004 EU enlargement certainly had a
profound impact on the structure of irregular migrant work in Austria
but little, if any, impact on its dynamics.
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7. The ongoing process of EU enlargement has noticeable (substitution)
effects on already-established migrants working both regularly and
irregularly in Austria.
The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements have brought new divisions
within the non-national labour force, privileging ‘new’ EU citizens over
third-country nationals, even if access to the labour market for both is
currently restricted. For these two groups, changes associated with en-
largement are of a different nature: for EU-8 citizens, EU enlargement
is associated with freedom of residence and movement, while access to
the EU labour markets has become arguably more difficult for third-
country nationals.
Thus, interviewees coming from the ‘new’ EU countries stated that
EU enlargement has profoundly changed their life. They can now
move freely between their countries of origin and Austria, not having
to fear border controls or the consequences of police inspections (ex-
pulsion) anymore. Furthermore, they no longer have to invent strate-
gies to keep their residence status legal, such as through becoming per-
manent commuters travelling back and forth every three months or
using falsified stamps. Overstaying is no longer a problem. This right
to stay has resulted at least in a ‘better feeling’ as stated by many new
EU citizens in our interviews, even if nothing has changed in respect
to their access to the labour market. As our experts in the Delphi study
suggested, the risk connected to irregular employment has also subjec-
tively diminished for the EU-8 citizens. Most were conscious of the fact
that, first of all, they cannot be deported anymore and, second, in the
event of worksite inspections, their legal residence status provides
them with better means to take legal steps against their employers.
Still, worksite inspections can result in the loss of one’s (irregular) job
and thus in the loss of one’s livelihood.
We also noticed that the right to move and settle within the EU has
apparently resulted in an increase of more or less spontaneous arrivals
and stays of younger persons or students, in order to earn some money
for a limited period. On the other hand, for some ‘new’ EU citizens,
the perspective to permanently settle in Austria has opened up. While
the latter project is not bound to a regular job, those who plan to settle
in Austria face additional difficulties in irregular job arrangements, as
their aim to integrate into Austrian society and to establish life locally
implies a higher cost of living.
At the same time, EU enlargement has also resulted in increased
possibilities to work within the EU and thus in other countries than
Austria – in countries not protected by transitional regulations even in
regular job arrangements. Especially students and younger, better qua-
lified persons are reported to make increasingly frequent use of these
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more attractive working alternatives. In addition, possibilities of trans-
national insurance have improved and many of our interviewed work-
ers now have at least basic health insurance, whereas they were work-
ing without any insurance coverage at all for most of the 1990s.
On the other hand, within this ongoing process of EU enlargement,
third-country nationals face increasing difficulties regarding their ac-
cess to the labour market and to the EU in general. Reinforced EU bor-
der controls affect the entry of third-country nationals to the EU, while
they no longer have consequences for EU citizens. Thus, in contrast to
the assessment of our experts, third-country nationals who are still sub-
ject to visa regulations cannot profit from the flexibility implied in irre-
gular working arrangements. In order to keep their right to return to
their home countries or back to Austria, they cannot flexibly travel back
and forth as they wish, even in cases of emergency.
As EU citizens enjoy preferential treatment in almost all areas of for-
eign employment, third-country nationals have almost no chance of
getting a regular or pseudo-regular job anymore. This is especially true
for seasonal labour contracts, which are no longer issued to newly ar-
riving third-country nationals.
Although experts declared EU-8 citizens to be ‘potentially competi-
tive’ with natives and saw them in direct competition with already inte-
grated (legally employed) third-country nationals, this was not directly
confirmed by our migrant interviews. Competition between natives
and EU-8 citizens seems to be marginal and, among EU-8 citizens,
third-country nationals and the additional group of future EU citizens
(i.e. those of accession countries), it seems to occur mostly between
newcomers and in the lowest-skilled segments. Nonetheless, the first
argument appears to be at least indirectly true, as dependent forms of
employment are more and more substituted by often irregular self-em-
ployment arrangements by outsourcing tasks to sub-companies.
For both EU-8 citizens and other migrant workers, however, EU en-
largement has not changed the relatively low chances of making a ca-
reer in a regular or irregular employment situation. EU-8 citizens can
at least wait for the end of the transitional periods on the labour mar-
ket, expecting to then have the possibility to choose and not having to
accept just any job. In this sense, many of our interviewed migrant
workers from the EU-8 expected some future upward mobility over the
course of their stay in Austria and were less willing to accept ill-paid
job offers. Some also complained about workers from other countries
(e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova), who would work for less
money and could not afford to be so picky. In certain sectors, most
clearly in agriculture and domestic work, there was already a noticeable
shift in irregular workers from EU-8 countries towards irregular work-
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ers from Romania, Bulgaria and non-EU countries, a process that can
be expected to accelerate in the coming years.
Thus, the end of transition periods on the labour market for the EU-
8 citizens (whether they will come in 2009 or 2011) will not necessa-
rily mean that irregular migrant work will decrease in general, as a re-
latively constant demand for IMW is met by new sources of supply.
Since 2007, there are already two new groups (Romanians and Bulgar-
ians) that face restrictions on the labour market while enjoying free
movement and residency rights within the EU. Other countries already
enjoy visa-free travel and face few restrictions on entry to Austria. Nor
do EU enlargement and the eventual end of transition periods for
‘new’ EU citizens imply that most irregularly working migrants will
shift from irregular to regular work, even if theoretically they could do
so. After all, this would make them more expensive for employers and
hence negate their main competitive advantage over regular workers.
Hence, for the foreseeable future, many irregularly working migrants
from the EU-8 will remain in an irregular situation while others will
return, become self-employed or get a regular job, in which case they
will quickly be replaced by others irregularly working from more dis-
tant countries.
4.2 Concluding remarks
At the end of this research report, we hope to have drawn attention to
some of the implications of our findings for public policies – especially
those relating to migration and the labour market – for migration re-
search in Austria and elsewhere and for the public debate shaping atti-
tudes on irregular migration and irregularly working migrants.
As we have seen throughout this report, there are many underlying
reasons for the occurrence of irregular migrant work that together ac-
count for the significant extent of the phenomenon in Austria. Never-
theless, while an adequate supply of foreign workers willing to work in
Austria irregularly, often under difficult, unpleasant and physically de-
manding conditions for low wages, is a necessary condition for irregular
migrant work to occur, it is not a sufficient condition. For irregular mi-
grant work to occur, a demand for the services of irregularly working
migrants is also necessary. Both elements are currently present in Aus-
tria to a considerable extent.
Both the supply side and the demand side are in turn determined by
a number of factors, and we have encountered many throughout our
research project. On the supply side, migrants bring with them a mix
of motives that together account for their mobility and activity deci-
sions – the wish to earn a higher income, generate savings, support
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their families, have new experiences, learn foreign languages or get an
education abroad. On the demand side, there are at first sight also a
number of determining factors – the non-availability of native workers
in certain occupations, the need for flexible workers on short notice,
the non-affordability of regular personnel, etc. In the end, however, all
these factors boil down to one central factor: irregularly working mi-
grants are simply less costly to hire for their employers than regular
(native or migrant) employees. And the main reason for this cost ad-
vantage of irregularly working migrants is not necessarily their lower
wages (as we have seen, skilled irregularly working migrants can earn
net wages comparable to those of regular workers), but the fact that
their wages are not subject to taxes and social security contributions,
two factors that enormously increase the wage costs for employers.
We do not wish to go into an argument about formal exclusion and
exploitation here, and we recognise that to a certain extent non-wage la-
bour costs are a necessary contribution to the maintenance of the social
welfare system in our market economy. Still, this is the evidence: em-
ployers do not irregularly hire migrant workers because they are avail-
able, more pliable, more dependent, more flexible, more versatile or
harder working (they usually possess all these traits, too), but because
they are cheaper to hire than regular employees. Nonetheless, before
rushing to premature conclusions, we should take a closer look at who
the employers are. Certainly there are many among them who are
criminal entrepreneurs and use irregular migrant labour to increase
their tax-free profits (especially in branches such as construction and
industry). Then there are many small- and medium-sized entrepre-
neurs (e.g. in agriculture, catering and tourism), who feel strong cost
pressures and hence the need to opportunistically use flexible and less
costly irregularly working migrants. But there are also a great number
of private households that benefit from irregularly working migrants,
in areas such as home renovation, cleaning, childcare or care for the el-
derly. When irregularly working migrants provide services such as
childcare and health or elderly care in private homes, they also help to
alleviate the shortcomings in the public provision of these services (e.g.
nursing homes for the elderly or nursery schools) in Austria. This ir-
ony – irregularly working migrants as both supporting and undermin-
ing social welfare systems – illustrates the complexity of the issue and
the difficulties of designing sensible policy interventions in this area.
When talking about irregular migration, ten to fifteen years ago the
most pressing issue was the overburdening of asylum systems across
Europe and – though it certainly existed – there was less concern about
irregular migrant work. The concerns and problems surrounding asy-
lum seekers have since been substantially reduced, and the next big is-
sue (at least in many Western European countries, including Austria)
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was the enlargement of the EU to the East and the resulting implica-
tions for East-West migration and labour markets. To alleviate pres-
sures on native workers, temporary restrictions on the access to labour
markets were put in place in twelve of the EU-15 countries in 2004,
and Austria (as well as Germany) has been one of the countries deter-
mined to prolong these transitional regulations as long as there is a
serious risk of labour market disturbance.
At the same time, the 2004 EU enlargement also had consequences
for irregular labour markets in Austria (and elsewhere in Western Eur-
opean countries), which has raised new concerns among the public. As
we have seen, however, it is not so much the extent of irregular mi-
grant work that has experienced fundamental changes since 2004, but
rather the forms it takes on. Thus, both migrants and employers have
used emerging opportunities to circumvent legal regulations and policy
intentions, and a number of semi-legal or quasi-regular forms of irre-
gular migrant work have gained prominence. This should not be sur-
prising: both migrants and employers are innovative human actors and
are constantly searching for ways to adapt to changing economic, legal
and institutional circumstances to achieve their respective goals.
But while the forms and organisational arrangements of irregular
migrant work have changed, its basic determinants have remained
fairly stable. We do not know how irregular migrant work will look ten
to fifteen years from now (it will very likely appear in very different
forms yet again), but we know that it will exist as long as there is a de-
mand for it. And from all we have learned in our research, we are con-
vinced that the uses of irregularly working migrants are by now so dee-
ply ingrained in various areas, branches and sectors that this demand
is very likely to persist over the coming decade. But what if the current
workers from Austria’s neighbouring countries are no longer coming
to Austria because they find better opportunities at home or elsewhere?
Then again, we expect the market mechanisms to do their work by re-
placing current workers from Central European countries with workers
coming from countries further East, a development already visible in
some segments of irregular labour markets.
All of this, of course, raises the question as to what policymakers
can reasonably do in order to address irregular migrant work. Above
all, they should carefully consider all possible consequences of their
policy interventions before publicising or promoting them, as the mea-
sures they adopt will eventually lead to direct as well as indirect and,
very often, unintended consequences. This is all the more so, as both
irregularly working migrants and their employers will certainly react to
restrictive or inconvenient measures and develop new ways and means
to circumvent them. At the same time, both can be expected to use
new legal opportunities and favourable options to their advantage. The
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challenge is thus to design policy measures that use this active capacity
of their target groups by aligning expected behaviours with motives
and incentive systems (incentive-aligned policies).
To design policy measures that are effective as well as incentive-
aligned is not an easy task, especially in such a complex and largely
hidden area as irregular migrant work. Using the insights and evidence
collected in this research project is only a first step. The next step is to
develop concrete evidence-based policies that are flexible enough to
adapt to a frequently changing phenomenon. Finally, the real challenge
is to implement them.
What could such policies look like? Without going into detail, it is
unlikely that extreme policy measures will reach their goals in an area
as complex as this one. For example, throughout this report we have
seen that inspection measures alone have only limited effectiveness.
Thus it is unlikely that multiplying inspection measures by a factor of
x (whether x times more worksite inspections, more internal controls,
stricter border controls, the introduction of more generalised bio-
metrics, etc.) will decrease the extent of irregular migrant work accord-
ingly, as both migrants and their employers will invent new ways of
evasion. The same, of course, is true also of extreme policy measures
on the converse side. For example, simply regularising all irregularly
working migrants is unlikely to solve the problem, as this does not re-
move the underlying reasons for the demand for irregular rather than
regular workers; quite simply, the latter are less expensive. We may
thus expect that regularised migrant workers would become too expen-
sive for many employers and would be laid off and then replaced by
other irregularly working migrants.
Likewise, from what we have learned from our own research, we can
also expect that isolated or one-sided policy measures will not be effec-
tive and may even be counterproductive. To take up the example of the
recent policy proposal of the European Commission cited in the intro-
duction, the explicitly stated rationale of this proposal is to reduce the
pull factor of irregular work for illegal migration by ‘targeting the em-
ployment of third-country nationals who are illegally staying in the EU’
(Commission of the European Communities 2007a: 2). To do so, the
Commission proposes mainly to harmonise (i.e. presumably increase)
employer sanctions (including the adoption of criminal sanctions for
certain infringements), increase employers’ responsibility for checking
work documents and dramatically step up inspections of worksites.
Nevertheless, while it is doubtful if these measures, which are likely to
cost billions of euros to implement, will reach their desired goals, there
are no indications in the policy proposal that thought has been given
to any unintended consequences that the planned interventions are
likely to engender. This is unfortunate, as we have shown time and
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again in this research report that irregular employers and employees
(and migrant workers are no different in this respect) are likely to react
to stronger control measures and harsher sanctions in all kinds of eva-
sive ways, thus counteracting the effect of the control measures and
sanction regimes. Moreover, our case study has also shown that third-
country nationals are not a major factor in overall irregular migrant
work in Austria (and the situation is likely to be similar in most EU
countries), thus targeting only third-country nationals is too one-sided
and isolated a measure to say the least. It would be better to take a
comprehensive approach towards irregular migrant work as an integral
part of the informal or ‘shadow’ economy of many states, rather than a
single-issue approach. At the same time, broader policy measures that
consider the full structure of the economic and regulatory system are
called for, ones that are appropriate to address the underlying forces of
supply and demand for irregular (migrant) work.2
If extreme policies to address irregular migrant work are unlikely to
be effective, we should look for a number of medium-range policy in-
struments that together can make an impact on policy outcomes. In
our Delphi study, we discussed a number of proposed policy measures
as seen by our experts, so we will thus not repeat them here. Rather,
we wish to add one final observation on the nature of the policy mix
available to policymakers: policies aiming to reduce irregular migrant
work can address either the supply, demand or repression side of the
equation, but up to now the focus was almost exclusively on repres-
sion. While there is not much within the sphere of Austrian policy-
makers that can be done on the supply side, more efforts should be de-
voted to the demand side. What, if anything, can be done to reduce the
demand for irregular migrant work? The answers could be conven-
tional (employer sanctions, fines) progressive (more nursery schools,
public nursing homes for the elderly, innovative (tax breaks, so-called
household service cheques) or even futuristic (tele-home care), but they
will all have to deal with one fundamental issue – the different and of-
ten opposing interests of various groups in society affected by such pol-
icy measures.
In this sense, effectively addressing irregular migrant work is not
only an issue concerning the interests of ‘those’ irregularly working mi-
grants. It is an issue that reaches deep into the interests and political
stakes of various groups in Austrian society itself.
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Notes
1 See also Fassmann et al. (1995).
2 The European Commission itself recognises this in another recent communication
on policy measures against ‘undeclared work’. In this communication, which is not
concerned with migration but the economic and fiscal systems, alternative ap-
proaches such as ‘reducing the financial attractiveness of undeclared work stemming
from the design of tax and benefit systems’ and ‘administrative reform and simplifi-
cation, with a view to reducing the cost of compliance with regulations’ are empha-
sised (Commission of the European Communities 2007c).
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Annex
Annex Political measures to reduce irregular migrant work: Expert evaluations in
Delphi 2
Policy option Feasibility Yes No Don’t know Total
Desirability Yes No Don’t know Total
1 Opening of the labour market for certain
occupations
Feasibility 16 4 2 22
Desirability 15 5 2 22
2 Opening of the labour market for certain
groups
Feasibility 21 1 0 22
Desirability 16 3 3 22
3 Regional opening of LM by branches and
occupations
Feasibility 14 6 2 22
Desirability 10 11 1 22
4 Early phase-out of transitional rules Feasibility 9 12 1 22
Desirability 10 12 0 22
5 Liberalisation of current labour standards Feasibility 14 5 3 22
Desirability 2 17 3 22
6 Adjusting minimum wages downwards Feasibility 6 13 3 22
Desirability 0 20 2 22
7 Merging of the right to reside and the right
to work
Feasibility 18 4 0 22
Desirability 16 4 2 22
8 Increasing state-funded care allowances Feasibility 7 14 1 22
Desirability 17 3 2 22
9 Switching from cash to in-kind care
allowances
Feasibility 14 7 1 22
Desirability 20 2 0 22
10 Providing access to the LM for foreign
household helpers
Feasibility 14 3 5 22
Desirability 17 1 4 22
11 Combination wage for low-wage jobs Feasibility 15 4 3 22
Desirability 8 11 3 22
12 Sanctions or fines against irregular
migrant workers
Feasibility 16 4 2 22
Desirability 5 16 1 22
13 Strengthen legal support for irregular
migrant workers
Feasibility 16 5 1 22
Desirability 18 3 1 22
14 Creation of specialised advisory services Feasibility 18 2 2 22
Desirability 18 3 1 22
15 Mandatory role for trade unions in legal
proceedings
Feasibility 11 10 1 22
Desirability 15 6 1 22
16 Skimming off profits Feasibility 8 12 2 22
Desirability 17 3 2 22
17 Exclude offenders from public work
contracts
Feasibility 14 4 4 22
Desirability 14 4 4 22
18 Common EU framework for combating
irregular work
Feasibility 12 6 4 22
Desirability 16 3 3 22
Annex Political measures to reduce irregular migrant work: Expert evaluations in
Delphi 2 (continued from previous page)
Policy option Feasibility Yes No Don’t know Total
Desirability Yes No Don’t know Total
19 Approximation of economic framework
conditions
Feasibility 10 9 3 22
Desirability 14 6 2 22
20 Raising awareness among irregular
employers
Feasibility 11 7 4 22
Desirability 16 3 3 22
21 Strengthen control systems through
modern technologies
Feasibility 12 7 3 22
Desirability 3 18 1 22
22 Faster recognition of foreign diplomas Feasibility 18 2 2 22
Desirability 16 5 1 22
23 Legalisation of irregular migrant workers Feasibility 14 7 1 22
Desirability 14 6 2 22
24 Better networking of labour market
institutions
Feasibility 18 1 3 22
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